The War on Terrorism: Medvedev Takes Putin’s Path
By Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan
April 8, 2010
Yezhednevny Zhurnal

In the week that has passed since the bombings on the city metro, President Dmitri Medvedev has actively intruded upon Putin’s personal domain – which the war on terrorism is considered to be – and proposed a few solutions. Clearly, they should demonstrate that his approach to this problem differs from the last one, which, considering what happened, has obviously not proven its worth. Today there are three initiatives – a presidential decree regarding transportation safety, the appointment of a new security force in the North Caucasus, and the introduction of a scale of terrorist threats.

The decree entitled “On the creation of a complex system to provide safety to the population on transportation” calls for the creation of a system to prevent emergency situations and terrorist attacks, most of all in the metro. Judging by the text, this would involve equipping public transportation with special technology to deal with “acts of unlawful interference,” and also systems to collect information about emerging emergency situations and threats of terrorist attacks. That is to say, additional systems to monitor passengers, and also all possible devices to determine the presence of poisonous, toxic, or other malicious agents in the air.

According to the document, the most vulnerable facilities should be equipped with this special technology by the end of next March, and the entire safety system should be completed by 2014.

Insofar as this is the only open document adopted after the bombings in the metro, one can make the conclusion that the state is intent on investing funds to prevent terrorist attacks at the last stage – when a terrorist with a bomb or poisonous gas cartridge is already moving toward a goal and falls into view of technical or other systems of control.

Meanwhile, it’s entirely obvious that cameras and censors don’t help to stop terrorists in the middle of a crowd in the metro or in a train station; at the very least, there have been no such examples of this happening in the past ten years. Moreover, as Russian experience has shown, barriers can be an obstacle to entering a defined area, but they won’t hinder a terrorist from detonating a suicide bomb in a crowd of people. At the Krylya festival in Tushino, a suicide bomber was unable to enter the stadium and blew herself up in the line at the barrier.

Of course, video cameras can help to quickly establish the identity of a suicide bomber, and, it’s true, that turns out to be helpful in the search for the terrorist’s accomplices; although, recently, as a general rule, they skillfully disguise themselves, covering up with caps and using glasses to change how their faces look. But none of this has anything to do with preventing a terrorist attack itself, and, at best, eases the investigation of a tragedy that has already happened.

In London, the world’s most developed video surveillance system (official figures say that Great Britain has one camera for every twelve people) couldn’t prevent the underground and bus terrorist attacks in 2005, although, as consequently became clear, the terrorists fell into view of the cameras numerous times on their way to the sites of the explosions and as they made preparations for the attacks.

British police already admit that all of this technology is practically useless even against normal crime, let alone terrorist attacks. The head of video surveillance management at Scotland Yard, Mick Neville, said at a 2008 press conference that less than one of every thirty crimes is uncovered with the help of CCTV – with its help, but not thanks to it exclusively.

Moreover, for understandable reasons, the metro and above-ground transportation in large cities cannot be equipped with the same safety measures that are used in airports (barriers, x-rays, all possible kinds of detectors). The head of the city metro, Dmitri Gayev, has spoken about this numerous times in the past few days.

The second initiative announced after the Moscow terrorist attacks was the scale of terrorist threats, which the National Anti-terroristt Committee is intent on introducing – not the same type that was introduced in the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

It’s obvious that this scale is meant first and foremost for the population, since the intelligence agencies already have their own internal plan of action for any terrorist threats that show up. For example, before the 2005 terrorist attacks in London, the threat level was decreased. Moreover, experience has shown that raising the threat level only increases the nervousness of the population. Normal people who aren’t trained to identify dangerous behavioral indicators are inclined to see them in everyone that looks or behaves “just not right.” This, naturally, leads to a growth in suspiciousness and xenophobia. At the same time, the intelligence agencies wind up swamped with a humongous quantity of garbage information that they’re required to respond to.

Medvedev’s third step was a staffing decision in the North Caucasus. Having visited Dagestan, the president appointed Deputy Chief of Internal Forces Yevgeny Lazebin, who head the United Group of Federal Forces in 2005-06, as the supervisor of the Internal Ministry in the North Caucasus.

All three of these decisions proposed by Medvedev in the wake of the terrorist attacks have one quality in common: they are a direct continuation of the strategy formed by Putin in the beginning and middle of the last decade.

The Internal Ministry has been investing funds in a system to control the population, including with video surveillance, since at least 2005. The scale of terrorist threats has been the beloved brainchild of Nikolai Patrushev even since during his tenure as FSB director, and they’ve been trying to introduce it since 2004. However, while the effect of these two initiatives is simply doubtful, the appointment of an Interior Forces general belongs in a separate category.

