In a continuation from his last article, Russian opposition leader Garry Kasparov argues that many of the country’s prominent public figures who purport to be part of the liberal intelligentsia have more in common with the ruling regime than they’d like to admit.

A Niche of Comfort
Putin’s system painstakingly mimics political liberalism
By Garry Kasparov
February 4, 2011
Kasparov.ru

The more obvious the aggressive essence of Putin’s regime becomes, the more that parallels with Rasputin’s influence over the imperial court, which conclusively discredited the tsarist regime and made support for the monarchy impossible for the cognizant part of Russian society, come to mind. This is what I wrote about in my previous article. However, today, as opposed to events from a hundred years ago, there’s a clear answer to the question of what more needs to be done to the regime so that people who are used to calling themselves liberals stop supporting it. Unfortunately, they and the people who see themselves as part of the apolitical intelligentsia have no such boundaries. They are so accustomed to their existence within this frame of reference that their own reputation lost any kind of meaning long ago. It’s easier to live in a state of permanent comfort without one.

Nevertheless, the verdict in the second Yukos trial and the New Year’s Eve arrests of opposition leaders provided a reason for certain people to state their positions. But Akunin’s “amputination” sounds dissonant compared to statements by liberal advocates.

Arkady Dvorkovich, a conspicuous bureaucrat “from the presidential team” who loves to talk about himself, is hardly worried by the lawlessness in the Khamovnichesky Court or the general collapse of the judicial system. For him, the main issue is to prepare another modernized striptease in Davos so that western cash flows continue to replenish the accounts of the boss and his faithful associates, who are clearly sliding into poverty.

Yevgeny Yasin, with persistence worthy of a better cause, does not tire of convincing us that Russia has created a market economy. Again – the lack of independent courts, obviously, fully corresponds with his idea of a market. The main problem that worries this systemic-liberal ideologue is high state expenditures; he mentions corruption perfunctorily and passes over Khodorkovsky and Lebedev’s sentence in embarrassed silence. Dvorkovich also calls for cuts in state spending, but at the expense of the students. Putin’s billionth mansion in Novorossiysk, strange as it may seem, turned out to be an eyesore they just couldn’t see.

The Presidential Council on Civil Society and Human Rights, which was given permission to write an expert analysis of the Yukos affair, is so oblivious in its joy to any boundaries that its sense of respect for the current judicial system overshadows its sense of respect for the law. As [former deputy finance minister Sergei] Aleksashenko correctly pointed out, everyone knows how the government’s next scheme “with decent people who want change so strongly” is going to end.

The famous liberal-minded historian Nikolai Svanidze continues to fight an all-out war against Stalin’s cult of personality. The cult of personality of the national leader does not fall into view for the people entirely comfortable in Putin’s system of agitprop.

Andrei Makarevich says he has no love for professional revolutionaries. He tells Yury the Musician how to deal with Putin if he winds up at another event. Of course, there were representatives of the intelligentsia a hundred years ago who didn’t want to take active positions, either. But it’s hard to imagine that they would allow themselves to speak so poorly of the ones who continue to fight. But the times are such that Makarevich and others like him can keep on ignoring the reality that surrounds them and sing bravely at their high-class parties, spitting disdainfully on any dissenters.

Ideological forms of indoctrination have become much more sophisticated. There were no such subtleties a hundred years ago. Now the government has skillfully created a buffer for itself out of the liberal social strata, which allows it to keep up a certain superficial level of propriety in our modern-day version of Rasputin’s court. And a whole lot of people see those in this strata as having liberal values. Putin’s system painstakingly mimics political liberalism, but its principles (separation of powers, free and competitive elections, freedom of expression) are widely violated in practice. The result is their total discredit.

The absurdity of the situation also lies in the fact that people who openly oppose the regime cannot relate to those who want to have it both ways. The government creates a situation where it is difficult to define the boundaries for a moral boycott. Therefore, the mocking discussions about how each consecutive refusal to cooperate with the government must, in the end, come down to tax evasion and ignoring the law, continue. But everyone understands perfectly well that it’s at least time to stop pretending that the regime’s liberal servants are gradually changing it from within.

