In contrast, Russia’s “non-systemic” opposition consists of an enormous number of political movements, organizations, and coalitions that have either been denied registration and are thus unable to participate in elections, or who don’t bother trying since they know they won’t be allowed to obtain it. Despite representing an extremely wide variety of viewpoints, what all of these groups have in common is that they are true alternatives to the current ruling regime.

In September, a group of four prominent opposition leaders announced the formation of a new coalitional party called “For Russia Without Tyranny or Corruption.” Coalition leaders said they intend to attempt to register the party and participate in upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. Their party, though coalitional, would not include as wide a variety of opposition viewpoints as, for example, the Other Russia.

One large question that remains about the future of the new coalition is whether or not Solidarity – one of the most prominent non-systemic opposition movements in Russia today – will join it. In this recent op-ed, United Civil Front leader and Solidarity co-leader Garry Kasparov explains why doing so could easily create more problems than it would solve.

A Political Mess: It’s not yet time to create an ideologically narrow coalition
By Garry Kasparov
October 8, 2010
Kasparov.ru

The news about the creation of a new liberal coalition has evoked an extremely positive, if not enthusiastic, response from supporters of the liberal political wing of our country. Liberal-minded journalists are describing its prospects in the most opalescent tones. And there’s a perfectly rational explanation for such euphoria.

The idea of a union of democratic forces is a panacea for all the troubles and misfortunes that our country encounters, which are not new and trace back from the time of the endless history of the unification of the SPS [Union of Right Forces – ed.] and Yabloko. Naturally, as control of the regime was tightened under Putin, discussions about unifying the opposition gained strength. And the common argument that asks how you could trust people to run the country who can’t even agree amongst themselves is as popular as ever among both supporters of the opposition and its opponents. For some reason, most of these discussions refer to the liberal opposition, although discord among the left and national-patriotic opposition forces is no less serious.

The desire of people who generally take no part in politics to speak out with dissatisfaction about the current state of affairs by simply dropping a ballot into a ballot box is perfectly clear. However, the elimination of the choice to vote “against everyone” forces the voter to search for an alternative that’s acceptable to him from the vegetarian political menu proposed by the Kremlin. Therefore, there are periodically public demands for the Russian political kitchen to come up with new ingredients. And the Kremlin chefs, reliable as ever, continue to keep their not particularly demanding clientele on a Lenten fast.

Not long ago, the New Times magazine published an article about the pre-electoral situation in Venezuela. The entire pathos of the article consisted of the idea that the country’s opposition committed a grave error several years ago by boycotting the elections, but now they’ve come to their senses and intend to participate – a type of reproach of Russian oppositionists. But all of this ignores the fact that the opposition in Venezuela is not banned, is officially registered, and can participate in elections, and in Russia, it can’t. As a matter of fact, the apparent success of the opposition in those elections relied on the unification of the most varied political forces, which set aside their differences on social and economic issues for the sake of creating a united anti-Chavez front.

In our Russian reality, playing on the feelings of people who are striving to unite to confront the regime is leading to the creation of a dangerous mythology that enables not the weakening, but, on the contrary, the strengthening of the government.

These concepts become mixed up when, in discussing the current coalition of these four well-known democratic politicians, many liberal-minded people breathe a sigh of relief – this time it’s without Limonov or the leftists. They forget that the idea of various political forces taking cooperative action against the regime, which the United Civil Front proposed be the fundamental activity of the Other Russia, has already become mainstream and no longer surprises anyone. Today, cooperation between coalitions in protests is the main key to the successes of large opposition rallies. In Kaliningrad, the largest such event of the past several years was held under banners of all the colors of the ideological spectrum. It is also worth noting that the leadership of the Communist party – the main party of the systemic opposition – tries with all its might to prevent the efforts of various ideological groups in organizing protests from coming together.

The question of to what extend this kind of cooperation can extend to larger political projects – such as presidential elections – remains, like before, unanswered. It is obvious that breaking apart the regime, or at least forcing it to consider people’s opinions, is only possible by uniting the widest possible ideological spectrum. Alexei Kondaurov and Andrei Piontkovsky recently wrote an excellent article on this point. But unfortunately, many people don’t realize that, for the time being, many basic issues could be resolved if completely different political forces came together. There are examples of successfully realized projects like this in the histories of countries that have stood in opposition to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. It suffices to remember Chile at the end of the ’80s, when there was unification all across the political spectrum in order to achieve victory in the referendum and bring free elections back to the country. Democratic Russia in 1990-91 was just as wide a coalition, albeit lacking such strikingly outspoken political groups.

In conditions where independent organizations are factually banned from participating in elections, a purely ideological union – even one including some competitors, but ones that are from one part of the spectrum of groups – is a thing in itself.

