According to Rinpoche, the official response from Moscow cited the 65th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II as a complicating factor in their decision. “A visit by the Dalai Lama to Russia would be taken particularly painfully by Beijing during the current anniversary year of our shared victory with China in the Second World War,” read the response.

Russia’s concern over preserving positive relations with China, a major economic partner, was also the basis of the 2004 visa debacle. At the time, China, which sees the Dalai Lama as a dangerous separatist and routinely berates countries that allow him to visit, even issued a statement of approval of Russia’s refusal to grant the Buddhist leader’s visa. But following subsequent protests by Russian Buddhists, Moscow reversed its decision. This time around, said Rinpoche, “such a refusal is distressing, but we are not going to stop and will continue to work in this direction.”

But any reference to the World War II anniversary, which Russians celebrate annually as Victory Day with more fervency than almost any other national holiday, means that the Foreign Ministry is unlikely to relent. In addition to that, Rinpoche said that Moscow’s response cautioned that future discussions on a possible trip by the Dalai Lama to Russia would depend on “signs of an ease in tension in his relations with the official authorities of the PRC [People’s Republic of China].” Judging by the extent to which China lambasted the United States for the Buddhist leader’s February trip to meet with US President Barack Obama, no such ease is in sight.

“A modern transport infrastructure is the real road to Russia’s future,” said then-President Putin to a gathering of highway construction workers in the city of Krasnoyarsk in late 2007. And yet, not a single highway or expressway and only a smattering of smaller roads have been built in Russia over the past two decades. By comparison, China has laid more than 40,000 thousand miles of high-volume roadways over the same amount of time. “Naturally,” said Latynina, “this raises the question: Has anything been built in Russia with this money? And if yes, then what?”

It turns out that something was.

“For example, the presidential residence in the city of Yekaterinburg, which cost 1.2 billion rubles [about $40 million] to construct, and which President Medvedev has stayed in once,” said the journalist. A similar example was Konstantinovsky Palace in St. Petersburg, a crumbling historic landmark that Putin ordered be renovated in 2001 for use as a presidential residence. The official cost of renovation: $250 million.

There were more. One new presidential residence was constructed just two years ago. Another called Lunnaya Polyana is now in the works, blocked off from public view. An Olympic residence in Sochi is also planned for construction. All in all, said Latynina, Russia has built thirteen official residences for its president. Compare this, she proposed, to the number of official presidential residences in America: there are but two. And neither the White House nor Camp David is anything to rival the grandeur of Konstantinovsky Palace. “My point is that if you consider the number of residences, then Russia is a superpower and the United States just gets these two little things,” the journalist said.

On the topic of superpowers, Latynina questioned Putin’s declaration that Russia is a superpower in the raw materials market. “It’s very interesting to compare Russia with the production of natural gas in the United States,” she said, and followed to rattle off a list of figures: In 2008, Russia extracted 640 billion cubic meters of gas, 550 billion of which were from the state-owned company Gazprom – the latter figure being the more telling, as that’s what gets sold abroad. American production of gas totaled 582 billion cubic meters during the same year – less than Russia, but more than Gazprom. Then there’s the revenue: American gas sales totaled $185 billion in 2008, while Russian sales to Europe, its primary source of export, totaled only $47 billion. In addition, Russian production fell in 2009 to 575 billion cubic meters of gas, with 460 from Gazprom. America’s grew to 620 billion. “So why is Russia called a raw materials superpower?”

Russia, Latynina explained, has virtually no chemical industry. The United States, on the other hand, has the world’s most highly developed chemical industry. Thanks to its more energy-efficient facilities, she explained, the States are able to sell gas at a much higher price than Russia with its long, cold, ineffective pipelines. Meanwhile, instead of building more effective facilities, Gazprom built an exact replica of Konstantinovsky Palace for its CEO, Aleksei Miller. “I invite you to think about the philosophy of the matter,” said Latynina. “Bill Gates could not allow himself to build a Konstantinovsky Palace, because it’s a different philosophy of life… But Aleksei Miller could.”

Frivolous spending on the part of the Russian elite brought about the question of why the Russian government tells its citizens that “the West doesn’t love us.” If that were true, asks Latynina, then why would Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, Putin’s right-hand man, keep his plane in Helsinki and buy three different villas in Sardinia? Why are oligarch Roman Abromovich’s yachts registered in the West, including the $50 million one he gifted to Vladimir Putin? Why do all of the people who tell Russia’s citizens that the West doesn’t love them send their children to study in England? “Why don’t they keep their money in the banks of Iraq, North Korea, Venezuela, or the other wonderful countries that are friendly to Russia and love us a great deal?” asked Latynina.

