As Slavic Power leader Dmitry Demushkin told Kommersant, this unification of nationalist organizations became possible after the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) was banned. “After that we decided to unite all of Russia’s nationalist forces into a new movement, The Russians. At its core are the largest nationalist organizations – the DPNI and the Slavic Union,” explained Demushkin. At the very least, the new organization’s goal is to further general ethno-political Russian solidarity, and at the most – to establish a nationalist government heading a nationalist Russian state.

The DPNI was ruled extremist and subsequently banned by a Moscow court in April 2011. The Slavic Union was banned a year earlier, after which it changed its name to Slavic Power.

The structure of The Russians can be found on the DPNI’s website. In particular, it lists the names of the agencies of its administration, including: the Council of Nations (an all-Russian meeting to define strategies for the existence and activities of the organization), the High National Council (to correct strategy and ongoing activities and to confirm annual plans) and the National Observatory Council (to represent the interests of the organization and develop strategy). The first council will be chaired in turn by Aleksandr Belov, Aleksandr Turik, and Stanislav Vorobyov. The second council will be led by Demushkin, and the third by Belov.

The movement also named a number of other structures: the National Committee for Action, the National Committee for Control, and the High Court of Honor. This last one, Demushkin told Interfax, “is the movement’s highest judicial authority, led by Georgy Borovikov.”

As Demushkin explained to Kommersant, he and Belov will play a substantial role as authoritative figures for The Russians. “There’s no guarantee that the new movement won’t repeat the fate of the nationalist organizations that are already banned right now. But for this we purposely gave ourselves this awkward name. So the courts and law enforcement agencies would be banning not nationalists, but ‘Russians,'” Demushkin explained.

Human rights activist and head of the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis Aleksandr Verkhovsky told Kommersant that the emergence of a more radical sentiment among neo-Nazi organizations presents a blatant, prospectiveless dead-end for its followers. “The same thing’s going to happen as did to the DPNI,” Verkhovsky said. Svetlana Gannushkina, head of the committee Civil Assistance, sees the emergence of The Russians as a call for a change in constitutional order. “Actually, this is a disgrace for Russia,” she told Interfax.

Compiled from reports by Natalya Bashlykova and Dmitry Kozlov at Kommersant, and Interfax.

The surge in Russian nationalism has been endorsed in no small part by a variety of government representatives. At the same time, Russian rights activists and oppositionists have been repeatedly targeted by ultranationalist groups, and accuse the government for turning a blind eye. The editorial team at Gazeta.ru points out that with Chuvashov’s murder, they’re going to have to either start make some changes or start watching their backs.

Brown Blackmail
April 12, 2010
Gazeta.ru

Attempts by the Russian authorities to use nationalist organizations to further their own goals, in particular the battle against the democratic opposition that exists outside of the political system, are dangerous to the authorities themselves.

Investigators immediately linked the shooting of Moscow City Court Judge Eduard Chuvashov with his professional activities, naming revenge by nationalists as one possible motive.

Chuvashov presided over the scandalous cases of Artur Ryno’s and the White Wolves nationalist group’s skinhead bands, whose followers had repeatedly and publicly – on the internet – threatened him with physical violence.

One very telling commentary on the murder was given by Dmitri Demushkin, leader of the Slavic Union nationalist organization (By the way, Union members participated in the “Youth Against Terror” rally organized by the pro-Kremlin organizations Young Russia and Young Guard on Moscow’s Triumfalnaya Square on March 31). Demushkin said that “A new generation is coming to replace the large organizations of nationalists, a generation of disparate groups of autonomous youths, aimed at committing grave and very serious crimes.” Lamenting the government’s ban of the Slavic Union, he pointed out a direct threat to the government: now, “the wave of attacks from illegal nationalist groups will intensify… Many young people who don’t see any alternatives will start taking more aggressive action.”

For a long time, the Russian government has not seen nationalists as a threat to itself or to order in the country. Crimes against migrants from Asian or African countries are almost always treated by the courts as common hooliganism, not as a manifestation of interracial strife.

There are still a significant number of people in the Russian political elite and law enforcement agencies today who sympathize with Russian nationalists, and some of the slogans of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration were completely in tune with various bureaucrats’ proclamations.

Moreover, soon after the colored revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the authorities even allowed the nationalists to hold a “Russian March” in Moscow on November 4 – National Unity Day.