It was already clear in 2007 that official participation in political life in Russia was only possible with the Kremlin’s consent, and only with the fulfillment of corresponding conditions – taking the oath of fealty. The failure to register [former State Duma Deputy Vladimir] Ryzhkov and [former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail] Kasyanov’s party clearly defined the direction that political life in Russia develops. It’s important to note that this was not a matter of extremist organizations, but of people who themselves came from within the current government. Despite how critical these people are, only in the inflamed imaginations of Kremlin propagandists could they be referred to as radicals or extremists. Therefore, the numerous failures of [National Bolshevik leader Eduard] Limonov’s party are not even worth discussing. The recent attempt to register the Russian United Workers Front, effortlessly rejected by the Justice Ministry, also shows that the Kremlin has not allowed any changes to occur. But projects like this that create unions, which have recently been created among liberals, leftists, and the national-patriots, are undoubtedly a positive force.

From a historical perspective, these sorts of unions could become the nucleus of a future political system. And in this sense, the emergence of Solidarity in 2008 was a gigantic step forward, because, for the first time, a liberal-minded organization that had no connections to the Kremlin was allowed to be formed. The role of such organizations, both right and left, could most of all come down to developing policy positions for the future, working with citizens of the country, educating, constantly applying pressure on the government, and holding street rallies – that is to say, the role is of a tactical nature, not a strategic one. For today’s opposition, which is deprived of the opportunity to assert influence through the mass media and thus fully participate in political life, the possibilities for strategic planning are extremely limited.

All the euphoria surrounding the ongoing process of creating this coalition has the quality of being distracted from reality.

The task of forming a political party seems at least strange, since its fate is probably clear to everyone. An opposition organization cannot obtain any kind of registration under current conditions. When they are denied registration and everything becomes clear to everyone, the discussions that will be repeated like mantras will be reminiscent of the folktale of the white bull, endlessly walking in circles. Or an unreasonably drawn-out speech before a skeptical audience (whether abroad or at home) that needs to hear yet another explanation of the antidemocratic essence of the current regime.

Maybe some members of the coalition are hoping for a drastic change in the situation and the emergence of the “Medvedev majority,” where this structure has a place. But nobody talks to us about this openly. What they say is that, once again, we have to take the path of collecting signatures and submitting documents to the Justice Ministry. Thus, regardless of the pointlessness of this procedure, they are trying to convince us to once again play by the existing rules. If this idea is doomed, then it is entirely unclear what we are proving and to whom. And if somebody thinks that registration is possible, then I’d like to hear where such optimism came from.

A question: what is considered to be a change in the situation? That the Kremlin suddenly considers it necessary to put a liberal force in its pocket, or is, after all, going forward with legislative liberalization? A change in the situation does not signify mercy on the part of the Kremlin, but its consent to change the rules. And that is a fundamental difference. The situation is going to change when the country operates under normal laws, and not when they let somebody [register – ed.] and not somebody else. There is also a purely practical question.

A petition, if it’s not just something to show off – which people who want to register usually resort to – is a distraction of the organizers’ energy.

After [Solidarity co-founder Boris] Nemtsov signed the agreement, Solidarity began to participate in coalition projects, and the main, if not only project of the coalition is to create a party structure. In accordance with the regulations put in place by the Justice Ministry, the founding congress of the new party should happen in December. This means that Solidarity will drag out practically in full force from the congress on December 11 to the congress on December 14. At the same time, the decision hasn’t been made within Solidarity to transform the movement into a party. Respected members of the organization such as [Vladimir] Bukovsky and Piontkovsky are categorically against it. Many of those who did not speak out against such a transformation have always insisted that the formation of plans for a party should not involve the necessary collection of signatures. Solidarity’s planned congress should resolve these issues, and it’s obvious that if the decision is made to launch plans for a party, it won’t be required for those who don’t plan on joining the party structure. Solidarity’s format as a social movement will be preserved. That position remains unchanged.

But today’s story with the coalition, which began long before the congress, puts our organization in a strange position. This kind of divided organization strikes me as extremely dangerous. The idea of creating a party through a coalition seemed to me from the very beginning as hopeless and a threat to the existence of Solidarity as the main opposition force in the liberal wing. It’s interesting that another idea – the advancement of a single candidate for president from among the liberal forces – had no problem being absorbed into party rhetoric.

Although, it is precisely this idea that has a practical basis. It is obvious that it is the president who holds power in the country, and not the parliament – which, as we know, is not a place for discussion. It is also obvious that a candidate from the non-systemic opposition will not obtain registration. But this kind of idea is more understandable, and opens an opportunity to negotiate with different opposition ideological associations, in order to take in a larger number of people. I’ll return again to the article by Kondaurov and Piontkovsky: They propose holding a general democratic congress and have a good terminological description of how “general democratic” today does not indicate ideological consistency, but the attitude towards procedures of choosing government. Therefore, people other than those with liberal ideological views would be able to take part in such a congress.