In some cases, they do. On October 17, 2009, Prime Minister Putin announced the government’s decision to make a $500 million purchase of microprocessors with 90 nanometer process technology from the primarily government-supported French-Italian firm STMicroelectronics. Two weeks before this happened, Intel had announced that they were going to begin producing microprocessors with 32 nanometer technology. What was the point of buying something so expensive that was already out of date? According to Latynina, it was simply a way of transferring money abroad.

“In fact, for me it turns out to be a very sad story,” she went on. “It’s the story of the technical degradation of the foundation that we had from the Soviet Union.” While the STMicroelectronics purchase was sure to hinder the pace and efficiency of Russian industry and development, other instances of such degradation represented more direct threats to the safety of ordinary Russians. Poor construction and shoddy upkeep lead to the deaths of 75 people on August 17, 2009, when an old turbine in the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric dam spun out of control, breaking open the ceiling and flooding the facility. On the night of December 4, 2009, more than 150 people died in the Lame Horse club in the city of Perm when, having violated “every single possible fire safety regulation,” it shot up in flames. But most of the dead bodies dragged out of the club, Latynina pointed out, had no burn marks: the victims died almost instantly from smoke inhalation and carbon monoxide poisoning that resulted from burning foam polystyrene insulation. A commission set up to investigate the fire released its findings on March 9, concluding that the club’s own management was to blame. “But the scariest part is that it said in this report, verbatim, that ‘we cannot establish how harmful the foam polystyrene insulation was, how chemically harmful it was for people, for the reason that there was a lack of men on whom we would have liked to conduct experiments.'”

Really? “After the fire in the Lame Horse,” Latynina went on, “the government made quite a big fuss, especially President Medvedev. He loves to stomp his feet, crying ‘I’m going to deal with it,’ he always yells in future tense. ‘We must put an end to terrorism; we must put an end to corruption.’ I still haven’t heard that we’ve put an end to it, so it’s always in future tense.” It was clear, Latynina said, that the government wanted the situation to go away, and suppliers of construction materials had paid off the commission to keep silent about the foam. “So it turns out that they don’t have any men,” she said. “The president stomps his feet.”

Thus, in a nutshell, was Latynina’s dour prognosis of Russia’s current state of affairs.

During the questions that followed, Latynina was asked who would make a worthy Russian president. Her response: “Khodorkovsky,” the former oil tycoon currently sitting in prison. And what is to become of him? “He’ll sit in prison as long as Putin is in power.”

Latynina played down the audience’s fears that her safety was at stake for criticizing the Russian government. Arguing that Russia lacks internet censorship (as opposed to China) and allows Ekho Moskvy radio to broadcast whatever it wants, Latynina linked fears that free speech was being suppressed to the legacy left over from Soviet times. Back then, she said, people were arrested or murdered for speaking out against the government. “The maximum now is that they turn off the broadcast.” When numerous members of the audience objected that Russia figures as the third most lethal country in the world for journalists, Latynina countered that Russia was a lethal country for everyone. “It’s more dangerous to be a citizen of Russia than to be a journalist,” she said. “If you drive down Leninsky Prospekt and meet Lukoil Vice President Barkov, he’s not going to ask if you’re a journalist or not.”

That said, Latynina was skeptical of the effectiveness of initiatives by the Russian opposition, including a petition calling for Putin to resign that has so far gathered more than 18,000 signatures.

Asked for her opinion on Moscow’s plan to put up posters of Josef Stalin for Victory Day celebrations in May, Latynina replied: “Every person who wants to has a right to march for Stalin, because unlike Hitler, Stalin was never sentenced for having committed any crime – there are no laws saying that he was a criminal. But when it’s state-sponsored… You know, when dealing with these situations, I always think: What would Stalin do with Putin? He would put him up against the wall!”

It became apparent during the question and answer session that Latynina’s cynicism had frightened at least some members of her audience into considering the prospect that democracy in Russia was simply not possible, leaving Putin’s regime as the only viable choice. She was quick to dispel this notion, and delivered a more hopeful version of events then one might otherwise have come to expect. “First of all, I maintain that democracy in Russia is of course possible,” the journalist said in response. “But, you know, democracy is like a refrigerator. You can’t say that a certain refrigerator doesn’t work in Russia; it’s just that in Russia the electricity flows different. No – the refrigerator works in Russia if it has the particular electrical wiring for the place where you want it to work. If it doesn’t have the wiring, then it isn’t going to work.”

Therefore, Yezhednevny Zhurnal recently sat down with Kasparov for another interview, in order to extend the discussion of why European integration is necessary for Russia and how current political posturing on economic and political reforms will inevitably come to naught.

