Representatives of the movement justified the necessity of the restructuring. They noted that many of its leaders have recently moved on to other work in the government, including the State Duma, the Federation Council, municipal administrations, and the Committee for Youth Affairs created under the presidential administration.

At the same time, political analysts connected the coming changes with fading interest from the Kremlin. They cited a waning need for the group’s mammoth street demonstrations, which were intended to combat the opposition. “Russia’s streets are already under our control,” Ivan Demidov, the head of the movement’s Coordination Council, told Kommersant in an interview. “Now, more sensible behavior is required. Before, we were presenting ourselves, and now we’ll take to creating.”

“The street won’t empty, but protests against political opponents won’t be needed any more,” Demidov added.

Less than a month ago, news surfaced of a structural reorganization at Nashi, another pro-Kremlin youth group. Nashi will soon close the majority of its regional offices, decentralize leadership, and change the scope of its activities. As with the Young Guard, political analysts attributed the group’s new format with the wish of authorities to move away from street demonstrations, which have led to scandal and embarrassment on numerous occasions.

Radov, the group’s top campaign manager, was loudly critical of the group:

“It’s sad when something that you have put your hands, heart, time and talent into turns into an ugly monster. Today, the Young Guard ideology is populism… and that’s not my ideology. Instead of democratic values, [they are] promulgating and establishing authoritarian values which I cannot be close with.”

Radov wrote that he was tired “of the greed, lack of integrity and the all-consuming ideology of party members and bureaucrats, who no one will ever change. The elections have decisively turned into a farce, a parody of the citizens’ expression of their free will.”

“The practice of political repression is continuing in the country,” the youth leader continued. “The pro-Kremlin parties and movements operate under conditions of rigged political competition, [or] more accurately, they altogether don’t experience any competition and don’t plan on ever experiencing it.”

Radov also noted that many Young Guard activists were fed up with the organization. He told Kommersant that promises have not been kept to the volunteers. “They promised us a lot in regard to the elections, and people haven’t even been given the chance to become aides to deputies.”

The former “younguardsman” called on all other members of the organization to follow in his example and “quit the ranks of the Young Guard and engage in something publicly or at least personally useful and meaningful.”

Andrei Tatarinov, another Young Guard leader, told the Moscow Times that Radov’s accusations were “unfounded.” Dismissing the importance of Radov’s work in the organization, Tatarinov commented that the former activist was previously “displeased with his low salary.”