Recognizing that the future of Solidarity as an independent organization is at stake, I in no way want to oppose those in the makeup of the coalition who plan to create a party. But, that said, I have no desire to become a part of this project in the form that it is being presented to us. Right now it is extremely important to continue cooperating with all opposition forces in a political field that is independent from the Kremlin. This is the position that the United Civil Front will continue to adhere to.

Translation by theotherrussia.org.

He did, however, announce his resignation from United Russia – the country’s leading political party, head by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. In a written statement, the now ex-mayor said that he had been “subjected to a fierce attack by the state mass media” and “savage harassment,” which “were connected with the task of eliminating the mayor of Moscow from the political arena.” He then blamed United Russia for “not giving a member of the party any kind of support; [the party] did not demonstrate any desire to deal with and put a stop to the stream of lies and slander.”

Then, on late Tuesday, an entirely unexpected document was published by the opposition-leaning newspaper the New Times: a scathing letter from Luzhkov to President Medvedev, accusing the latter of “informational terror” and intentional slander, among other things. The harassment, he says, stemmed from two of Luzhkov’s letters concerning the Khimki Forest controversy that were published earlier this month. But the letters, in which Luzhkov backtracked on his original decision to stand with Medvedev in opposition to the forest’s destruction, were “not a reason, but an excuse” to get rid of him, Luzhkov asserts. “The task has been set: Get rid of him. The excuse is found. Act!” says the letter.

The Kremlin had already made about as much clear through a whisper campaign of anonymous tipsters to the Moscow press over the past month, as well as a propaganda campaign run through the state-run media. Denouncing Luzhkov’s Khimki letters as an attempt to drive a wedge between the president and the prime minister, one Kremlin source noted that “it’s obvious that such attempts will not go without corresponding reactions.”

According to Luzhkov’s latest letter, the president’s administration had already told the mayor on September 17 about the decision to fire him due to loss of confidence. Apparently, Luzhkov was asked to resign voluntarily the next day, but when it was clear that wasn’t going to happen, he was given an extra week to think it over. When Luzhkov returned to his office on Monday morning and announced that he wasn’t going anywhere, he already knew what was going to happen the next day.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has translated the text of the letter in full. Newtimes.ru, which hosts the original, has been suffering from bandwidth overload since the letter went online.

Prime Minister Putin said he agrees with Medvedev’s decision, and, as he is wont to do, stressed that it was made in strict accordance with the law. “It’s perfectly obvious that the relationship between the mayor of Moscow and the president didn’t work out, and anyway, the mayor is a subordinate of the president, not the other way around,” Putin said.

Several opposition activists were detained outside the mayor’s office on Tuesday evening, including one Other Russia member who attempted to unfurl a banner reading “Luzhkov, as you leave, break the fence.” The fence in question referred to the recently-erected barrier blocking off Moscow’s Triumfalnaya Square, where oppositionists gather on the 31st of each month to hold rallies in defense of free assembly as part of the Strategy 31 campaign. About 50 demonstrators were present outside the mayor’s office in total, including members of Solidarity, Yabloko, and the United Civil Front.

Here is a sampling of reactions from Russian analysts and oppositionists on Medvedev’s monumental decision:

Boris Nemtsov, Solidarity Co-Leader and Former Deputy Prime Minister

This morning, D. Medvedev, for the first time, performed a truly presidential deed. He fired Luzhkov as a result of a loss of confidence.

This is the first case where Dmitri Anatolevich has clearly acted independently.

The conflict between Medvedev and Luzhkov was advantageous for Putin, but the removal of a corrupt civil servant is extremely undesirable, as his system of power breaks down.

It’s the first time that there’s been a dismissal due to loss of confidence without having criminal suits filed or obvious city cataclysms.

If criminal suits for corruption don’t show up after this dismissal, then the dismissal is going to look unconvincing, and Luzhkov has a clear political future…

In short, in the run-up to 2011-2012, Luzhkov will offer up more than a few surprises.

So whether or not Dmitri Anatolevich likes it, criminal suits are going to have to be filed.

Otherwise we’re going to have yet another unexpected candidate for president.

Stanislav Belkovsky, Political Analyst

What should have happened has happened. Luzhkov is done with, although Yury Mikhailovich himself firmly believed that he was going to survive the latest try after seven previous unsuccessful attempts to remove him. For me, as a Muscovite voter, who the new mayor is going to be is totally unimportant. For me, it’s obvious that Luzhkov’s dismissal is not a political project, but an economic one. There are no politics here, because Luzhkov didn’t block Kremlin policy. He didn’t interfere in the process of determining a nominee for president in the 2012 elections, and a year and a half later would have supported any, or the only, candidate named by the Kremlin. The political character [of the dismissal] is very contrived.