Translation by theotherrussia.org.

Russia 2010: Another Step Towards Catastrophe?
The population is decidedly disappointed in the “tandem”
By Garry Kasparov
December 30, 2010
Kasparov.ru

In summing up the politics events of the year, I would dare to call this year a critical one. There is a trend of mass consciousness: Russian citizens are decidedly disappointed in the ruling party – United Russia – and their skepticism is gradually spreading to Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev. In 2010, the tandem definitively split up its spheres of influence: while the “national leader” appeals to the most conservative and uneducated segments of society, the function of the head of state is instead to evoke sympathy from the well-informed and dynamic minority focused on global integration.

Medvedev’s mission is falling apart before our very eyes: even a maneuver as impressive (despite the dragged-out waiting period) as firing Yury Luzhkov did not change the overall picture. The pathetic ending to the story of the Khimki Forest, the hopeless situation with the investigation of the attack on journalist Oleg Kashin, the lack of a coherent response to the events on Manezhnaya Square, and, finally, the disgraceful congratulatory remarks to the Belarusian dictator for his “victory” in the elections – Dmitri Medvedev has committed an entire series of acts that are unacceptable for a politician counting on the support of Russian citizens focused on European values.

And, finally, the last and final test for Medvedev “the liberal” was held on December 27. There were no surprises: the Khamovnichesky Court began its historic session by announcing the guilt of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev. All the colorful words about how pressure on the courts from “other officials” was unacceptable naturally turned out to be just that: words. If anyone was still under any illusions, now they have no grounds for them at all.

But this is not only – and not even so much – about disappointment in Medvedev. General perceptions about forms of protest are changing in the country. People are beginning to realize: under the growth of authoritarianism, there is no point to social protest if it is not accompanied by political demands. The Kaliningrad rallies at the beginning of the year; the springtime wave of Communist demonstrations with slogans calling for the resignation of the government; the ever-growing activeness of Strategy 31; the strong appeal of anti-Putin slogans – all of this testifies to a change in trends.

No “ratings” will compensate for the shock from the summer fires or the ubiquitous Kushchevskaya massacre. Here one may recall the revealing video footage from Nizhny Novgorod, in which fire victims screamed their complaints about the government right into the face of the confused “national leader.”

Disengagement from political demands inevitably leads to a dead end. In contrast, when the need to advance and assert political demands becomes clear to everyone – including trade unions, ecologists, war veterans, and football fans – the government will falter. It is important that, at that moment, it is not opposed by disparate masses of people.

Unfortunately, there is no broad public dialogue going on in this country. This is largely the result of mutual distrust between various social groups, personal ambitions, the lack of a culture of searching for compromise in oppositionist circles, and, naturally, the deliberately divisive actions of pro-Kremlin structures.

Nevertheless, the government itself does promote a general type of politicization – insofar as it establishes that any issue that affects the interests of one civil servant or another is a political one. Very often we see inept management, incompetency, abuses, and even blatant crimes go unpunished only because they are committed under the banner of “United Russia.” This is becoming too noticeable, and the comprehension that Putin’s United Russia is precisely the main source of lawlessness in this country is penetrating the general consciousness.

Given the obvious fall in its level of public support, Putin’s corrupt, bandit-ridden power vertical requires that crackdowns continue – without consideration of the possible consequences – if it is to survive.

The toughening of an authoritarian regime is an entirely logical phase of its development, and in Russia there is no exception. As I’ve already noted in my previous articles, the stability of Putin’s vertical is the result of not only the social apathy of society and well-organized, deliberate propaganda, but also the creation – with the help of prominent representatives of homegrown liberalism – the illusion of a stable economy, which allows, to a certain extent, state finances to be managed in a reasonable way, which compensates for the woeful ignorance of greedy security officials and civil servants.

