Russia this week upheld another shining foreign policy victory: The work of regional branches of the British Council in St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg was suspended. These brazen British, who have been soiling Russia for more than just the past century, reckoned on defending themselves with certain arrangements, like the 1994 bilateral agreement on cooperation in the domains of culture, science and education. Since in accord with [the agreement], Moscow pledged (oh, those “accursed 90s”) to “foster on its territory the opening of centres of culture, education and information of the opposite side,” and “provide every assistance to such centres.” Those shysters from foggy Albion were also counting on the fact that the British Council in Russia holds the status of a cultural branch of the embassy, and that all diplomatic privileged are extended to it. They were calculating, no doubt, that our mighty state would be proving somewhere, that the activities of British Council employees were illegal.

The good people studied our history poorly. Otherwise, they would have known how [Count Alexander von] Benckendorf rebuked the unfortunate [Baron Anton Antonovich] Delvig, who risked making reference to the law: “Laws are written for the subjects, and not for the authorities, and you don’t have the right to refer to them or use them to excuse yourself in your explanations with me.” And [the laws] are not strong in the ideology of the present-day Russian government. Otherwise the [students] would remember how one of Benckendorf’s successors explained the essence of “sovereign democracy” a few years back: “We must be the masters in our own country.” Not the law, not the people –THEM. And that’s why [the authorities] can demonstrate their truth by having “prophylactic talks” with Russian citizens working at the British Council, or by arresting Stephen Kinnock, who heads the St. Petersburg branch, for driving under the influence.

In truth, this whole comical war with the British Council—an organization called to serve the dissemination of the English language [and] knowledge of Great Britain’s culture—very clearly demonstrates the fundamental differences between the political cultures of the two countries.

More than a year ago, even before [Alexander] Litvinenko’s poisoning, when the Kremlin was taking pleasure in badgering the British ambassador with the help of the Nashi [youth group], one of Russia’s political analysts couldn’t bear it and asked a question: why don’t the British respond appropriately. Why not establish an “Ours” movement (preferably out of the most die-hard Liverpool [Football Club] fans”) and establish a merry existence for the Russian ambassador. Any why not, at present, make use of the circumstance that the children, wives and mistresses of Russia’s highest-[ranking] civil servants permanently reside in the United Kingdom? A Scotland Yard special division, in collaboration with MI-5 could easily discover a couple cartridges, or a baggie with heroin on family-members of some ardent British detractor. Under an “eye for an eye” logic, they would entirely have the right—remember, that the Stephen Kinnock arrested in St. Petersburg is the son of Neil Kinnock, the former head of the [British] Labour [Party].

Finally, why don’t they use the bank accounts of Russian citizens as a pressure lever. Well, why not review them for money laundering? And block them for the period of examination.

In a word, a lot of things could be contrived. And all that would remain would be to marvel at the desperation of Russia’s higher-ups, who had turned their loved ones into natural hostages on enemy terrain. But that’s just it, what the representatives of the so-called Russian elite understand perfectly well is that on the territory of the United Kingdom, nothing will endanger their families or even their money. For the simple reason, that even now, as in Benckendorf’s times and even earlier, the authorities in that country serve the laws, and not the other way around. The court there isn’t [like] Basmanny. And it doesn’t hand out arrest warrants on the prime minister’s command. And it allows extradition only in the event if a person’s guilt is proven.

And Russia’s patriotic superiors are perfectly aware of this. They prefer to keep their families in England, as at any moment, their close ones could become hostages in their native land.

Translated by theotherrussia.org

Putin is heading for a worrying future

Seven years ago, the economist Brigitte Granville and I published an article in the Journal of Economic History entitled “Weimar on the Volga”, in which we argued that the experience of Nineties Russia bore many resemblances to the experience of Twenties Germany. In particular, we focused on the impact of very high inflation, suggesting that it had similar causes and consequences in each case. . . .

The rule of law is the keystone of both liberal democracy and international order. Yet last week the Russian government showed its contempt for the rule of law by flatly refusing to extradite the man who is the prime suspect in the case of Alexander Litvinenko, poisoned in London last November. The Crown Prosecution Service says it has sufficient evidence to warrant a prosecution of Andrei Lugovoi. But the Russians maintain that it would be unconstitutional to hand him over.

It might also be embarrassing. The world might finally hear how up to 10 micrograms of the lethal radioactive isotope polonium-210 found their way from a Russian nuclear installation to a teacup in the Pines Bar of the Millennium Hotel in London, where Litvinenko most likely ingested them. There are only two possibilities. Either the Russian government ordered Litvinenko’s assassination. Or – not much better – the Russian government has no control over the lethal substances produced in its nuclear reactors. . . .

Foreign investors have also felt the backlash. Having successfully reduced Shell’s stake in the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas field, Moscow now seems intent on doing the same to BP, which has a substantial interest in the Kovykta gas field. As before, the tactic is to accuse the foreign company of violating the terms of its licence. All that remains to be decided is how much of its stake in Kovykta BP will have to yield up to Gazprom.

Russia under Putin has remained outwardly a democracy. Yet there is no mistaking the erosion of democracy’s foundations under his presidency. In the name of “sovereign democracy”, the direct election of regional governors and presidents was replaced with a system of presidential nomination. Opposition groups can no longer operate freely. Earlier this month, the chess maestro and Putin critic Garry Kasparov and other anti-government activists were prevented from boarding a plane to Samara, where Russian and EU leaders were meeting.

On Putin’s watch there has also been a discernible reduction in the freedom of the press. The three major television networks (Channel One, Rossiya and NTV) are under direct or indirect government control, while reporters who antagonise the authorities can no longer feel safe. Only eight months ago, the investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya was shot dead outside her home, one of 14 Russian journalists who have been murdered since Mr Putin came to power.

To repeat, there is no such thing as the future; only futures. One conceivable future is that after (if?) Mr Putin steps down next year, Russia will become more liberal in its politics. But that is not the future on which I would put my money. A more plausible future is that, having more or less stifled internal dissent, Russia is now ready to play a more aggressive role on the international stage. Remember: it was Mr Putin who restored the old Soviet national anthem within a year of becoming president of the Russian Federation. And it was he who described the collapse of the Soviet Union as a “national tragedy on an enormous scale”.

It would be a bigger tragedy if he or his successor tried somehow to restore that evil empire. Unfortunately, that is precisely what the Weimar analogy predicts will happen next.