The fact is that the federal financial-industrial groups decided to take Moscow for themselves, because they have long considered it unjust that these gigantic economic resources are being managed by a person from the past, who is organically disconnected from the contemporary federal elite. However, Vladimir Putin, who governed under the unofficial slogan “don’t make a splash,” that is to say don’t violate such hard-won socio-political stability – he was afraid to fire Luzhkov. And Dmitri Medvedev, as the famous Chinese proverb says it – “a newly born calf doesn’t fear a tiger,” the president, who doesn’t remember how it is when there’s instability, when there’s chaos, who is used to stability, came to this radical decision…

It’s possible that the new mayor, in the first months of his rule, will take a few relatively popular steps in order to win Muscovites’ trust… But the new mayor is not going to be interested in dismantling Luzhkov’s system. His task is to get control of this system and even strengthen it. Therefore, corruption in the city will remain and even grow.

Eduard Limonov, Other Russia Party Leader and Strategy 31 Co-Organizer

So they’ve gotten rid of the mayor!

Look out the window into the streets; can you see tanks? Luzhkov’s division hasn’t appeared?

I don’t think it’s going to appear…

I’ll see very soon whether or not the attitude of the Moscow courts toward the conflict on Triumfalnaya is going to change. On September 30, the Tverskoy Court is going to decide (for the second time) the fate of our suit (Alexeyeva, Kosyakin, Limonov) against the Moscow government concerning the rally on December 31, 2009.

On October 5, Justice Zaytsev will decide my personal fate as an organizer of the rally on August 31 of this year.

On October 6, the Moscow City Court will decide the fate of our suit (Alexeyeva, Kosyakin, Limonov) against the Moscow government regarding the July 31 rally.

So we’ll see.

Anton Orekh, Journalist, Ekho Moskvy Radio

This is what I want them to understand.

Moscow is a separate state. They say this about Moscow often, striving to underline how it gets fat at the expense of the rest of the country…

And few would find it simpler to govern Moscow than to govern the rest of Russia. And if the comrades from Leningrad think that this isn’t so, then they’re mistaken. And if they think that their friends from some kind of cooperative or their messmates from their school department can deal with the management of a separate country, they they’re also mistaken.

We shouldn’t be naive.

You’re not going to create freedom or democracy in Moscow by itself. There can’t be an honest capital in a larcenous country. If there’s no justice here, there won’t be any in Whitestone.

Whatever kind of mayor we get, he’s going to have to govern Moscow by the same rules that work in the entire rest of the territory of Russia, albeit Moscow and Russia are different countries.

Oleg Ptashkin, leader of an independent journalists trade union, said in a press conference in Moscow on Tuesday that the managers of numerous media outlets were using the global economic crisis as an excuse to hire journalists as independent contractors instead of normal employees. Ptashkin, who used to work for Russia’s state-controlled Channel One TV until he was illegally fired, said that these kinds of contracts violate the rights of media workers and that his union is working on an initiative to ban the practice.

Igor Trunov, a lawyer for the trade union, said that the Russian government has recently been using a wide variety of measures to put pressure on journalists and the media. Among such measures, he said, have been police raids on editorial offices, evictions, and libel and defamation suits. Last month, for example, the editorial offices of the New Times magazine were raided after an article was published accusing an elite subdivision of the OMON riot police of using migrant workers for slave labor. The raid was condemned by journalism watchdog groups worldwide, but the police justified their actions by accusing the publication of poor-quality journalism.

New legislation expected to be adopted soon by the Russian State Duma that allows the Federal Security Service (FSB) to issue preemptive warnings to anyone suspected of acting in a way that might lead to extremist behavior is one of the most serious blows to free speech and democracy facing the country right now, Trunov went on. The bill’s wording is so vague, he said, that it would allow police to issue a few such warnings and then arrest a publication’s editor-in-chief for a fifteen day term.

Shortcomings in current Russian law would make it virtually impossible to appeal such decisions, the lawyer added.

Ptashkin said that the union is appealing to Russian President Dmitri Medvedev with a request to veto the bill.

On April 5, the Tverskoy Court in Moscow sanctioned a search and seizure of the New Times editorial office in connection with police accusations of libel. The police attempted to carry out the seizure this past Wednesday, but Editor-in-Chief Yevgeniya Albats refused to hand over any documents, maintaining that the seizure is illegal while the magazine awaits a hearing to contest the decision in the Moscow City Court.

In response to the failed search, the international journalism watchdog Reports Without Borders and the Russian Union of Journalists have issued press releases condemning the court decision and actions by the police. Both are reproduced below.

Russian Union of Journalists
Announcement
April 16, 2010

The Russian Union of Journalists expresses its extreme anxiety with the attempt to seize documents from the editorial offices of the New Times. The court decision allowing investigators to seize interview notes that contain references to sources of information constitutes a gross violation of source confidentiality as guaranteed by media legislation and the Russian criminal code. We hope that higher courts will rectify this mistake, or the impending plenum of the Russian Supreme Court will explain that the court can free an editorial office from its duty to keep journalistic sources confidential only in connection with an ongoing case; that is to say, after the case has been brought to court, and not simply by the request of investigators or interrogators.

