Dmitri Peskov, press secretary for Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, said that the prime minister was aware of Monday’s events, but stressed that the rally was not held in a location sanctioned by the Moscow city government.

“The prime minister, of course, knows about the demonstration. He knows, in particular, where it was given permission to be held and where it was actually held,” said Peskov.

Putin made a guarded statement last week that protests should always be allowed if their participants follow the law, after being confronted about the issue by a Kremlin-critical rock musician. But as the Moscow Times points out:

City officials banned the rally on Triumfalnaya Ploshchad, saying an authorized pro-Kremlin rally was already scheduled to take place instead.

Preventing unwanted public gatherings by holding official rallies is a well-known tactic. In his 2000 book of interviews, “From the First Person. Conversations with Vladimir Putin,” Putin admitted to using it himself when working in the St. Petersburg administration in the 1990s.

When asked what the prime minister thought about the actions of the police – which included detaining up to 170 people, beating dozens of them, holding them for hours in buses that were more than 95°F, shattering one man’s arm, and manhandling a World War II veteran – Peskov declined to comment.

Any discussion of the incident was blocked in the State Duma on Wednesday by United Russia, the country’s leading political party headed by Vladimir Putin. Communist Party Deputy Sergei Obukhov tried to raise the issue but was shot down by First Deputy Speaker Oleg Morozov, who condemned him for giving an unsanctioned presentation.

Meanwhile, Moscow Human Rights Ombudsman Aleksandr Muzykantsky said that he takes issue with the fact that youth activists routinely hold events on Triumfalnaya Square on the 31st of every month – the same time the Strategy 31 rallies are meant to take place – thus providing the city government with a formal way to refuse to sanction the oppositionists’ event.

“It brings to mind how in the 20s of the last century they [Stalin loyalists – ed.] would disrupt Trotskyist meetings by using young people who stirred up fights. Those who disrupted the meetings were, in the end, convicted of taking part in Trotskyist rallies,” said Muzykantsky, as quoted by Interfax. “Young people were used cynically, and then they were thrown out.”

He added that he pitied the young people who are attracted to taking part in the events that are meant to disrupt the Strategy 31 rallies.

Russian Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin, who joined Muzykantsky at Monday’s rally as an observer (and who police attempted to arrest), called the detentions “illegal” and said that the idea of a “sanctioned action” does not actually exist in Russian legislation. Instead, according to the constitution, organizers are only required to notify the local government if they plan to hold a large demonstration, he said.

Just as a two-day summit between Russia and the European Union wrapped up on Tuesday, EU representatives said that they knew of Lukin’s comments and promised to investigate Monday’s actions by the Moscow police.

Michael Webb, the deputy in charge of the EU delegation, said that “on the whole, the European Union supports Russia so that it fulfills the obligations that it undertook as part of the Council of Europe. And also so that it realizes civil rights as secured by the constitution. In particular, the right to free assembly and free speech.”

In an article published earlier this week by the Guardian, Russian opposition leader Garry Kasparov chastises European leaders for forming increasingly close relationships with Russia and thus enabling the Kremlin’s violent suppression of free speech and human rights. Given the numerous annual murders of Russian journalists and activists and the Kremlin’s unbridled attempts to broadcast its own propaganda abroad, Kasparov calls on Europe to check these relationships at the door and reconsider its stand on human rights.

Don’t cosy up to Russia, Europe
Stifling free media, arresting journalists, bullying its neighbours – Moscow is stamping on freedoms and the EU turns a blind eye

By GARRY KASPAROV
February 23, 2010
The Guardian

In the capitals of European democracies, leaders are hailing a new era of co-operation with Russia. Berlin claims a “special relationship” with Moscow and is moving forward on a series of major energy projects with Russian energy giant Gazprom, one of which is led by the former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi traveled to St Petersburg late last year to join in the celebration of his “great friend” Vladimir Putin’s 59th birthday. And in Paris, negotiations are under way for a major arms sale that would allow Russia to acquire one of the most advanced ships in the French navy.

At the same time, democratic dissent inside Russia has been ruthlessly suppressed. On 31 January, the Russian government refused to allow the peaceful assembly of citizens who demonstrated in support of … the right to free assembly, enshrined in article 31 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: the right “to gather peacefully and to hold meetings, rallies, demonstrations, marches and pickets”.

Likewise, Russian journalists have been increasingly harassed for expressing any criticism of the government. But prosecution is hardly the worst outcome for Russian journalists who fail to report the news in a “patriotic” manner. In 2009, more than dozen of journalists, human rights activists and political opponents were killed.