In the past few years, the government has finally begun to gradually understand the danger that nationalist organizations pose. At the very least, the Russian Marches have invariably been banned over the past few years [although not in 2009 – Ed.]; judges began more commonly punishing skinheads for crimes committed on a nationalistic basis, without hiding behind the formulation of “common hooliganism.” And the cases for Ryno and Skachevsky’s band (Judge Chuvashov announced the sentence on the second case against this group on April 8, 2010) and the White Wolves had become the biggest antinationalistic judicial cases in the country’s modern history.

Nationalists in Russia have also previously been charged with murdering their opponents from among the “native” (in their assessment) population. In particular, Petersburg skinheads are accused of murdering the famous Petersburg ethnographer and human rights advocate Nikolai Girenko on June 19, 2004, in a trial that has already been going on for more than a year. Nationalists are charged with the 2009 murder of lawyer Stanislav Markelov. Judge Eduard Chuvashov, who was physically threatened numerous times by the White Wolves, was clearly their enemy as well. But unlike Girenko and Markelov, Chuvashov is a representative of the state.

Ultranationalists have always and everywhere been a subversive force that is prepared to commit crime – including against government representatives, even if the government has tried to play along with them.

And for sure, if radical nationalists came into power, it would lead to a great amount of blood – remembering the fascist regimes in Italy and Germany is enough.

The Russian authorities need to be aware of the fact that there are no “tame nationalists.” You can create the moderate nationalist block Rodina in the political-technical test tubes, so that you can then slam the door on the first threat of its return to real, serious political power. But you cannot, with impunity, use grassroots nationalist organizations as instruments of the state. And powerful nationalistic rhetoric from government representatives is extraordinarily dangerous as well, since it feeds the radical xenophobic mindset of some young people.

The government needs to understand that the “browns” [umbrella term for fascists/ultranationalists/neo-Nazis – Ed.] cannot just be fellow travelers in the battle against the liberal opposition; they will inevitably enter into conflict with state representatives, especially when they sense their own impunity. And that’s the main lesson that it’s time the government learned from the notorious murder cases involving representatives of nationalist organizations.

In Moscow, an estimated one thousand anti-fascist activists gathered on Chistoprudny Boulevard for a rally they called “Russian Patriotism Against Fascism and Xenophobia.” According to speaker Maksim Stepanov, the goal of the demonstration was “to express protest against the neo-Nazi demonstrations” taking place elsewhere in the city that day.

“While they say they’re only fighting against illegal immigrants, there are enough fascist flags at their rallies, and they say their idol is Hitler,” he added.

Stepanov called those gathered to action. “If you see a fascist inscription – paint over it; if you see a person with Nazi insignia – tell him to his face that fascism is not acceptable!”

While the demonstration itself was without incident, Kasparov.ru reports that an eyewitness saw police and men in plain clothes detain several anti-fascist protesters near the Kitai-gorod metro station hours after the event.

In the southeastern outskirts of the city, around two thousand people attended the ultra-nationalist “Russian March.” Many participants brandished flags with swastikas and chanted anti-Semitic and other xenophobic slogans. Detailed instructions on how to acquire firearms were distributed amongst the crowd. Dmitri Demushkin, leader of the Slavic Union, said that soon in Russia “only two things will hold true value – food and ammunition.” The march, sanctioned by city authorities, was held in the Lyublino region of Moscow, where many migrant workers have recently relocated after the closing of a large market complex in June.

Across the river from the Kremlin, an additional concert was held by the ultra-nationalist organization “Russian Image.” The concert, also sanctioned by authorities and attended by approximately 700 people, featured the openly neo-Nazi groups Kolovrat and Khuk Sprava.

The city’s largest rally was held by the radical pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi, often considered Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s version of the Soviet Komsomol. More than fifteen thousand people gathered for a rally and concert. Leaders of the group preached tolerance to the crowd, chanting “Russia for All.”

The holiday, which traditionally celebrated the liberation of Moscow from foreign occupiers in 1612, was reintroduced by then-President Putin in 2005 after being abandoned in 1917. Most Russians are unaware of the holiday’s historic roots, and it has been largely latched onto by ultranationalist organizations since being reintroduced. Despite condemnation from Russian leaders, nationalistic sentiments are held by a growing percentage of the population as well as many politicians.