In this regard, Yevgeny Yasin’s many statements are revealing. This is a man who, after Yegor Gaidar’s departure, could be fully considered a pillar of Russian liberal fundamentalism. On his blog on Ekho Moskvy, he rather frankly sets out the views of the enlightened part of the Russian elite on the state of affairs in the country: “If you’d like – the creation of a democratic Russia is a task that was set aside in ’92 for the sake of radical economic reform. But now that the basic reforms have already been carried out and we have a market economy, its further development is only possible under democracy.” This is an exceptionally valuable admission that establishes that neither Gaidar nor Anatoly Chubais considered a democratic framework to be a necessary condition for Russia’s market economy in general.

It is also not insignificant that Yasin is talking about the successful completion of market reforms precisely now, in 2010. It would be interesting to know, then, how the apologists of “Russian liberalism” picture the market and market economy. The lack of a guarantee of private property? Bureaucratic lawlessness? The lack of independent courts? A level of corruption that is beyond the pale? Or the fact that the majority of students from Yevgeny Grigorievich’s State University – Higher School of Economics want to work in Gazprom and the presidential administration. And that’s an economic result that, from Yasin’s point of view, is entirely acceptable today. This is exactly the result that was achieved by people who continue to call themselves Russian liberals, entirely discrediting the idea of a market economy and liberal democracy.

Talk of democracy has now become relevant because the party of “supporters of enlightened Putinism with a human face” knows perfectly well that the system becomes unstable under Putin’s excesses; but it nevertheless shows no desire to undertake any fundamental reforms.

The pinnacle of their desires is a return to blessed 2002, for the authoritarian form of rule to be softened but the mechanism allowing for the unchanging and supreme power of oligarch groups be preserved, with this group then resolving the power issue amongst themselves. A clear warp has formed on the part of one of the groups – the Putin one. And this has evoked rejection from systemic Russian liberals, since the oligarchical consensus has ceased to function.

I have written many times that Yeltsin’s fatal Decree 1400 in the fall of 1993 drove our country back into the rut of authoritarian development. Although, it’s now becoming clear that the method of carrying out “Gaidar’s great reforms” also brought along the seeds of authoritarianism, which was unavoidably necessary to defend the interests of the oligarchy forming then. And the liberal echelons appearing from the ranks of the so-called “Kamikaze government” are in fact an organic part of the Yeltsin-Putin regime. It is they who are its designers and engineers; it is they who created and nurtured this construct.

Any attempt to divide Putin’s milieu into “liberals” and “security officials” ignores the fact that the two work in harmony – or, in the current political fashion: in tandem. The Baikalfinansgrup fraud was created not so much by Igor Sechin and Sergey Bogdanchikov as by Alexei Kudrin and Sergey Ignatyev. And one can find very “liberal” surnames – Gref, Golikova, Khristenko – on the lists of beneficiaries of corrupt bureaucratic schemes.

The young people who wound up on Manezhnaya Square on December 11 grew up in an era of economic reform that completely changed the way of life of the population of our country. This is the generation that Gaidar’s acolytes dreamed of, insisting that young people who knew nothing of Soviet life would form the nucleus of a free, future Russia. Today it’s become clear what kind of political force makes up the nucleus that these young people have formed.

And this is quite a natural result, given the contemporary Russian conditions of non-functioning social mobility, the oppressive sensation of hopelessness for a large number of Russian citizens, a total lack of prospects, and egregious social differentiation, which also overlap with the unavoidable confessional and ethnic mix of the former Soviet empire. It impossible to think of a better fertilizer to cultivate nationalistic sentiment in a society.

At the beginning of the ’90s, when the newly-formed democratic Russian state was attempting to escape from the quagmire of social and economic chaos, many people thought that a repeat scenario of Weimar Germany was a real possibility. That said, no one considered that the Weimar Republic disappeared not as a result of Hitler’s unconditional electoral victories (the Nazis never took more than 38 percent of the vote), but as a result of the collusion between oligarchical and military circles and the Nazis, who were seen as a natural counterweight to the leftist threat.

All of the entreaties about the red-brown threat of the ’90s have turned out to be untenable. At that historic moment, the red-brown coalition was largely the result of the clumsy actions of Yeltsin’s government. But it is now possible for the red-brown combination to become a reality, as the color brown becomes consumed by shades of the Black Hundreds. And the government’s active battle against the left enables this.