Having stifled internal criticism of its policies in the Caucasus, the Russian government is now turning its attention to those who criticize them from abroad – and it is being abetted in this project by European businesses and governments. The last victim of Moscow’s censors and their western friends is called Perviy Kavkazskiy (First-Caucasian). This young Russian-language television station was, until the end of January, freely available to people living in Russian-speaking areas. Now, Eutelsat – the leading European satellite provider based in Paris – has taken the channel off the air and refuses to implement the contract negotiated with the TV.

It seems the Russian company Intersputnik made Eutelsat an offer it couldn’t refuse on 15 January, holding out the possibility of millions of dollars in business with the media holdings of Russian gas giant Gazprom on the condition that Eutelsat stop doing business with First-Caucasian. Eutelsat capitulated and sent a disastrous message to the world: no Russian-language television that is not controlled by the Kremlin will be allowed to be aired in the Russian Federation. Even if it is based abroad. Even if it has a contract with a European satellite provider.

The English-language satellite channel, Russia Today, funded and controlled by the Russian government, did not face such problems with European satellites. This channel has recently launched an advertising blitz in the United States and the United Kingdom featuring billboards that show the face of US President Barack Obama morphing into that of Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Nobody raised any concerns about Russia Today and western viewers will be allowed to receive the propaganda that is broadcasted in Russia. But the very idea of an alternative channel in Russian language seems too “provocative” to some Europeans.

Eutelsat’s collaboration with these policies is a clear violation of the spirit of the EU laws protecting freedom of the press, and French courts may well find that the firm violated more than just the spirit of the law as the case against Eutelstat unfolds in the coming weeks. Still, this is just the latest example of European complicity in the Kremlin’s consolidation of political power inside the country and its reconstitution of the military used to coerce those nations that lie just across the border.

This is the context in which came recent reports that the French government intends to go forward with the sale to Russia of one or more Mistral-class amphibious assault ships. The Russian military has not concealed its plan for these weapons. In September of last year, the Russian admiral Vladimir Vysotsky triumphantly declared that “a ship like this would have allowed the Black Sea fleet to accomplish its mission [invading Georgia] in 40 minutes and not 26 hours”.

Only a little more than a year ago, as Russian tanks occupied parts of Georgia, NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared that there could be “no business as usual with Russia under present circumstances”. Russian forces still occupy Georgian territory, in violation of the ceasefire brokered by French president Nicolas Sarkozy, and yet NATO, too, is back to business as usual with Putin’s regime.

As Moscow shuts down opposition newspapers, arrests journalists who fail to toe the government line and bullies its democratic neighbors into submission, some European leaders are not silent. Instead they are arguing for closer ties to Moscow, for energy cooperation, for military for arms deals.

European leaders must take a stand for freedom of speech and in defense of the free media that enables it. This starts by making clear to European companies that they are not supposed to be the obedient tools of the Kremlin’s censorship. The same leaders should also show that, at the beginning of the 21st century, one cannot occupy a foreign territory without consequence. It clearly does not imply selling weapons to occupation forces. At stake is not only the freedom of Russian citizens, but also the very meaning and the honor of Europe.

• The following people endorse this article: Elena Bonner-Sakharov; Konstantin Borovoï, chairman of the Party for Economic Freedom; Vladimir Boukovsky, former political prisoner; Natalia Gorbanevskaia, poet, former political prisoner; Andreï Illarionov, former adviser to Vladimir Putin; Garry Kasparov, leader of United Citizens Front; Serguei Kovaliev, former minister to Boris Yeltsin; Andreï Mironov, former political prisoner; Andreï Nekrasov, filmmaker; Valeria Novodvorskaya, leader of Democratic Unity of Russia; Oleg Panfilov, TV presenter; Grigory Pasko, journalist, ecology activist, former political prisoner; Leonid Pliouchtch, essayist, former political prisoner; Alexandre Podrabinek, journalist, former political prisoner; Zoïa Svetova, journalist; Maïrbek Vatchagaev, historian; Tatiana Yankelevitch, archivist, Harvard; Lydia Youssoupova, lawyer

The commission’s report is part of a program between Russia and the European Union dubbed Partnership for Modernization, and was prepared in response to an appeal from Russian President Dmitri Medvedev at the Russia-EU summit in Stockholm last November. At the time, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso personally stepped forward with a promise from the commission to aid Russia in its process of modernization.

The resulting report specifies that first and foremost, Russia must succeed in creating a state based on the rule of law. Without “the supremacy of law,” it says, no modernization can hope to be achieved.

The report adds that the European Commission is prepared to help Russia in its ongoing battle against corruption, improvements to its climate for investment, the process of modernizing non-governmental organizations, and Russia’s transition to European standards and technical regulations.