We cannot disregard this dangerous precedent since it risks becoming common practice, thus burying the possibility for a trusting relationship between journalists and their sources. Source confidentiality is a safeguard for the constitutional right of citizens to obtain complete and objective information.

Secretariat of the Russian Union of Journalists

Translated by theOtherRussia.org.

Reports Without Borders
Police try to search Moscow weekly for sources to story about elite unit
April 14, 2010

Reporters Without Borders condemns today’s abortive attempt by the Moscow police to search the premises of the Moscow-based independent weekly The New Times/Novoye Vremya in execution of a court order that is the subject of an appeal by the weekly.

Moscow’s Tverskoi district court issued the search order on 5 April in response to a libel action by the elite Omon police and the General Directorate for Internal Affairs (GUVD) under article 129 of the criminal code over a 1 February story in The New Times headlined “Omon Slaves” about alleged corrupt practices within the elite unit.

Reporters Without Borders stresses its complete support for the magazine and its staff, who have the courage to do proper investigative reporting into matters of general interest, an activity that is at the core of real journalism.

“We share the view of The New Times editor Yevgenia Albats that the protection of journalists’ sources is an essential element of press freedom and that investigative journalism cannot exist without it,” Reporters Without Borders said.

No search can legally be carried out in response to the court order until the weekly’s appeal has been heard, and The New Times deputy editor Ilya Barabanov told Reporters Without Borders that the search order was illegal under articles 41 and 49 of the media law.

Based on information provided by unidentified sources with Omon, The New Times story accused the elite unit of selling its protection services to businessmen and even criminal organisations. It drew an immediate denial from Omon followed by the libel action.

The Moscow City Court is set to hear the New Times’ complaint on April 28, and we will be following the course of events as they continue to develop.

In a press released posted Tuesday on the agency’s official website, Lieutenant General Vladimir Gorshukov said that an article published Monday in the New Times magazine accusing an elite subdivision of the OMON of using slave labor was “a complete fabrication.”

“I would call it an intentional campaign against the OMON detachments of the Russian Internal Ministry, and against the Zubr detachment in particular,” said Gorshukov.

The lieutenant asserted that the article was based on “the private statements of a former member of the division who had disciplinary problems and did not follow demands from above that were given to members of the special subdivisions; in consequence of this, she was fired.”

Monday’s article by the New Times consisted largely of the transcript of an interview with former Zubr OMON officer Larisa Krepkova, who claims to have witnessed migrant workers brought to the OMON base and forced to work without pay. The article asserts that her reason for leaving the force was related to illness.

Major General Aleksandr Ivanin, who commands the Zubr unit of the OMON, said that while Krepkova was sufficiently qualified for her job as a canine handler, she had repeatedly come to work intoxicated and was seen consuming alcohol on the job. “We conducted a service check on the matter and have all the supporting documentation,” he added.

Ivanin claimed that Krepkova was given the opportunity to resign, but that the reason for her dismissal was changed to the condition of her health after a medical commission was completed. What exactly the commission concluded was unclear.

Internal Ministry spokesman Oleg Yelnikov accused the media of failing to fact check their articles. “Some journalists, clearly, have forgotten that in accordance with article 49 of the law regarding the media, a journalist is required to check the reliability of the information presented to him,” blaming the New Times for relying solely on Krepkova’s testimony.

The agency announced Monday morning that they plan to sue the magazine for libel.

The article, which was published on Monday by the New Times magazine, is based on allegations made by former police officer Larisa Krepkova, who left the elite Zubr subdivision of the Russian Internal Ministry’s OMON security forces a year and a half ago due to illness. According to Krepkova, officers from the unit would travel to Moscow’s Yaroslavskoye Highway to recruit migrant workers, who were then brought to the Zubr base in the nearby region of Shchelkovo. There, they were forced to dig ditches, set up fences, and clean toilets without pay, even though Official invoices included tallies of the cost of labor.

Krepkova said that the workers, who she labeled as “slaves,” even wound up working in the dacha of Deputy Interior Minister Colonel General Mikhail Sukhodolsky. In addition to not being paid the workers were beaten and poorly treated in general. After Internal Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev undertook a survey of the base, the workers were assigned more specific tasks, she said.

The former officer explained that funding for labor was previously determined by the Zubr officers themselves, and that today the funds are specifically allocated by the Internal Ministry. As such, she was unaware if Zubr was continuing such practices today.

The New Times article adds that the Zubr OMON subdivision is under the direct jurisdiction of Internal Minister Nurgaliyev, and is commonly known as “the minister’s personal security.”