Garry Kimovich, in your opinion, do the nationalist and leftist wings of the National Assembly support the idea of European integration?

The strategic vector of Russia’s future development is, of course, a question for national discussion. At a time when a new global consensus is developing, Russia’s own interests force it to determine who its strategic partners are. It is possible that, as before, part of the left will look towards China. They think that the ruling Chinese Communist Party will implement the correct scenario for the country’s development.

However, in my opinion, if Russia focuses so recklessly on the East, it will inevitably cause our country to lose geopolitical subjectivity. Nothing will come of Russia’s own role, most likely becoming a purely raw-exports role for its active eastern neighbor. China is a very strong player, constantly driving economic expansion. By steadily expanding the limits of its influence, it has already established hegemony over practically the entire Asian expanse.

It is possible that there are some nationalists who, believing in Russia’s divine destiny, will say: “But we don’t need anyone – we’ll handle it ourselves.” I think that all of these utopian theories will come to be rejected as a result of discussion. I do not doubt that in the end, both the nationalists and the leftists will choose the vector of European integration.

Do you think that all Russian citizens support this geopolitical course?

Unlike the United States or China, which have a potentially negative connotation in the Russian consciousness, Europe won’t be rejected outright by Russian citizens. Europe is a related culture with high standards of living and free movement across the continent without the need for a visa. Where do our citizens turn to when they are disappointed with Russian justice? To Strasbourg. Many consider Europe to be a source of judicial justice. On the other hand, there’s a danger that people will get high expectations and hope that integration will solve all of our problems. The integration process is long and requires the introduction of legislation to bring us in line with basic European norms, and also to balance economic conditions and social safety nets.

Over the course of the integration process, the situation in the country should fundamentally change, of course, for the better. It is obvious that industries are beginning to move from the West to the East, closer to sources of raw materials, and that the qualified work force is catching up with them. Indeed, Europe today is suffering from overpopulation, and Russia has a great deal of undeveloped territory. If Russia becomes part of a common European expanse, we will be able to have European technology for, among other things, Russia’s gigantic farmlands. We will come to share such high-tech European projects as Airbus. With European integration, situations like the failed deal between Sberbank and Opel will become impossible. These issues will be resolved without the influence of political factors, even if the Americans don’t like it.

Is it just coincidental that several Kremlin political consultants have recently introduced projects that, in one way or another, promote the idea of European integration?

It is important to stress here that the Kremlin’s projects differ fundamentally from the processes of European integration as we understand them. They would base the integration of Russia with the Western world on alliances, including military-political ones, with various governments in Europe and America. For example, Director Igor Yurgens of the Institute for Contemporary Development proposed forming a military-political alliance with America together with his coauthors in a project entitled “A New Entente.” The United States could choose to enter into an alliance with Russia for their own tactical reasons – to move Russia away from China and to prevent China from creating a raw materials base in the Far East and Siberia. In doing so, the Americans would close their eyes to the lawlessness and absence of democracy in Russia.

The situation with Europe is more complex, but it could also enter into other types of elite arrangements. For example, former German Councilor Gerhard Schröder has already worked for Gazprom’s sister company for quite some time. The former Finnish Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen, also works for Gazprom. Silvio Berlusconi makes no attempt to hide his close business contacts with Putin. This is precisely why the propagandists from the Kremlin are trying to formulate such projects, so that they can maximally integrate the Russian elite with the global elite. Such plans would ensure that there would be no interference from the West in our own matters, and would preserve the patriarchal-feudal system of the Russian government. Even Dmitri Rogozin has spoken publicly about the use of integrating Russia into NATO. These projects are pure ostentation, and the authorities have absolutely no desire to discuss the process of real European integration that would demand a change in the inner substance of our state. Such changes would be fatal for the government, since they would have to introduce electoral legislation that corresponds to European norms.

Are the experts from the Institute for Contemporary Development, who are often critical of the government and promote various proposals to modernize the economy, really not potential allies for the opposition?

As a matter of fact, they are our antagonists; our ideological opponents. And they are all the more dangerous – in contrast with open fans of authoritarian and totalitarian forms of governance, they put on a show of multi-layered, ostentatious rhetoric to hide their actual refusal to accept political liberalism. That the very meanings of “democracy” and “liberalism” have been cheapened in the eyes of Russian society has been their “contribution.”