The document is currently in Moscow for review by the federal government, which so far has given it a mixed reaction. On the whole, the report is being called a positive “intellectual contribution” to the process of modernization. However, the Kremlin would prefer that their European partners focus more on the economic and technical aspects of modernization, and not so much on the topic of a state based on the rule of law.

“The program should have an application-oriented character, without broad discussions of the advantages of European values,” says Vladimir Chizhov, Russia’s permanent envoy to the European Commission.

Russia has designated the Ministry of Economic Development to handle its own side of preparations for the joint project. So far, the amount of money to be designated to the Partnership for Modernization and the deadlines for its planning and implementation have not been specified. Civil servants interviewed by Kommersant indicated that more will become clear after the next Russia-EU summit in May.

The thoughts and proposals laid out in these articles elicited a stormy reaction from within the internet community. In an interview with Yezhednevny Zhurnal on November 23 to further explain his positions, Kasparov discussed the goals of Russia’s united political opposition, the importance of Russia’s integration into Europe, and the futility of Medvedev’s plans for modernization.

Garry Kimovich, in your opinion, how successful overall has the opposition been in moving forward in the development of its “way of the future,” given that it has been criticized for lacking one?

The National Assembly is an arena that was created for different ideological forces, united by a rejection of the current system, to discuss an agenda for the future of our country. The inability of the governing regime to make changes adequate for the demands of the 21st century has imposed this necessity upon us. Preserving the status quo has lead to the ruin of our state. An understanding of the doom of this regime and of these other menaces – which invariably lead to an uncontrolled collapse through our rotten government agencies – formed the basis for the unification of the opposition.

From the moment of conception of the United Civil Front in 2005, I have not tired in repeating that dismantling Putin’s regime is an applied problem. Dismantling does not presume total destruction; on the contrary, in order to avoid tragic consequences, maximal moderation is necessary to analyze the elements of the faulty structure that may still be used when forming a new statehood. The National Assembly defined a minimum set of basic elements: free elections, abolishment of censorship, and the observation of human rights. These simple things are written in its charter. The stage was therefore set to produce a national consensus. The task is to identify reference points to use to draw up a new state structure. This series of conferences is dedicated to drafting a new constitution, since the current one is, frankly, authoritarian. So that process is going forward rather intensely.

What place does your series of articles “Russia After Putin” have in this process?

They are the result of long discussions, including within the National Assembly, on political problems in this country. I dedicated the first piece of material to the morphology of the regime, since I think it’s important to find the root of the problem in the search for an exit from the crisis. It’s well known that many people, unprepared for a critical perception of reality, are easily subjected to ideological influence. The authorities use this effectively to their own ends, imposing their own perceptions onto such people by using various myths that unabashedly exploit the understandings of democracy and liberalism. We perceive a close interdependence between Yeltsin’s and Putin’s periods of rule. This position is now becoming commonplace even among experts.

The second part of my article, “Project Display,” characterizes the state of mind. I did a survey of ideas thought up by the opposition, since the official public arenas are intentionally “scorched” (even our parliament has ceased to be a place for discussion, and there are homunculi breeding in [Kremlin ideologist Vladislav] Surkov’s test tubes that are unable to think up any creative, original ideas). In the third part, I tried to lay out my vision of Russia’s future without changing my political views, which with a stretch of the imagination can be classified as left-liberal.

My first attempt to formulate this project strives to determine what will be acceptable to society. It’s possible, of course, to dream of various things – for instance, of the restoration of our state within the boundaries of the 1975 Helsinki Accords (a project that the nationalist-patriots announced at the conference), but my intentions are not so ambitious. I believe that in order to achieve a consensus, the project should take into account both the domestic political situation and the realities of our foreign policy. The National Assembly is an extremely representative platform that includes the main ideological camps of Russian society.

For your project, did you try to keep in mind ideas that would accommodate various groups?

When you’re looking for a consensus between different groups, you don’t attain anything by just tallying ideas. Politics, in any case, is not math. The main thing is that, understanding that we must somehow come to an agreement, we have already put a stop to the “citizen cold war” within our association. Moreover, such a consensus is necessary to counter an ideological ghetto, which is the atmosphere that the authorities are trying to reanimate. The authorities don’t try to suppress, for example, ideologically homogeneous demonstrations. On their own, the communists, nationalists, and liberals can have their own protests – but as the united transideological opposition undertakes any joint effort – for example, [Eduard] Limonov and [Lyudmila] Alexeyeva holding a joint rally – there, the authorities react in the blink of an eye, cruelly suppressing their effort. That very unification is seen as a menace. The ability of various ideological forces to agree with each other on government management methods, on the constitution, on the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and on the transitional period, represents an alternative to the existing authorities. And we cannot make do without compromise. In particular, I try to develop political formulas that such a “motley crew” could accept. Certainly, any draft reflects the convictions of the person who wrote it, and for me there’s a fundamentally liberal trend, but I’m prepared to make a compromise in the decision and take a more eclectic view.