A spokesperson from the Internal Ministry said on Monday that they plan to sue the magazine for libel.

Monday’s article is the second in less than a month by the New Times to address problems with the OMON, which are notorious for their brutal suppression of activist rallies and other protests. On February 1, the magazine published an open letter from a number of former Moscow OMON to Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, describing poor working conditions, mistreatment by their superiors, orders to break up opposition rallies, and rampant corruption.

The next day, members of the Moscow city OMON announced their decision to sue the New Times for libel. City Police Chief Vladimir Kolokoltsev later stated that an internal investigation found the charges to be false. Additionally, the agency sent invitations to a number of journalists and rights activists to join the OMON for Russia’s traditional Maslenitsa festival celebrations. The OMON said that the event was a chance to show that the agency had nothing to hide, but the online newspaper Gazeta.ru described the proceedings as obviously staged.

The New Times noted that in response to the February 1 article, it has received a record number of letters from police officers with similar experiences. Its editors said on Monday that while they have yet to receive notification of any lawsuits regarding the articles, they are prepared to defend them in court.

Monday’s article can be read in its entirety in Russian by clicking here.

Farewell to illusions
Garry Kasparov
The New Times magazine
02/23/2009

For several years now, the American Discovery channel has had a popular science program named “MythBusters.”  Special effects specialists host the show, using their know-how to experimentally test various yarns, rumors and urban legends.  What is happening today in our country can be compared with one of these experiments, aimed at busting the myths created by [Vladimir] Putin’s agitprop, not without the use of special effects.

In the role of lead myth buster – the economic crisis, which dramatically shows that the fireplace Russians warmed themselves by in recent years was painted on a TV screen.  That the island of stability was merely a frail ship in the storming ocean of the world economy.  And that the mighty walls of our sovereignty were made of cardboard.

The mythology the Vladimir Putin era

Before all else, the myth of stable economic growth, as shown by the Putin economic model, has crashed.  High oil prices merely masked the actual inefficacy of a system of bureaucratic monopolism.  The unsteadiness of the system became readily apparent as soon as external conditions became more complicated.  For proof, it’s enough to turn to data from Rosstat, [the Russian statistical agency]: if in November the decline in manufacturing output amounted to what then seemed a record 8.7 percent, then the statistics for January (as compared to the same period of 2008) showed 16 percent.  This is no longer a decline.  This is a collapse.  Hundreds of billions of dollars, thrown on to extinguish the fire, didn’t save the economy, as is now clear: in January, the fall of production in machinery manufacturing comprised 35 percent.  Cumulatively over 8 months, it was 63 percent, according to data from [independent economist] Andrei Illarionov.  We have returned to the lowest point of the 1998 default – as if these 10 fertile years never happened.

Putin’s administration started with 10 percent economic growth in the GDP (even taking the 1998 default into account, this is fairly high), a 12 percent growth in manufacturing output and a significant investment appeal in Russia.  In spite of an exceptionally fortunate business climate in the foreign economy and foreign policy, it is ending in 2009 with negative economic growth, a deficit in the state budget of more than 100 billion dollars, and an unceasing outflow of capital.

And now a new myth is surfacing: that everything is linked to hydrocarbon prices, and that the crisis will end as soon as oil prices climb upward.

In its root, this idea is mistaken: Russia’s fall into economic crisis happened amid the highest historical prices for oil –94.6 dollars per barrel.  By itself, a decline in oil prices could not lead to such a serious crisis –take another look at the Rosstat data on the falling manufacturing output: What does oil have to do with it?  The reason is an uncompetitive, monopolized and corrupt economy, with too many great risks for investors.  This stems from the government bureaucracy, low job rotation in the elites, the illegitimacy of authorities, and the opacity of decisions taken by the executive branch.

Clearly, these problems don’t have an economic, but rather a political character.  No economic measures are capable of dramatically changing the situation.  As the hero of [Yevgeny] Shvarts’ fairy tale once said, no manner of petrodollars “won’t help make the leg small, the soul big, or the heart just.”  And the issue here is not only and not just the figure of Vladimir Putin himself.  Even if he is sacrificed on the altar of the crisis, the situation cannot fundamentally improve while Putin’s principles remain as the framework for how the authorities works.  It is another matter that Putin is in essence the product of a compromise of different bureaucratic, regional, power and business-elites, and that his disappearance will clearly hasten the dissolution of the regime.

Scenarios for tomorrow

If we want to avoid emerging unrest with an unpredictable outcome, the intellectual elite needs to start a sensible evaluation of the near future, instead of hysterical mantras about the “senseless and ruthless.”  The first thing that needs to be done is admit that without a drastic political restructuring of Russian society and the Russian state, we cannot preserve the country.  Precisely this thesis is laid out in the package of anti-crisis measures proposed by the Solidarity movement.

