Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev previously stated that while the new doctrine was based on the previous one from 2000, it included changes to properly reflect a change in global circumstances.

Patrushev insisted that the document was defensive, but that NATO expansion, international terrorism, and conflict in the North Caucasus were examples of changes in circumstances that require a change in military doctrine.

With Friday’s presidential confirmation, Russia now reserves the right to deliver a nuclear strike not only in response to direct aggression, but also “in response to a threat, against it or its allies, of the use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction, and also in response to aggression with the use of conventional weapons in situations critical for the Russian Federation.”

The document, entitled “Fundamentals of State Politics Regarding Nuclear Deterrence Through 2020,” is the third version of Russia’s military doctrine since 1993.

The version confirmed in 2000 only gave Russia the right to use nuclear force in response to the actual use of aggression, reading “the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use, against its or its allies, of nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction, and also in response to large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons.”

The new military doctrine, which will be the third version introduced since 1993, comes at a time of heightened military hostility from the Kremlin. A recent bill passed by the State Duma expands the potential role of troops deployed abroad, and NATO has expressed concern that war games in September between Russia and Belarus were “the largest since the end of the Cold War.”

In an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta on November 20, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev said that the doctrine will now provide for a possible preemptive nuclear strike depending on situational considerations and the intentions of a potential adversary.

The secretary cited the desire to retain the status of Russia as a nuclear power in order to act as a deterrent, especially from other nuclear powers, as a main reason for the change in doctrine. “A potential adversary should comprehend the futility of unleashing aggression with the use of not only nuclear, but of conventional means of destruction,” said Patrushev. “The inevitability of retribution is a sobering factor for any potential aggressor.”

That said, Patrushev stressed that the military doctrine was defensive and that Russia categorically opposes the use of military force – let alone a nuclear strike – to settle any conflict.

However, the secretary cited NATO expansion, international terrorism, and conflict in the North Caucasus as evidence that Russia continues to face potential military threats, apparently justifying the nuclear policy. He singled out last year’s war in Georgia as an example of the “senseless policy and unmeasured ambitions of [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili” that “directly affected the life and security of our citizens.”

Military analysts were divided in response to the doctrine. An article in the Christian Science Monitor reported that experts were divided into two groups: those who saw the policy as increasingly menacing towards Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors, and those who saw it as an expression of vulnerability in a time of radical military reorganization.

“Naturally, the army is weakened, temporarily weakened, by these very radical changes,” said Vitaly Shlykov, an adviser to the Russian Defense Ministry. “It’s natural that we would rely more on our nuclear deterrent during this transition, though it’s debatable whether that should be done in the loud fashion that Patrushev did.”

The new military doctrine, which will be the third version introduced since 1993, comes at a time of heightened military hostility from the Kremlin. A recent bill passed by the State Duma expands the potential role of troops deployed abroad, and NATO has expressed concern that war games in September between Russia and Belarus were “the largest since the end of the Cold War.”

Writing for the Wall Street Journal, Russian opposition leader Garry Kasparov calls for President Barack Obama to face the reality of Russia’s interests in continued high tensions in the Middle East, and to take a serious stance in talks with Moscow over Iran’s nuclear program.

Russia Worries About the Price of Oil, Not a Nuclear Iran
The Obama administration’s foreign-policy goodwill has yet to be repaid in kind.

By GARRY KASPAROV
October 18, 2009
Wall Street Journal

Last Wednesday in Moscow, the remaining illusions the Obama administration held for cooperation with Russia on the Iranian nuclear program were thrown in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s face. Stronger sanctions against Iran would be “counterproductive,” said Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, just days after President Dmitry Medvedev said sanctions were likely inevitable. This apparent inconsistency should remind us that Mr. Medvedev is little more than a well-placed spectator, and that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who discounted sanctions in a statement from Beijing, is still the voice that matters.

This slap comes after repeated concessions—canceling the deployment of missile defenses in Eastern Europe, muted criticism of Russia’s sham regional elections—from the White House. Washington’s conciliatory steps have given the Kremlin’s rulers confidence they have nothing to fear from Mr. Obama on anything that matters.

And nothing matters more to Mr. Putin and his oligarchs than the price of oil. Even with oil at $70 a barrel, Russia’s economy is in bad straits. Tension in the Middle East, even an outbreak of war, would push energy prices higher. A nuclear-armed Iran would, of course, be harmful to Russian national security, but prolonging the crisis is beneficial to the interests of the ruling elite: making money and staying in power.

The Obama administration’s foreign policy has directed a great deal of optimism and good will toward friends and foes. Such a cheery outlook is commendable as long as it does not clash with reality. Unfortunately, there were several clashes in the past week.