In your opinion, how could a window of opportunity open for the opposition to implement your project?

The world is facing global change. In developed countries, there are attempts to extinguish it through financial influence. This even includes publishing houses that act in violation of their own basic beliefs. This, in my view, is the agony of the current world order. The fact that the system doesn’t follow the trends of the times is leading to a global cataclysm. During such periods in history, the world usually went through war. I hope that now it will make do without a major war; there’s an understanding, in any case, of the catastrophic scale of the consequences. But there are, in fact, localized wars. We live in a time of permanent war, when change comes at the expense of the weak and ill-equipped.

Right now, Russia is the weakest player on the global geopolitical map. The country is turning from an object into a subject, most of all in Chinese politics. As we can see, the Sinicization of the Far East is proceeding at full speed. Our government is helping China to prepare this gigantic staging area. The second menace is radical Islam, which comes from the south where the North Caucasus are a hotbed of tension. Illegal immigration exacerbates danger for Russia with its accompanying demographic problems.

Given these circumstances, I have a clearly formulated task: To preserve the core of Russian civilization, preferably within its current borders. There is an excellent toast from a classic Soviet film that comes to mind: “Let us drink so that our wishes would always corresponded with our opportunities!”

In any case, what concrete events could there be in our country that would dismantle the regime?

In commentaries to my article, many citizens wrote: “What Constituent Assembly – there are no elections here in general!” They say all that you’ve described – that it’s a utopia and will never correspond to reality. It seems to me that we don’t need to mix up these particulars of our reality with the general direction of our strategy. Of course, we can’t examine any scenario separate from its existing reality, but if we begin making adjustments to the things that we must necessarily build so that they correspond with today’s realities, then in the long run we drift into this so-called “Medvedev modernization.”

That’s not something that can last. I can’t make an exact prediction as to when the system will fall apart, but in my view it is inevitable. For example, it suddenly became clear in February 1917 that the government was non-functional. Today, state institutions are in an even worse crisis than back then. Today, disgust with the regime is spontaneously beginning to engulf the most varied, previously depoliticized strata of society, and furthermore, its support – the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This is attested to by these virtual (for now) police riots. It’s happening because of the sense of the hopelessness of the regime and of its dead end. It is itself tumbling towards catastrophe; we have no influence on it.

The possible types of scenarios can vary. It’s possible that I’m mistaken, but I’m incredibly certain about these events. When it happens is not important, but it is the duty of every honest citizen and patriot of our country to have a plan of action to propose – not to this regime, but to the people who want to form the core of a new statehood. The sooner we come to an agreement and reach a consensus, the more certainty there is that we will be able to find a common language in the frame of this new structure. This will be our greatest contribution to the creation of a future Russia.

And what will be the fate of the entire class of bureaucrats?

It’s not necessary to automatically write the whole class of bureaucrats into one category to cleanse and purge. However, we cannot repeat the mistake of the past and say that for the sake of civil peace we should close our eyes to the fact that many high-ranking civil servants, judges, police commanders, and deputies have acted in obvious violation of the law. It is obvious that anyone who tarnished their reputation by grossly violating the law cannot operate normally in our new state institutions. So a purge is inevitable, but what has to be discussed is the scale of the purge of the executive administration.

In my view, reforms in Russia cannot be taken gradually, even moreso if they concern such conservative social strata as the civil servants. My rather radical proposal is to organize the state administration’s structure by cutting the number of branch ministers and transfer administrative functions to the regional – and to a greater degree, the municipal – level. By doing this, we strip off a part of the federal bureaucracy that lived by distributing quotas and issuing permits, and by being able to extract bureaucratic duties. Shifting the focus of the administration’s burden is a more down to earth approach, and is closer to the spirit of the people’s traditions – and that is a better way to preserve the state.

One could theoretically agree with your thesis that reforms need to be taken quickly. But practically speaking, how will people react to this that have already lived through the shock of the beginning of the 1990s and don’t wish to repeat it?