Rehabilitating liberal thought in Russia would require overcoming the inertia of a massive consciousness that still include proponents of the views of Gaidar and Chubais. Andrei Piontkovsky devotes much consideration to this important topic in his impassioned articles, constantly pointing out how these types of Russian liberals are incorporated into the infrastructure of the oligarchic regime. The National Patriots, who have shown that they are prepared to work with other ideological groups and abandon current stereotypes, did an interesting comparative analysis of the position of liberals and neo-liberal “liberasts” on key socio-political issues.

Not long ago, Yegor Gaidar made a very important confession. In an interview with Novaya Gazeta, he said that while we had indeed created a market economy, “we did not solve one of the important problems – the separation of power and property.” Herein lies Yegor Timurovich’s trickery: that the problem of the separation of power and property was never solved. We never had real market reform because the market, most of all, presupposes a systematic battle against monopolization in every sector, and not a formal division and privatization by the very same oligarchs of companies such as the Unified Energy System.

In her new book, “The Lonely Power,” Lilia Shevtsova writes that Russian “reformers” came under criticism in the 1990s by Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel laureate in economics, then-Senior Vice President of the World Bank. “Privatization is no great achievement,” Stiglitz mocked the “privatizers,” “it can occur whenever one wants – if only by giving away property to one’s friends. Achieving a private competitive market economy on the other hand is a great achievement but this requires an institutional framework, a set of credible and enforced laws and regulations.” Stiglitz convincingly proved that privatization in Russia occurred “in an unregulated environment,” and instead of doing what was needed to creating the environment “to curb political intrusion in market processes, an instrument was created to be used by special interest groups and political forces to preserve power,” Shevtsova concludes.

The oligarchic method of governing – that is to say, the seamless interweaving of power and property – will sooner or later lead to the abolition of democracy as such. Nobody will give up their power if they risk losing their property. Obviously, the ideal of the Medvedev wing that Yurgens represents is the liquidation of various excesses from Putin’s administration. But in doing so, it may not touch the oligarchic essence of the state. The Russian liberals that are incorporated into the system fear free elections like fire, since they inevitably lead to the abolition to the oligarchic model of government rule. Among these people, genuine liberalization brings about a real allergic reaction.

Why, then, was Igor Yurgens present at the conference of the Public Anti-crisis Initiative, expressing his intent to sign a measure that would promote political demands to modernize the political system?

First of all, signing a demand and managing to fulfill it are very different things. Secondly, the political reforms proposed by this group go, at the very most, only halfway. Without a doubt, Vladimir Ryzhkov, Sergei Aleksashenko and even Aleksandr Lebedev can potentially be our allies, but they have never before crossed the line necessary to challenge the system.

What do you think of the idea of gradual democratization of the system, which many have put their hopes in?

An anti-democratic regime can be neither reformed nor modernized; it can only be dismantled. All the hope that goes into finding a way to somehow reform or perfect the current system is in vain. It’s impossible, because the essence of the system will remain the same. Yegor Gaidar was precise in defining this: it’s power and property mixed up in the same bottle. Our situation will not change while the question of the separation of power and property remains resolved. This is a purely political decision. There exists no other way of reforming the system, such as with free elections. The five-second rule doesn’t apply to free elections – they’re basically saying that “we cannot allow irresponsible people to come to power.” We take a directly contradictory stance: “Give the people freedom, and you need not worry excessively about their elections.”

Do you think that the government’s apologists will convince the public that the discussion of unfair elections is a thing of the past, and that now, like they say, the new president is working to curb the “administrative games” of United Russia?

As a matter of fact, Medvedev has said nothing about honest elections; I don’t need to speak on his behalf. Twenty years ago, this was a beloved pastime of Western experts, who based their conjectures on their readings of Gorbachev in translation. Thank god we listen to Medvedev in Russian! On the contrary, he maintained the status-quo, saying: “We shall not rock the boat… We shall not allow the balance to be disrupted… We shall put this to an abrupt stop… We shall put them in jail.” Add to that the fact that the authorities took this as a direct order and put Limonov in jail for ten days for standing up for citizens’ right to freedom of assembly. Nothing in Medvedev’s speeches indicates that the Russian president wants real change. So, let’s leave him alone.

The apologists from the “Medvedev Majority” don’t say anything about free elections, either. This remains the case even when examining very different people. For example, the same Igor Yurgens who talks about the possibility of democracy “from above.” He proposes creating two political parties – one under Putin and another under Medvedev, and making it so that they can replace each other from time to time. Are those really free elections? This is a mask for the regime, unapologetically suppressing any impulses that threaten the bond between power and property. And free elections are a direct threat to the oligarchic method of managing the economy.