It is interesting to note that the Communist Party’s eternal leader, Gennady Zyuganov, who has continued to emasculate the resources of the left flank of the opposition for all these years, began his own political career in post-Soviet Russia in the ranks of the National Patriots. Numerous purges – carried out by the Communist Party at Zyuganov’s behest and culminating in the total ruin of its Moscow city branch – lead to the domination of nationalistic and clerical views within the party leadership.

Dreams of a Russian Pinochet in the Yeltsin era excited supporters of radical economic reforms. And so only in the Russian reality does General Pinochet somehow acquire the characteristics of Lieutenant Colonel Putin or Colonel Kvachkov.

And it is also obvious that the government, whose consciousness has been dominated by the threat of red revenge since 1995, encourages the development of ultra-right groups. And the actions of left and radical-left groups elicit a brutal response from the police, even though there is not a single hint that they would use any violence. Internal Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev’s finger-pointing of the left – which, in his opinion, is responsible for the riots on Manezhnaya – is quite possibly linked with his unprofessionalism, but it is more likely linked with the simple stereotype that threats to the existing order in Russia always come from the left.

The ultra-right usually does not infringe upon private property and the oligarchical regime fears slogans of social justice more than anything else. And the regime’s reaction to the events on Manezhnaya Square is not connected to the rejection of the process itself, but with the necessity to control such potential excesses – as in the case of Kvachkov. That said, the treatises of the Minin and Pozharsky People’s Militia, which include open calls to overthrow the existing government, appeared more than a year ago. It is obvious that Eduard Limonov would have gotten 10 years without the right of correspondence for each line of that text. Until recently, Vladimir Kvachkov got away with it entirely.

In the midst of a growing socio-economic crisis, the government is going to look at the fascistization of society – most of all of its youth – as the main way to channel any desire to protest. An even more aggressive ideological formation is now beginning to crystallize from the deformed seedlings that grew into the crops at Seliger. Putin spoke in this vein when he discussed the restrictions on registration rules for nonresidents, all the way up to criminal liability. Not for foreigners – specifically for Russian citizens. Here we can once again recall the Russian constitution, which Putin’s OMON have already been wiping their feet on for a long time. But the government is already distinctly aware that, at some point, even the OMON won’t be enough.

In a healthy society, there is an acceptable balance on the scale of social differentiation. But by consciously recreating poverty and hopelessness, the government is inevitably becoming a fascist one.

In my aforementioned article, I wrote nearly three years ago: “Today we must call upon those who still foster any illusions about the current regime, and those who no longer foster any illusions, to openly and honestly declare that it is disastrous for our country. We no longer have the right to pretend that the current Russian government can be humanized through ‘small deeds.’ If we do not halt the growth of this dangerous organism today, tomorrow it will prolong its development and inevitably turn into a fascist beast. The logic of history is inexorable.”

Only by turning away from this oligarchical dead end by dismantling the Yeltsin-Putin regime as fast as possible can we save our country from such a catastrophic scenario.

Translation by theotherrussia.org.

In remarks today at the official opening of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev spoke about his goals for Russia’s economy and how state policy would be shaped to achieve them, Interfax reports.

“Russia,” the president said, “must become an attractive country that people from all over the world will aim for in search of their dreams. In search of the best opportunities for success and self-realization, which Russia can give to everyone ready to heed this call and love Russia as their new or second home.”

“Such are the goals of our modernization – they are realistic and achievable,” Medvedev asserted. He added that favorable conditions for modernization are currently developing in the country’s economy. He also said that state fiscal policy would be shaped with this in mind.

The three-day forum, which began Thursday afternoon, brings together European leaders, representatives from international corporations, economists, and other global policy makers to discuss modernization and development in emerging economies. A range of topics, including energy and security policy, are expected to be covered.

A presidential aid had stated earlier that Medvedev’s speech “will be mainly dedicated to Russia and the way we have changed.”