A state that is legitimate, transparent and publicly accountable is necessary to enact effective anti-crisis measures.

This is why free and fair parliamentary elections must be conducted as the foremost step in the transitional political period.

Only a regime that holds a people’s mandate can count on their support when conducting decisive reforms.  A freely elected parliament cannot be homogenous.  Herein lies its fundamental difference from the current State Duma, which is “frightfully far from the public,” and therefore commands minimal trust.  The new deputies will necessarily need to reach compromises.  There is already an experience with this kind of cooperation between ideologically different forces in the National Assembly.  It is evident, however, that the sooner that inter-ideological discussion enters the public life, the more effective the transitional parliament will be.

While it is unlikely that supporters of Russia’s development into a “democracy without adjectives” will have objections regarding the necessity of holding legitimate elections, many other aspects of the post-Putin future beg thoughtful public discussion:  Should these elections be elections to the State Duma in line with the acting Constitution, or is it necessary to hold elections to a Constitutional convention;  What kind of balance will there be between the legislative and executive branches;  Should Russia’s future political structure be Parliamentary or Presidential, what rules must govern the work of the transitional government; Is the nationalization of illegally obtained oligarchic structures necessary; Is lustration [openly dealing with the past] necessary and on what scale;  What should the national-territorial structure of the Russian Federation be.

Fears

An oft encountered argument on preserving the status quo says that there is no strong opposition in Russia.  That even if authority falls out of the hands of today’s elites, broken by the crisis, there will be no one to catch it, except radicals, extremists and the blind mob they lead.  Proponents of this theory consider the existing opposition in the country to be insignificant in number, disparate, isolated from the public, and as not having a positive program.  It is evident that we are dealing with another widely sown myth.  The political process is a two way street.

The current opposition have structural and intellectual resources to answer the social demand for renewal, which is taking shape and spreading more and more widely.  The gradual politicization of society will bring new leaders to opposition [forces] of all ideological directions, as well as a large number of supporters and a pool of talent.

But the opposition already has a skeleton to grow muscle on.

The sooner that sensible and responsible Russian citizens start to discuss these and other questions connected with our near future, the easier we will manage to live through the complex times of political reform.  Reform, which is the only alternative to Russia disappearing off the world map.

translation by theotherrussia.org.

We, journalists and colleagues of Natalya Morar, a correspondent of the New Times magazine, demand that the leadership of the FSB ceases her anti-constitutional detention in the customs area of the Domodedovo airport, and opens the Russian border for her.

Natalya Morar did not commit any crimes on Russian territory, and she has not been presented with any charges. She has every legal basis to enter the territory of the Russian Federation [(RF)]. For several days now, Natalya Morar has been forbidden from crossing the Russian border, in an attempt to deport her to Moldova.

By persecuting Natalya Morar, Russian authorities are violating the laws of the RF as well as international law. For a great while, Natalya Morar and her husband Ilya Barabanov have been kept from eating, drinking and sleeping normally, which is a direct violation of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and of articles on the right to life in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

This whole time, her attorney has been kept from her, and this is a gross violation of parts 1 and 2 of article 48 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Natalya Morar has lived in Russia for more than 6 years. She completed the Moscow State University, she is registered to live in Moscow, and she has a work permit. Furthermore, she is a citizen of Moldova (with which Russia has visa-free travel), and the spouse of a Russian citizen, Ilya Barabanov. The actions of the FSB violate the requirements of the fundamental documents of the OSCE [(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)], which forbid the separation of families, and the RF federal law “On foreigners.”

We are convinced, that the reasons for Natalya Morar’s deportation are political, and connected with her professional activities. Morar’s persecution began after her publication of courageous investigative reporting in the New Times magazine –“Bureaucrats are Diverting Money to the West,” “A lifetime ‘Discount’” [a Moscow bank], “Payment for Loyalty,” “VTSIOM 2,” “The Black Till of the Kremlin.”

We are convinced, that the FSB is using clause 1 of article 27 of the law “On the procedure for departing the RF and the procedure for entering the RF,” to carry out political censorship. We believe that by answering journalistic investigations with these measures, Russian authorities, as represented by the FSB and president Vladimir Putin personally are signing off on confessionary statements to all the facts of corruption laid bare by Morar’s articles.

We demand that the Federal Border Service of the FSB RF cease its blatant violation of the law, and admit Natalya Morar onto the territory of the Russian Federation. We likewise demand that Russian authorities publicly name the reason for Natalya Morar’s deportation.