This is also characteristic of the regional governments, where the families of governors and state prosecutors control large spheres of business. So the regional elites aren’t interested in free elections, either. But Medvedev’s apologists won’t manage to fool the people. Russia’s main “liberast,” Anatoly Chubais, generally sees these tricks as an empty waste of time, and is calling directly for economic reform, putting a stop to these unnecessary discussions of political reform.

One more apologist from the “modernization majority,” a, is trying to hoist the same agenda upon us, but hiding it behind the name of Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov. Such attempts are typical for the more active Russian “liberasts,” and are especially immoral because they use Sakharov’s humanitarian legacy to justify a purely technocratic approach to governing the country, one based on the innermost contempt for its own people.

Then what does it tell us when, for example, prominent United Russia member Andrei Makarov announces that the Internal Ministry needs to be liquidated? Did he not, in fact, state your proposal?

That’s the spontaneous revolt of individual people who are sensing the dead end ahead. Anyone not completely hardwired into the system is protesting. And within the system, this protest is gaining momentum. “Sartre’s nausea,” as Andrei Piontkovsky writes, is approaching. The Brezhnev generation might see the question of when everything will come tumbling down as a rhetorical one, but for the 40-50-year-olds who make up the basis of the current government, this is not a theoretical question, but a practical one. Today, these people want to understand what will happen tomorrow. They still have the strength and desire to not wind up beneath the wreckage of the system.

And indeed, the system is not going to collapse just because I write that it will – all I do is expound upon the fears and dangers that a lot people are experiencing. I think that the process of the system’s collapse is going to gain momentum. At the end of the day, the stumbling block will be the question of political liberalization.

It’s possible that all of these people will put their hopes in Medvedev until the very end…

But he isn’t planning to introduce any corrections into the political system. After a year and a half of Medvedev’s tenure as president of Russia, Putin’s authoritarian regime has only become more severe. The Internal Ministry now has a special new subdivision for the war on extremism – Center “E;” cases of extremism have begun to appear, demonstrations have begun to be broken up more severely, and political activists have begun getting beaten.

In addition, today we have come face-to-face with a new and extremely dangerous phenomenon – the sharp growth of street violence between neo-Nazi and anti-fascist groups. Violence is pouring out onto the streets, and the thieving, cowardly government tries to use violence to its own ends. All of Medvedev’s attempts to play an independent role are connected with a desire to preserve Putinism without Putin. Further thoughts on this are worthless. Putin and Medvedev are representatives of a single system, one where power and property are combined. This renders the whole conversation about economic reform meaningless. The monopoly in politics and the economy doesn’t go together well with free elections.

Would you, then, recommend those who aren’t hardwired into the system to wait for the regime’s collapse?

In any case, I don’t advise them to participate in Medvedev’s various initiatives – that’s an attempt to shift his civic duty onto somebody else. Such attempts may bring about an opposite result and only prolong the agony of the regime. No attempt to play along with Medvedev’s initiatives will benefit anyone. The citizens that want free parliamentary elections have been effective in uniting into their own networks.

Is this where you got the idea to transform the National Assembly into a series of networks?

Yes, we are planning to reform the National Assembly. We want to make it available for all Russian citizens to join, and also to create regional branches for the National Assembly. The new structure will respond to the demand to represent a maximum number of different ideological trends on the basis of our common values. We hope that the existence of such a wide-ranging structure will help us support the country at a time of catastrophe, and implement a range of necessary actions during the transitional period while the country is preparing for elections – which will be held with clear, transparent rules. Right now, nobody knows where they’re going to be working, whether in the legislative, executive, or judicial branches; we can develop an objective procedure for elections and a system of checks and balances that would suit everyone.

In your opinion, will the National Assembly be the only force vying for power when the system collapses?

Undoubtedly not. A variety of forces will come to the surface during the moment of chaos. The advantage of our organizational structure is that it includes all colors of the rainbow; all political spectrums. The National Assembly is a place to form a new political expanse. We have an important trump card – nobody has learned better than us how to negotiate the most complex issues. And it is only possible to rescue the state during a moment of crisis on the basis of a wide consensus.

Interview conducted by Olga Gulenok. Original version in Russian available on Ej.ru.

Exclusive translation by theotherrussia.org.

The thoughts and proposals laid out in these articles elicited a stormy reaction from within the internet community. In an interview with Yezhednevny Zhurnal on November 23 to further explain his positions, Kasparov discussed the goals of Russia’s united political opposition, the importance of Russia’s integration into Europe, and the futility of Medvedev’s plans for modernization.

Garry Kimovich, in your opinion, how successful overall has the opposition been in moving forward in the development of its “way of the future,” given that it has been criticized for lacking one?