On Wednesday, a top Russian security chief, Nikolai Patrushev, said in an interview in Izvestia, one of the main Kremlin propaganda papers, that Russia was planning to reshape its policies on nuclear force to allow for pre-emptive strikes and use in regional conflicts. Since it cannot be a coincidence that this news leaked while Mrs. Clinton was still in Moscow, it can be considered a response to Mr. Obama’s talk of a world without nuclear weapons and rescinding the deployment of missile defenses.

Also last week, Lt. Gen. Vladimir Shamanov was cleared of wrongdoing for dispatching a squad of his paratroopers to interfere with the criminal investigation of a firm owned by his son-in-law. Transcripts of the general’s phone calls demonstrating his involvement were published in Novaya Gazeta newspaper, the last print outlet critical of the Kremlin. But this was not enough to cause trouble for this idol of the second Chechen war, where his forces were repeatedly accused by Human Rights Watch and other organizations of atrocities against civilians.

Then there was the spectacle of Russia’s regional elections. They were as fraudulent and superfluous as every election under Mr. Putin’s reign, with real opposition candidates barred and the ruling United Russia party receiving its predetermined majority. This time the fraud was too blatant even for Kremlin-allowed opposition party leaders Alexander Zhirinovsky and Gennady Zyuganov, who loudly protested results that have moved Russia to the verge of a one-party dictatorship. Mr. Medvedev asserted that the elections had gone perfectly well. Meanwhile, the U.S. statement expressed the usual concerns and quoted President Medvedev’s own words on the importance of free and fair elections—as if he would be shamed by them.

From the shameless expect no shame. And from a corrupt and criminal regime, expect no changes unless real consequences are put on the table. With Russia, this would mean going after Mr. Putin’s coterie of oligarchs and hitting them where it hurts: their privileges and their pocketbooks. If the European Union and the U.S. started canceling visas and prying into finances, they would find the Kremlin far more interested in sanctions against Iran. Mr. Putin has used human rights and democracy as bargaining chips because these things matter to the West and not to him. Until the game is played for stakes with value to the Kremlin, it’s a one-sided contest.

If the U.S. is serious about preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, then Mr. Obama must get to the point and state the penalties unequivocally. Repeating over and over that it is “unacceptable” has become a joke. For more than 10 years a nuclear North Korea was also “unacceptable.” If Mr. Obama says the U.S. will do whatever it takes to prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon, then we will see if Tehran blinks. At a minimum, the White House should publicly promise that any attack on Israel with weapons of mass destruction will be treated as an attack on American soil and urge NATO to make a similar commitment.

Like many Russians, I was encouraged by Mr. Obama’s inspirational speech in Moscow last July, but he must know there is more to statesmanship than printing money and making speeches. Inflated rhetoric, like inflated currency, can lead to disaster. The goodwill bubble Mr. Obama is creating will burst unless there are real results soon.

Mr. Kasparov, leader of The Other Russia coalition, is a contributing editor of The Wall Street Journal.

“I think we should stand strong and indicate that that is something that crosses a threshold, crosses a red line, for the United States of America,” General Norton Schwartz said at a confirmation hearing in Washington on Tuesday. The General is nominated to be the U.S. Air Force chief of staff.

The General’s statement came in response to an article published in the Izvestia newspaper (Rus), which quoted a high-ranking unnamed source within Russia’s military establishment. The source indicated that Russia may bring strategic nuclear bombers to Cuba in response to the construction of a US Missile Defense Shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. “While they are deploying the missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, our strategic bombers will already be landing in Cuba,” the source reportedly said. It remained unclear if bombers would be stationed in Cuba, or would use bases there to refuel.

Russia has spoken out vehemently against the construction of a US anti-missile system close to its borders, and has called the system a threat to its national security. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement that the country would “be forced to react not in a diplomatic fashion but with military methods,” if elements of the system went forward.

Russian authorities declined to comment on the Izvestia report, although some military officials welcomed any steps that would enhance Russia’s global influence. Mikhail Oparin, a former commander of a Russian base in Cuba, which was closed in 2001, told the Interfax news agency that “Russia’s air fleet must work towards a presence in every corner of the world.”

Shortly after the Czech Republic signed an agreement with the US on the placement of anti-missile radar there, oil shipments from Russia were halved. Transneft, the Russian state-run pipeline monopoly claimed this was the result of technical reasons, although some experts saw political motivations. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin later ordered the government to ensure that there be no more shortfalls.

The US has maintained that its anti-missile system is targeted at defending against a possible attack from Iran, and that it poses no threat to Russian security.

Still, the placement of the system has drawn wide public scorn, with various proposals on how to respond.

Alexander Pikaev, the head of the disarmament and conflict settlement department of the Russian Academy of Sciences, spoke of one method to RIA Novosti (Rus):

“If Russian consumers were to forgo Czech beer in protest of the deployment of American radar, after, of course, all the ratification procedures, which may not even take place there, then this would likely be a serious response, more serious than restricting the supply of oil or a note of protest by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”