Yulia Galyamina, journalist (Kasparov.ru)
Alexei Sochnev, journalist (Kasparov.ru)
Anton Semikin, journalist (Kasparov.ru)
Yuriy Gladish, journalist (Kasparov.ru)
Natalya Volosnikova, journalist (Kasparov.ru)
Olga Malysh, journalist (Kasparov.ru)
Ksenya Firsova, journalist (Kasparov.ru)
Stanislav Yakovlev, journalist (Kasparov.ru)
Tatyana Kashintseva, journalist (Kasparov.ru)
Olga Bogun, journalist (Kasparov.ru)
Vladimir Tsybulskiy, journalist (Kasparov.ru)
Andrei Dmitriev, (APN-CPB (http://www.apn-spb.ru/))
Andrei Skovorodnikov, journalist (Krasnoyarskaya Gazeta)
Yekaterina Fatyanova, journalist (Ej.ru)
Aleksandr Golts, journalist (Ej.ru)
Olga Pashkova, journalist (Ej.ru)
Yekaterina Shmelkova, journalist (Ej.ru)
Svetlana Solodovnik, journalist (Ej.ru)
Maria Kamenskaya, journalist (Ej.ru)
Aleksandr Ryklin, journalist (Ej.ru)
Maria Olendskaya, journalist (Ej.ru)
Maksim Blant (Matveychenkov), journalist (Ej.ru)
Vladimir Yermolin, journalist (Grani.ru)
Natella Boltyanskaya (Ekho Moskvy)
Rimma Polyak, independent journalist, Moscow
Mikhail Fishman, journalist
Yuliya Kukushkina, OK! Magazine
Irina Borogan, “Agentura.ru”
Andrei Soldatov, “Agentura.ru”
Varvara Turova, journalist
Ilia Ekchtout, P.Eng
Alexander Samartsev, journalist

(translated by theotherussia.org)

According to the agency head, the FMS was not responsible or involved in Morar’s expulsion, and does not have authority over such matters. Romodanovsky bowed to other branches of the government, and indicated that such jurisdiction is reserved for the Federal Security Service (FSB).

Morar, who was turned away from a Moscow airport on December 16th, held documents issued by the FMS, including official registration papers and permission to work in Russia. She resides and works in Moscow, and received a diploma from Moscow State University. On her way back from a business trip to Israel, Morar was forced to return to her native Moldova.

Romodanovsky was unwilling to comment on the decision of his colleagues, but did not defend the FSB’s move. He told journalists: “Surely you can read between the lines and listen between the words.”

The Russian embassy in Moldova was also unaware of any official reason for deporting Morar. Like Romodanovsky, they learned about the incident from the mass-media, and commented that all of Morar’s papers were in order.

The journalist’s colleagues believe that she was pushed out for her investigative writing in the magazine, which put a magnifying glass to corruption among Russia’s bureaucracy and elite. Her most recent article described a “slush fund” used by the Kremlin to fund and control most of the political parties involved in the December 2nd State Duma elections.

The Other Russia released a statement denouncing the expulsion, and called on the Prosecutor General’s Office as well as the Central Electoral Commission to launch an investigation.

Morar, a vocal Kremlin critic and former press-secretary for the Other Russia coalition, believes that the authorities are punishing her for her writing. In a number of articles, Morar investigated corruption among Russia’s political and business elite, focusing close attention on the Moscow-based Raiffeisenbank. Her latest piece, titled “The Black Till of the Kremlin,” describes how the Parliamentary electoral campaigns of several parties were funded by the Kremlin. The article cited numerous unnamed officials and concluded that the administration was funding and directing most of the parties that participated in the election.

According to the journalist, Russian border guards gave her the option to return to Israel, or to the Moldovan capital of Chisinau, where she holds citizenship. In the Chisinau airport, border police forced her to “write an explanation for why she was deported.” Morar did not have a deportation stamp in her password, and attempted to tell them that she had not been legally expelled from Russia. The process of deportation requires a court decision, and there had been no trial. Moldovan citizens do not need a visa to enter Russia.

The Ekho Moskvy radio station reported that the FSB public relations department refused to comment on Morar’s situation. A press-officer said that “We have no information,” but did not exclude the fact that details could emerge shortly.

“The New Times” editors are prepared to challenge the journalist’s expulsion in court. Morar’s colleagues are convinced that the incident is connected to her professional work. According to Yevgenia Albats, a noted journalist and talk show host, the magazine is preparing a formal complaint. “I hope for prudence from the Russian authorities,” she said, “We are a publication which works completely in accordance with the laws on mass-media. We are carrying out the people’s Constitutional right to information.”

In the words of Oleg Panfilov, the director of the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, more than 40 publicly critical journalists, writers and public figures have been expelled from Russia in the past eight years. He commented that since 2000, it has been dangerous for individual to speak their mind about Russia’s acute political problems. “This campaign of retaliation from the Russian side started against journalists writing principally about the first Chechen war,” Panfilov added.  Commenting on Morar’s case specifically, he said that “This substantiates the premise, that for all intents and purposes, Russia’s military leaders and bureaucrats regard journalists that write about corruption and Russia’s internal problems as their foremost enemies.”