The National Assembly is an arena that was created for different ideological forces, united by a rejection of the current system, to discuss an agenda for the future of our country. The inability of the governing regime to make changes adequate for the demands of the 21st century has imposed this necessity upon us. Preserving the status quo has lead to the ruin of our state. An understanding of the doom of this regime and of these other menaces – which invariably lead to an uncontrolled collapse through our rotten government agencies – formed the basis for the unification of the opposition.

From the moment of conception of the United Civil Front in 2005, I have not tired in repeating that dismantling Putin’s regime is an applied problem. Dismantling does not presume total destruction; on the contrary, in order to avoid tragic consequences, maximal moderation is necessary to analyze the elements of the faulty structure that may still be used when forming a new statehood. The National Assembly defined a minimum set of basic elements: free elections, abolishment of censorship, and the observation of human rights. These simple things are written in its charter. The stage was therefore set to produce a national consensus. The task is to identify reference points to use to draw up a new state structure. This series of conferences is dedicated to drafting a new constitution, since the current one is, frankly, authoritarian. So that process is going forward rather intensely.

What place does your series of articles “Russia After Putin” have in this process?

They are the result of long discussions, including within the National Assembly, on political problems in this country. I dedicated the first piece of material to the morphology of the regime, since I think it’s important to find the root of the problem in the search for an exit from the crisis. It’s well known that many people, unprepared for a critical perception of reality, are easily subjected to ideological influence. The authorities use this effectively to their own ends, imposing their own perceptions onto such people by using various myths that unabashedly exploit the understandings of democracy and liberalism. We perceive a close interdependence between Yeltsin’s and Putin’s periods of rule. This position is now becoming commonplace even among experts.

The second part of my article, “Project Display,” characterizes the state of mind. I did a survey of ideas thought up by the opposition, since the official public arenas are intentionally “scorched” (even our parliament has ceased to be a place for discussion, and there are homunculi breeding in [Kremlin ideologist Vladislav] Surkov’s test tubes that are unable to think up any creative, original ideas). In the third part, I tried to lay out my vision of Russia’s future without changing my political views, which with a stretch of the imagination can be classified as left-liberal.

My first attempt to formulate this project strives to determine what will be acceptable to society. It’s possible, of course, to dream of various things – for instance, of the restoration of our state within the boundaries of the 1975 Helsinki Accords (a project that the nationalist-patriots announced at the conference), but my intentions are not so ambitious. I believe that in order to achieve a consensus, the project should take into account both the domestic political situation and the realities of our foreign policy. The National Assembly is an extremely representative platform that includes the main ideological camps of Russian society.

For your project, did you try to keep in mind ideas that would accommodate various groups?

When you’re looking for a consensus between different groups, you don’t attain anything by just tallying ideas. Politics, in any case, is not math. The main thing is that, understanding that we must somehow come to an agreement, we have already put a stop to the “citizen cold war” within our association. Moreover, such a consensus is necessary to counter an ideological ghetto, which is the atmosphere that the authorities are trying to reanimate. The authorities don’t try to suppress, for example, ideologically homogeneous demonstrations. On their own, the communists, nationalists, and liberals can have their own protests – but as the united transideological opposition undertakes any joint effort – for example, [Eduard] Limonov and [Lyudmila] Alexeyeva holding a joint rally – there, the authorities react in the blink of an eye, cruelly suppressing their effort. That very unification is seen as a menace. The ability of various ideological forces to agree with each other on government management methods, on the constitution, on the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and on the transitional period, represents an alternative to the existing authorities. And we cannot make do without compromise. In particular, I try to develop political formulas that such a “motley crew” could accept. Certainly, any draft reflects the convictions of the person who wrote it, and for me there’s a fundamentally liberal trend, but I’m prepared to make a compromise in the decision and take a more eclectic view.

In your opinion, how could a window of opportunity open for the opposition to implement your project?

The world is facing global change. In developed countries, there are attempts to extinguish it through financial influence. This even includes publishing houses that act in violation of their own basic beliefs. This, in my view, is the agony of the current world order. The fact that the system doesn’t follow the trends of the times is leading to a global cataclysm. During such periods in history, the world usually went through war. I hope that now it will make do without a major war; there’s an understanding, in any case, of the catastrophic scale of the consequences. But there are, in fact, localized wars. We live in a time of permanent war, when change comes at the expense of the weak and ill-equipped.

Right now, Russia is the weakest player on the global geopolitical map. The country is turning from an object into a subject, most of all in Chinese politics. As we can see, the Sinicization of the Far East is proceeding at full speed. Our government is helping China to prepare this gigantic staging area. The second menace is radical Islam, which comes from the south where the North Caucasus are a hotbed of tension. Illegal immigration exacerbates danger for Russia with its accompanying demographic problems.