There are few like him left

Olga Malysh

“Take care of yourself, ok?” Masha, a young nazbol hugged me, looking in my eyes.  That day some of the people who gathered at Prechistenka, the place where Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova died, said similar words to each other.  This pointless phrase had a new meaning in the context of the three deaths that happened on “black” Monday, the previous day.  It finally became clear that anyone with any visibility in the civil society [community] could be killed: an attorney, a journalist, an activist.  And one can only guess at who will be next.

It becomes especially frightening if one looks at the ranks of that same “civil society” – a few thousand people in all, who often know each other.

Guessing at why Stanislav Markelov was killed is pointless and fruitless.  He was involved in a multitude of high-profile cases.  He could have had enemies from practically every one of them.  Stanislav was a lawyer for the Kungayeva family, which means he was connected with the scandalous case of [Yury] Budanov.  In his time, Markelov represented the interests of the Chechen family in the case of Sergei Lapin (radio call sign “Cadet”), who was accused of torturing Grozny resident Zelimkhan Murdalov.  He was the attorney for Anna Politkovskaya, the victims in Blagoveshchensk (Rus), and “Nord-Ost”.  He fought for the right of amnesty for a Chechen resident, Musikhanov, who refused to serve under [Chechen President Ramzan] Kadyrov.  One can’t list everything.

Recently, Markelov had spoken as a lawyer for Mikhail Beketov, the editor-in-chief of the Khimkinskaya Pravda newspaper who was all but killed in the fall of last year.  Incidentally, they were friends.  The deceased lawyer wasn’t afraid of directly implicating the Khimki city administration in the attack on the journalist.  They say Stanislav was even conducting his own investigation.

Another critical detail – Markelov defended many activists in the Antifa [anti-fascist] movement.   Specifically, he took part in the murder cases of 19-year-old Alexander Ryukhin, teenager and skateboard enthusiast Stas Korepanov, and ecologist and anti-fascist Ilya Borodaenko by right wing [nationalist] radicals.  He was the attorney for the family of anti-fascist Alexei Krylov, and represented Alexei Olesinov, the Moscow leader of Antifa accused of hooliganism, in court.

This gives the anti-fascists and human rights activists grounds to assume that neo-nazis were involved in Markelov’s murder.  Stanislav himself said sometime that his name was on the list of “enemies” on certain right-wing radical websites.  In personal discussions, he called himself an adherent of the Antifa movement.  And the anti-fascists assert that journalist Anastasia Baburova was one of them as well.  “The perpetration of a crime, when two active anti-fascists are murdered in central Moscow in broad daylight leaves no doubt.  The murderers are neo-nazis!” the antifa write in their LiveJournal community.

Novaya Gazeta columnist Yulia Latynina leans to the theory that right wing radicals, connected with Budanov, killed Markelov.  “This is a case where everything is immediately clear,” she told me, reminding me that “fascists” had already attacked Stanislav for his part in the case against the former colonel.  “Budanov’s heroism consisted in that he raped a young Chechen girl, and the heroism of Markelov and Baburova’s killer in that he shot at defenseless people in the back of the head,” Yulia added.

Evidently, the law enforcement agencies are considering this as one of the main theories.  The leader of the [ultra-nationalist] Slavonic Union, Dmitri Demushkin, has already been called in for questioning to the Investigative committee.  He asserts that he will not likely be able to share any useful information with investigations.  Although that being said, he doesn’t hide that he always supported Budanov.  “Several years ago, I carried a poster with ‘Freedom to colonel Budanov’ to a May 9th [demonstration].  This has backfired for me,” he laments.

Demushkin thinks that someone among Budanov’s admirers organized the murder.  “If this was nationalists, then they were patriotically inclined.  People like colonel Kvachkov‘s defenders,” he says.  The leader of the Slavonic Union explains his certainty by the fact that the murder was too professional and as result uncharacteristic of skinheads.  “A hatred of their enemies is nurtured into skinheads, these people attack, inflict 30-40 knife wounds.  This isn’t the case when they keep guard for days, and then kill in cold blood and calmly ride away on the metro,” he says.

Demushkin doesn’t exclude the possibility that the killer didn’t shoot at Anastasia Baburova by chance, but that he knew the journalist by sight as an active member of Antifa.  Possibly, this sealed her fate.  “In certain circles, Anastasia was disliked,” Demushkin explains, “she was part of many actions, including forceful ones.”