The Russian president singled out inflation in his opening remarks as one of the primary issues faced by his country’s economy. He also said that the inflation rate has fallen over the course of the year and is now hovering at about 6%.

In his turn, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin pledged that inflation would not rise above 5-7% over the next three years, with the top target for next year set at 6.5%. He stressed that citizen trust in state policy was the key factor for successfully overcoming economic difficulties, and that Russians do indeed trust the ruble and their domestic banking system.

Former Economics Minister and Scientific Director of the Higher School of Economics Yevgeny Yasin said that the figures cited by the prime minister are realistic, but that inflation in Russia must necessarily fall to around 3-4%. In an interview with Ekho Moskvy, he also stipulated that the best time for prices to fall – the crisis period – had already passed.

While Russia has reported a decline in inflation each month since August 2009, some analysts say that the government’s reliance on consumer prices to calculate the rate presents a false reading of actual inflation. “Consumer prices,” says political commentator Sergei Shelin, “only make up a part of all prices. All the remaining prices are growing, and seem to know absolutely no shame.”

A panel entitled “Finance after the Crisis” was held in the same room after Medvedev’s remarks. There, according to the newspaper Vedomosti, influential global financial analysts discussed whether or not the presidents’ goals were achievable. The newspaper reported that of those present at the panel, 61% believed that the Russian financial system faces stagnation over the course of the next 2-5 years. About 5% expect another crisis, and the last third are optimistic that Russia will see a speedy rate of growth.

At another panel later in the day, Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said that the task of cutting the budget deficit is harder for Russia than other European countries. This, he explained, has to do with the fact that the state treasury is highly dependent on the oil and gas sector. Kudrin reminded his audience that the current cut in Russia’s deficit is happening as a result of high oil prices – not because of the efforts of the government.

The finance minister also said that a rise in the retirement age would be an unavoidable result of the budget deficit, and confirmed plans for substantial increases in taxes on gasoline, alcohol, and tobacco.

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“Along with happiness, in the exact same way and in perfectly equal proportion, man also needs unhappiness,” Dostoyevsky once said. “When trouble comes, don’t shrink from it,” the [Russian] proverb teaches. But are there any positive effects of the crisis that has seized Russia in the run up to 2009? Boris Nemtsov, Yevgeny Gontmakher, Garry Kasparov, Yevgeny Yasin, Nikita Belykh, and others respond.

Boris Nemtsov, board member of the Solidarity movement:

One point is welcome to everyone: gasoline prices have started to fall. Even though they are falling tenuously for now, they should fall to around 15 rubles [per liter] – and everything still lies ahead. Another good point for everyone is that prices for housing and land have started falling: this is also nice, although few have the money [to buy].

Another good thing is that new people have started coming into the Solidarity movement. Seven young twenty-somethings walked in to the political advisory council at the [Solidarity] conference. The youth understand that the country is headed the wrong way. I consider this a fantastically good moment – not only Roman Dobrokhotov, not only Ilya Yashin, not only Yulia Malysheva, but many other young people from the regions were with us. [Youth] in the country are defining their stances. In my opinion, this is the major positive result of the crisis. It is impossible, after all, to remain in a constant state of oil and gas delirium. The faster we sober up, the better it will be for Russia.

Yevgeny Gontmakher, chair of the Center for Social Politics at the Economics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences:

A crisis is always a chance to make sense of what has happened, and glean some sort of lessons. For all the past years, we accumulated problems and didn’t solve them. Only a crisis, perhaps, can push us to finally solve these problems, although the situation isn’t the most favorable for this at the moment. But nonetheless, there are positives in this sense.

What positive points can I see for myself personally? I regard life with great interest. I am curious as to what will happen with the country in these new, unorthodox conditions. I want to hope that everything will end well, and that we come out of this crisis in a civilized manner as a democratic country with a market-driven economy. As a country open to the world.

Nikita Belykh, appointed governor of the Kirov oblast:

I will probably not be very original, but will still say that the crisis, despite all of its drastic consequences, the tightening of belts and so forth- is a time of possibilities, a time of rising personal effectiveness and competitiveness. I think that within the frame of the crisis, a new generation of entrepreneurs and businesses will emerge, which will be able to take a dignified role not only in the Russian but in the global economy. [They will succeed] because they will prove their competitive ability in such severe conditions. This also applies to the political system.