Given these circumstances, I have a clearly formulated task: To preserve the core of Russian civilization, preferably within its current borders. There is an excellent toast from a classic Soviet film that comes to mind: “Let us drink so that our wishes would always corresponded with our opportunities!”

In any case, what concrete events could there be in our country that would dismantle the regime?

In commentaries to my article, many citizens wrote: “What Constituent Assembly – there are no elections here in general!” They say all that you’ve described – that it’s a utopia and will never correspond to reality. It seems to me that we don’t need to mix up these particulars of our reality with the general direction of our strategy. Of course, we can’t examine any scenario separate from its existing reality, but if we begin making adjustments to the things that we must necessarily build so that they correspond with today’s realities, then in the long run we drift into this so-called “Medvedev modernization.”

That’s not something that can last. I can’t make an exact prediction as to when the system will fall apart, but in my view it is inevitable. For example, it suddenly became clear in February 1917 that the government was non-functional. Today, state institutions are in an even worse crisis than back then. Today, disgust with the regime is spontaneously beginning to engulf the most varied, previously depoliticized strata of society, and furthermore, its support – the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This is attested to by these virtual (for now) police riots. It’s happening because of the sense of the hopelessness of the regime and of its dead end. It is itself tumbling towards catastrophe; we have no influence on it.

The possible types of scenarios can vary. It’s possible that I’m mistaken, but I’m incredibly certain about these events. When it happens is not important, but it is the duty of every honest citizen and patriot of our country to have a plan of action to propose – not to this regime, but to the people who want to form the core of a new statehood. The sooner we come to an agreement and reach a consensus, the more certainty there is that we will be able to find a common language in the frame of this new structure. This will be our greatest contribution to the creation of a future Russia.

And what will be the fate of the entire class of bureaucrats?

It’s not necessary to automatically write the whole class of bureaucrats into one category to cleanse and purge. However, we cannot repeat the mistake of the past and say that for the sake of civil peace we should close our eyes to the fact that many high-ranking civil servants, judges, police commanders, and deputies have acted in obvious violation of the law. It is obvious that anyone who tarnished their reputation by grossly violating the law cannot operate normally in our new state institutions. So a purge is inevitable, but what has to be discussed is the scale of the purge of the executive administration.

In my view, reforms in Russia cannot be taken gradually, even moreso if they concern such conservative social strata as the civil servants. My rather radical proposal is to organize the state administration’s structure by cutting the number of branch ministers and transfer administrative functions to the regional – and to a greater degree, the municipal – level. By doing this, we strip off a part of the federal bureaucracy that lived by distributing quotas and issuing permits, and by being able to extract bureaucratic duties. Shifting the focus of the administration’s burden is a more down to earth approach, and is closer to the spirit of the people’s traditions – and that is a better way to preserve the state.

One could theoretically agree with your thesis that reforms need to be taken quickly. But practically speaking, how will people react to this that have already lived through the shock of the beginning of the 1990s and don’t wish to repeat it?

As a matter of fact, it’s not the reforms that frighten people, but the material deprivation and psychological discomfort. A well thought-out plan and clear actions by administrative specialists, including ones in the financial sphere that could prevent businesses from stalling, would help avoid any social chaos. I believe that the population will accept many of the reforms with enthusiasm. For example, allotting more authority to smaller regions is a popular idea. Indeed, the majority of Russian citizens see Moscow as a vacuum cleaner, sucking out money from the provinces. That or the Ministry of Internal Affairs takes it. It’s perfectly obvious that the current form of the ministry, a hotbed of corruption and suppression of dissent, is completely out of date. The police are seen more than anything as menaces to the citizens, and by no means as a force to curb the crime rate. That’s to say nothing about the internal military troops, which are nonsense in general. We need an army for state defense from foreign expansion, which it is necessary to strengthen. I would intend for the internal security services and the Investigative Committee to be the ones fighting crime. The police should work to enforce the law, which is primarily a question of the local government. It is therefore necessary to hold elections for the municipal chief of police, as well as for local judges and prosecutors.

In your opinion, how important is the list of ministries and departments in the structure of government that you are proposing?

That’s a question of the essence of the government. As a matter of fact, the list of ministries and departments, which itself could make you laugh, defines both the social direction of the government and the ability to weaken its capacities for repression. This is something that I demonstrate clearly. Monsters such as the Internal Ministry disappear, but the government departments show up and expand the scope of the state’s concerns.