The Kremlin began to systematically move the Interior Forces into the main role in the North Caucasus back in the middle of the last decade. Back then, the highest-rated terrorist threat was an attack on a city by large detachments of militants, as happened in 2004 when Basayev’s detachment took control of Nazran within nearly twenty-four hours. Therefore, the main task was considered as having heavily armed detachments of special forces on hand to deflect an attack and carry out tactical operations in the city or forest.

In appointing Lazebin, Medvedev has shown that he continues to consider attacks by powerful militants to be the most dangerous threat. It’s obvious that such an approach has nothing to do with preventing terrorist attacks by suicide bombers, which most of all demand intelligence work – not the Interior Forces’ strongest point.

Moreover, Medvedev’s choice demonstrates that the Kremlin isn’t planning to even begin a battle for “the hearts and minds” of the North Caucasus. The interior forces have a fully developed reputation in the region. There are no such words that could convince the local population to enter into cooperation with the crimson berets. But this scarcely worried Putin, and as is becoming clear, doesn’t interest Medvedev even a bit.

Translation by theOtherRussia.org.

Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev previously stated that while the new doctrine was based on the previous one from 2000, it included changes to properly reflect a change in global circumstances.

Patrushev insisted that the document was defensive, but that NATO expansion, international terrorism, and conflict in the North Caucasus were examples of changes in circumstances that require a change in military doctrine.

With Friday’s presidential confirmation, Russia now reserves the right to deliver a nuclear strike not only in response to direct aggression, but also “in response to a threat, against it or its allies, of the use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction, and also in response to aggression with the use of conventional weapons in situations critical for the Russian Federation.”

The document, entitled “Fundamentals of State Politics Regarding Nuclear Deterrence Through 2020,” is the third version of Russia’s military doctrine since 1993.

The version confirmed in 2000 only gave Russia the right to use nuclear force in response to the actual use of aggression, reading “the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use, against its or its allies, of nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction, and also in response to large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons.”

The new military doctrine, which will be the third version introduced since 1993, comes at a time of heightened military hostility from the Kremlin. A recent bill passed by the State Duma expands the potential role of troops deployed abroad, and NATO has expressed concern that war games in September between Russia and Belarus were “the largest since the end of the Cold War.”

In an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta on November 20, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev said that the doctrine will now provide for a possible preemptive nuclear strike depending on situational considerations and the intentions of a potential adversary.

The secretary cited the desire to retain the status of Russia as a nuclear power in order to act as a deterrent, especially from other nuclear powers, as a main reason for the change in doctrine. “A potential adversary should comprehend the futility of unleashing aggression with the use of not only nuclear, but of conventional means of destruction,” said Patrushev. “The inevitability of retribution is a sobering factor for any potential aggressor.”

That said, Patrushev stressed that the military doctrine was defensive and that Russia categorically opposes the use of military force – let alone a nuclear strike – to settle any conflict.

However, the secretary cited NATO expansion, international terrorism, and conflict in the North Caucasus as evidence that Russia continues to face potential military threats, apparently justifying the nuclear policy. He singled out last year’s war in Georgia as an example of the “senseless policy and unmeasured ambitions of [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili” that “directly affected the life and security of our citizens.”

Military analysts were divided in response to the doctrine. An article in the Christian Science Monitor reported that experts were divided into two groups: those who saw the policy as increasingly menacing towards Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors, and those who saw it as an expression of vulnerability in a time of radical military reorganization.

“Naturally, the army is weakened, temporarily weakened, by these very radical changes,” said Vitaly Shlykov, an adviser to the Russian Defense Ministry. “It’s natural that we would rely more on our nuclear deterrent during this transition, though it’s debatable whether that should be done in the loud fashion that Patrushev did.”

The new military doctrine, which will be the third version introduced since 1993, comes at a time of heightened military hostility from the Kremlin. A recent bill passed by the State Duma expands the potential role of troops deployed abroad, and NATO has expressed concern that war games in September between Russia and Belarus were “the largest since the end of the Cold War.”

A Record Harvest of Spies
April 1, 2008
Yulia Latynina
Yezhednevny Zhurnal

The number of foreign spies and Islamic terrorists being caught by the [security] agencies is growing with terrifying speed. The FSB had just managed to reveal a spy, buried within TNK-BP, when the head of this service, Nikolai Patrushev, announced the suppression of Islamic aggression in the Urals: in the past few years, more than 80 members of radical Islamic organizations “Hizb ut-Takhrir” and the “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan” have been revealed there. If we add in the foreign spies that [Alexander] Bastrykin, the head of the [Prosecutor General’s] Investigative Committee, recognized in the midst of his own agency, and the Tajik national with the sniper rifle, who wanted to shoot [Vladimir] Putin and [Dmitri] Medvedev during their walk in the Vasilyevsky slope, then the March harvest was fantastic.