From this perspective, I accepted the proposal [to become governor of the Kirov oblast]. I believe that if I can do something positive for the oblast, it will demonstrate my personal competitive edge and at the same time underscore that liberals can effectively administer the regions. I hope very much that from within one region, I will be able to show that we are not simply in a position to speak, criticize, point out flaws, but also to engage in substantive action.

Yevgeny Yasin, Research Director at the Higher School of Economics:

For myself personally, I do not see any positive moments. The only good I see for the country is that the crisis could somehow affect those stagnant developments that have formed in our economy and society. They are connected, first of all, with high oil prices, which paralyze any kind of changes whatsoever in the domestic social structure. Secondly, [they are connected] with the authoritarian rule which has grown from this oil-based economy. This is a fairly difficult, painful adaptation, but it is essential to make our society and economy more healthy, so that they are oriented to work, risk and progress.

Maria Gaidar, politician:

I do not see any positive points, neither for myself nor the country. The restructuring taking place in the commanding elite comes at too high a price. We could somehow sober up without it. Without people being laid off, without falling industrial production. It is a tough time, what good is there? It is a tough, difficult time for everyone: for my friends who are losing their jobs; for the people who ran their business, their small or mid-sized, honest market-based business, and who now have colossal problems; for editorial offices, who are laying off journalists. If housing prices fall sharply – this will be good, but nothing else good can happen. There are no pluses in this. Including political ones.

Dmitry Oreshkin, head of the Merkator research group:

I am feeling a certain satisfaction as an expect, because all of what we long predicted is being realized. Unfortunately, this looks fairly nasty, and will get even nastier. Of course, the personal feelings of an expert have no significance at a time when the situation is becoming worse.

As for the good in this year, the society is apparently starting to recognize itself as separate from the government. The state tries to contrive and invent something, but the people understand that they cannot wait for some benefit from the state, and act independently. This is the number one point, because whatever they are saying at the top, people are acting in their own interests. For instance, rubles are being exchanged for foreign currency, businesses are transferring money abroad– this is a rational policy, but a personal policy, not a government one. This kind of individual behavior naturally leads a person away from the government.

At the end of the 80s, a serious public protest only started when cigarettes ran out in the stalls. People had become accustomed to the fact that there was no food. It was normal that there was never [food in the stores]. Now, since a new class of people formed who are aware of their interests and who are trying somehow defend these interests, the threshold for protest is lower. Which means that things are unlikely to go so far as the Soviet example. People already understand that they cannot expect anything good from the authorities. We are promised that everything will be in order, and we understand perfectly that everything will not be in order, and solve our own problems. As result, this governmental monster ends up sort of isolated from reality. This is very dangerous, but unfortunately, is inescapable with the model of governance built by [Vladimir] Putin. This is precisely why all the unpleasant predictions are justified, regrettably.

For me personally, a time of freedom has come, and I in no way depend on the government. I have cut all contacts with the state institutions and feel like an independent person.

Garry Kasparov, leader of the United Civil Front:

A crisis is the kind of thing where it’s hard to find any positive points, because it affects everyone. Maybe someone will cash in on it, but I do not belong to that group of people. And if we speak about the political and economic situation, then in Russia, as in America, China and Europe, the crisis is revealing problems in the existing authorities, their mistakes, miscalculations, and willingness, or lack of willingness, to find adequate solutions together with the public.

For Russia, in my opinion, the crisis tallies up the Putin epoch, and demonstrates that the Putinist economic and political models are exhausted. This supports our fight, because many are starting to understand that our warnings and estimations weren’t just conjectures, but were based on a true assessment of the state of affairs.

A crisis is always fraught with risk and possibility. The one who withstands the crisis – in their personal life, in politics, in the economy, on the chess board – comes out stronger, and hence with a better outlook. We need to build plans for the future, understanding that the crisis will not spare anyone.