I, for example, propose to institute a department for the affairs of veterans of military action and the armed forces. There are many such people, many more than we think – veterans of the Great Patriotic War, military actions in Chechnya and Afghanistan, and participants of other military conflicts where Soviet specialists were unofficially involved. Our work with them should not be limited to one-time cash payouts or other compensation – the ability for veterans to adapt to peaceful life is a large, systemic problem for the government.

Additionally, many strategic planning problems need to be solved during the transitional period, and central planning agencies like the Ministry of Economic Development will become necessary. Something that I consider fundamental is for state agencies to direct their actions towards solving key problems, and for Russia, among the most important of these is to decrease income disparity within the population. In my opinion, we should make a conscious decision to put this task at the forefront of state politics. It cannot be solved without restoring citizens’ trust in the state. We have to put a stop for good to the practice of deceiving citizens and finally repay old debts. This would include, for example, holdings kept in Sverbank and other Soviet credit institutions.

That question will be of interest to people in the 40 to 50-year-old generation. What about your project could attract young people?

We invite young people most of all to participate in the creation of a normal state, one that you don’t have to run away from. A state interested in its citizens. A state in which bureaucrats don’t just stand on the path of freedom and social development, but work on it. What I’m talking about requires the cooperative work of a massive number of people. Will we have this? I don’t know; nobody can guarantee that. If young people want to get everything for free, then let them go work with the Nashisti. There they give out t-shirts and tell you what needs to be done. That’s one algorithm of behavior.

I’m appealing to conscious people who think about what’s going to happen next with their country. All I’m proposing is a new structure of government that has no limits on citizen participation. We don’t want talented, intellectual people to leave our country. We want to give them additional opportunities and make perspective work available in different areas of study, whether it’s road or bridge construction or designing and launching spacecraft…

And this is all within a single political and legal realm that would stretch from Lisbon to Vladivostok…

Show me someone who can demonstrate a different way to keep Siberia and the Far East as part of Russia. Left to fend for itself, Russia winds up face to face with China in the east and radical Islam in the south. Only by integrating Russia into a single expanse with Europe can we maintain our territory and stop Chinese expansion.

That said, a Russia integrated into Europe would have an increased weight in world affairs. Only through integration and cooperation with Europe will Russia begin to solve its problems. It seems to me that this is an acceptable option for the overwhelming number of Russian citizens, since they are related by blood to Europeans.

Is this the key idea of your project?

This is not a project for the next 50 years; this is what we need to do now. Bringing Russian legislation into compliance with pan-European laws needs to start immediately. It is completely believable that Turkey’s inception into the European Union, which I also see as a positive development in world politics, will become a reality within the next decade. That said, Turkish society will have to overcome a much more elementary gap with the European Union because of a combination of historical, religious and social factors.

Are you saying that Russia’s current leadership is not trying to enter the European Union?

If you’re talking about the country that they’re in charge of, then to our general misfortune, it turns out that of course they are not. You can only see that aspiration in a personal capacity – by looking at bank accounts, purchases of soccer teams and real estate, and so on. Many civil servants’ children, including Putin’s, live there. I’m talking about the integration of our country, not of the individual families of billionaires.

And is Russia awaited within the European Union?

In its Putin-Medvedev version, of course not. Currently, the legal system in Russia is different from the norms of the European Union. Its political and legal structure makes it alien. We need a new vector of development. Infected as it is with corruption, Russia cannot become a full member of the European Union. Nevertheless, it’s easy for Europe to see the possible benefits of reconciliation. It makes it possible, within a single framework, to use the industrial strength of Europe to open up Russia’s vast natural resources. By and large, Russia has a gigantic territory and is poorly populated, whereas Europe has been resettled. The general concept of development based on new technology in the decades ahead, creating a united network of highways all the way up to Vladivostok, will allow for more unified job distribution. Many Russian citizens that left the country because they saw no prospects for themselves will be able to return to their homeland. The weight of the European Union will also increase with Russia becoming a part of the European expanse.

Why doesn’t Europe see all of these benefits to itself?

If you have to deal with corrupt authorities, you wind up forced to speak at arm’s length. When Russia makes a clear declaration of a course of reconciliation with Europe, it will be met there by open arms.

By and large, there are two major geopolitical players in the world today – the United States and China. The European Union is too fragmented to resist both the United States and China by itself. But a European Union that included Russia – that’s a powerful player, and it would be counted right alongside the United States and China. As a matter of fact, it would alter the world map dramatically. Such an incredibly powerful political and economic union would bring the world ballast and stability.

Interview conducted by Olga Gulenok. Original version in Russian available on Ej.ru.

Exclusive translation by theotherrussia.org.