I do, however, have a few questions. The number of apprehended spies and terrorists is growing, yet the percentage of solved crimes perpetrated by skinheads is falling. This is very strange, since it is easy to catch the skinhead, who brags about his murders and generally kills without great qualifications, whereas the foreign spy, who has undergone training, is difficult to catch. And still, the spies are caught, and yet the murderers of Tajik nationals are not. All the more strange, since a murder committed for nationalist motives (not for robbery or domestic squabbles) – is also an act of terrorism. The amount of terrorist acts on Russia’s soil grows exponentially, but the FSB doesn’t just fail to solve these terrorist acts – it doesn’t pay them any attention. Instead, it catches British spies.

And it is not only the victims of skinheads that are multiplying. The violence index is growing as a whole. Since 1996, it has doubled. Crimes aren’t just unsolved, they aren’t even reported.

When the Vice President of Vneshtorgbank is found with his hands bound in a run-down house, the investigation finds that this was a suicide. And when for some reason or another, a case is opened (or at least investigated), the investigative process leaves one completely astonished. Let’s take, for example, the double murder of two Dagestani journalists – Ilyas Shurpaev, a correspondent for Channel One, in Moscow, and Gadzhi Abashilov, the head of the “Dagestan” state-owned media company, that same evening in Makhachkala. Shurpaev’s killers were apprehended in Tajikistan, and it immediately became known, that one of then was already detained in the act of a robbery. And the detainee, a Tajik national (!) who was caught red-handed (!) after a robbery (! — pardon the exclamation points, but we somehow though that the militsiya didn’t grant any rights to Tajik nationals) – was released for some unknown reason.

Abashilov’s killer will probably not be found –the murder was meticulously planned, but here’s what they discovered during the investigation. The car from which the killers fired had been stolen not four days before the murder, as was first reported, but ten years before. And when its owner had gone to the militsiya, he was told: “Why would you report the theft, there, take that one, we have another car in the yard, also stolen and nobody’s, just change the plates and don’t worry yourself.” The owner took the other car, and drove it for ten years. And the other, stolen one, had driven another 140 thousand kilometers before it surfaced in the murder case.

You may ask: can’t we take these people, who are so successfully battling the terrorists, and kick them over to those other crimes, whose numbers are growing? Alas, I have to disappoint you. Do you know who is battling terrorism in Dagestan? It’s that same cop, who so successfully solved the problem of the stolen “Zhigulis” ten years ago.

Of course, one could assume, that the number of exposed spies is growing because foreign agencies are disquieted by the fact that Russia is rising from her knees.

But here’s a question. There is this company – Guvnor. It, you could say, is the most strategic company in Russia. Earlier, the Arzamas-16 [nuclear weapons center] was strategic, and now Guvnor. All that is holy flows through this private company – government oil that once belonged to the private YUKOS and Sibneft companies. And yet this here company is registered in the West. How! Quick, move it to Ust-Uryupinsk, under the guard of Bastrykin and Patrushev, so that Western spies don’t reach it!

Or there is this person – Gennady Timchenko. A friend of president Putin and an official co-owner of Guvnor. This is the carrier of our major secrets! What if Western spies kidnap him and force him to denigrate the Kremlin, showing that he, Timchenko, isn’t any kind of owner, but simply a cover? Mister Timchenko needs to immediately go from him villa to some place where the spy-catchers can provide reliable protection. But Mr. Timchenko and those who stand with him aren’t hurrying. For some reason, all these people are starting companies in that damned West, and fear the spies there less than their loyal [Russian] servants and protectors.

Up to 10% of students in English private schools are currently comprised of the Russian elite’s children: not just businessmen, but civil servants too. Bureaucrats are buying homes in the West, castles and yachts; bureaucrats go there for vacation and leave their children there, and even our guarantor, as they say, is building a villa for himself in Europe, where he will relax from the presidency. And as for the herd, well the herd can go to lake Seliger and listen to the stories of how spies have been revealed in TNK-BP.

A regional police chief has been murdered along with his driver in the southern Russian region of Kabardino-Balkaria. Unidentified assailants opened fire on Analoty Kyarov, the head of the region’s anti-organized crime division, as his car was traversing Nalchik, the local capital. Interfax reports that Kyarov and his driver, a senior officer of the OMON Special Forces, died shortly thereafter. Two other officers were injured and remain in critical condition.

An investigation has been launched, although no suspects have been apprehended.

A statement released by separatists on the “CaucasusCenter” website took responsibility for the attack, and noted that the actual target was Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB). The agency chief was visiting the area for an aviation exercise which landed Patrushev atop Mount Elbrus, Europe’s highest mountain. According to the statement, he was scheduled to drive through Nalchik with Kyarov in line with anti-terrorism events taking place across the Kabardino-Balkar Republic.