Perhaps Budanov’s name is most often raised in relation to the attorney’s murder.  Many people with completely different political views and convictions are inclined to connect Markelov’s involvement in the former colonel’s case with his death on Prechistenka.  And there are many reasons for this.  First of all, Markelov himself on numerous occasions expressed fear that the former colonel’s not-quite sane fanatics, who to this day continue to threaten the Kungayev family, would become active on Budanov’s release on parole.  Secondly, at the press-conference, about an hour before the murder, the attorney announced that he had appealed the actions of the Dimitrovgrask city court judge, who didn’t accept his appeal of Budanov’s parole and released him.

Thirdly, immediately after what happened, the young Chechen Elza Kungayeva’s father told journalists that Markelov had been threatened with violence if he didn’t step down from the process and didn’t stop working in the family’s defense.  The human rights ombudsman in Chechnya, Nurdi Nukhazhiyev insisted on this version as well.  “With this execution, former colonel Budanov’s adherents marked the release of their idol,” he said in an interview with Kommersant.

At the same time, opponents of the “Budanov version” among journalists and bloggers are calling it overly evident, and hence unlikely.  As always happens in such cases, the version about the involvement of the secret services in the murder of a famous attorney also lingers in the air, with [the secret services] working out a cunning multi-step combination.  But it also has its right to exist.  In part, the statement by the For Human Rights movement says, that what happened could be a provocation of “those forces, who want to scare the society, and justify the introduction of new, strict police powers.”

The version about a raging fascist underground makes many people uneasy: indeed, official “anti-fascist human rights activists” like Alexander Brod and Nikolai Svanidze reacted to it a little too quickly.  In tough times of crisis and instability, they will most certainly call on everyone to rally against the “fascist plague,” forgetting about their daily bread for a while.  If such rhetoric continues to be actively sown in the future, the version about the secret services won’t seem quite so conspiratorial.

All the more so since many have rushed to say the murder was meant to set an example.  Indeed, it happened in the city center, just a kilometer from the Kremlin, in a fairly lively place.  This gives reason enough for former FSB officer and political prisoner Mikhail Trepashkin to say that the murder was done by a professional.  In his opinion, a specially trained person shot at Markelov, not an amateur.  “I don’t exclude that this wasn’t his first time shooting [a gun],” Trepashkin says.  The former FSB investigator also adds that the law enforcement agencies should have no problems in solving the crime, because “there are a mass of trails.”  If only the desire was there.

In addition, Trepashkin says the fact that the crime happened in the center doesn’t necessarily indicate that it was “meant to set an example.”  It is possible that the killer preferred not to spy on his victim near his home, as often happens, since the neighbors may have noticed a strange person and could  identify him later.

As for the weapon that fired the shot, according to the investigation’s latest data, it was a Makarov pistol.  It is not so simple to get one.  As is known, it is banned from free sale in our country.  The type of weapon in question is only available to certain agencies, which according to Trepashkin’s statement then trade on black market.  The highest military ranks are directly involved in this business, and as result the [black market] “stall” is still thriving.  As the former FSB employee notes, weapons were supplied from state munitions depots into Chechnya in precisely this manner in 1995.  “That is how weapons get in the hands of killers,” Trepashkin sums up.

How the killer got the pistol, is of course, important for those investigating what happened, but secondary to understanding why it happened.  Since they could have beaten the renowned attorney to death, like Yury Chervochkin and nazbol Anton Stradymov.  Or they could have poisoned him, like Yury Shchekochikhin and Alexander Litvinenko.

“They’ll kill him.  There are few like him left,” one of my friends said around a month ago, after he heard about Markelov on television.  I didn’t agree then.  I couldn’t have imagined that something could happen to a cheerful and joyful person like Stanislav.  So many dangerous cases behind him, and then suddenly he’s killed.

It happened.

Markelov differed from many of his colleagues in that he didn’t take political cases for the hell of it, for the publicity.  If he defended someone, then it was in earnest, with an intent to win.  And it’s hard just to call him a lawyer.  Human rights defender is more fitting.  And he did everything with a smile, jokingly.  In the same way, he never paid any mind to the threats against him.

On New Year’s, Stanislav sent me a congratulations.  I didn’t understand right away who it was from.  I didn’t recognize the phone number… And now I don’t believe in omens anymore.

How many more deaths like this are still to come?  And how many more people must die for our country’s people to wake up?

translation by theotherrussia.org