As a matter of fact, it’s not the reforms that frighten people, but the material deprivation and psychological discomfort. A well thought-out plan and clear actions by administrative specialists, including ones in the financial sphere that could prevent businesses from stalling, would help avoid any social chaos. I believe that the population will accept many of the reforms with enthusiasm. For example, allotting more authority to smaller regions is a popular idea. Indeed, the majority of Russian citizens see Moscow as a vacuum cleaner, sucking out money from the provinces. That or the Ministry of Internal Affairs takes it. It’s perfectly obvious that the current form of the ministry, a hotbed of corruption and suppression of dissent, is completely out of date. The police are seen more than anything as menaces to the citizens, and by no means as a force to curb the crime rate. That’s to say nothing about the internal military troops, which are nonsense in general. We need an army for state defense from foreign expansion, which it is necessary to strengthen. I would intend for the internal security services and the Investigative Committee to be the ones fighting crime. The police should work to enforce the law, which is primarily a question of the local government. It is therefore necessary to hold elections for the municipal chief of police, as well as for local judges and prosecutors.

In your opinion, how important is the list of ministries and departments in the structure of government that you are proposing?

That’s a question of the essence of the government. As a matter of fact, the list of ministries and departments, which itself could make you laugh, defines both the social direction of the government and the ability to weaken its capacities for repression. This is something that I demonstrate clearly. Monsters such as the Internal Ministry disappear, but the government departments show up and expand the scope of the state’s concerns.

I, for example, propose to institute a department for the affairs of veterans of military action and the armed forces. There are many such people, many more than we think – veterans of the Great Patriotic War, military actions in Chechnya and Afghanistan, and participants of other military conflicts where Soviet specialists were unofficially involved. Our work with them should not be limited to one-time cash payouts or other compensation – the ability for veterans to adapt to peaceful life is a large, systemic problem for the government.

Additionally, many strategic planning problems need to be solved during the transitional period, and central planning agencies like the Ministry of Economic Development will become necessary. Something that I consider fundamental is for state agencies to direct their actions towards solving key problems, and for Russia, among the most important of these is to decrease income disparity within the population. In my opinion, we should make a conscious decision to put this task at the forefront of state politics. It cannot be solved without restoring citizens’ trust in the state. We have to put a stop for good to the practice of deceiving citizens and finally repay old debts. This would include, for example, holdings kept in Sverbank and other Soviet credit institutions.

That question will be of interest to people in the 40 to 50-year-old generation. What about your project could attract young people?

We invite young people most of all to participate in the creation of a normal state, one that you don’t have to run away from. A state interested in its citizens. A state in which bureaucrats don’t just stand on the path of freedom and social development, but work on it. What I’m talking about requires the cooperative work of a massive number of people. Will we have this? I don’t know; nobody can guarantee that. If young people want to get everything for free, then let them go work with the Nashisti. There they give out t-shirts and tell you what needs to be done. That’s one algorithm of behavior.

I’m appealing to conscious people who think about what’s going to happen next with their country. All I’m proposing is a new structure of government that has no limits on citizen participation. We don’t want talented, intellectual people to leave our country. We want to give them additional opportunities and make perspective work available in different areas of study, whether it’s road or bridge construction or designing and launching spacecraft…

And this is all within a single political and legal realm that would stretch from Lisbon to Vladivostok…

Show me someone who can demonstrate a different way to keep Siberia and the Far East as part of Russia. Left to fend for itself, Russia winds up face to face with China in the east and radical Islam in the south. Only by integrating Russia into a single expanse with Europe can we maintain our territory and stop Chinese expansion.

That said, a Russia integrated into Europe would have an increased weight in world affairs. Only through integration and cooperation with Europe will Russia begin to solve its problems. It seems to me that this is an acceptable option for the overwhelming number of Russian citizens, since they are related by blood to Europeans.

Is this the key idea of your project?

This is not a project for the next 50 years; this is what we need to do now. Bringing Russian legislation into compliance with pan-European laws needs to start immediately. It is completely believable that Turkey’s inception into the European Union, which I also see as a positive development in world politics, will become a reality within the next decade. That said, Turkish society will have to overcome a much more elementary gap with the European Union because of a combination of historical, religious and social factors.

Are you saying that Russia’s current leadership is not trying to enter the European Union?

If you’re talking about the country that they’re in charge of, then to our general misfortune, it turns out that of course they are not. You can only see that aspiration in a personal capacity – by looking at bank accounts, purchases of soccer teams and real estate, and so on. Many civil servants’ children, including Putin’s, live there. I’m talking about the integration of our country, not of the individual families of billionaires.

And is Russia awaited within the European Union?

In its Putin-Medvedev version, of course not. Currently, the legal system in Russia is different from the norms of the European Union. Its political and legal structure makes it alien. We need a new vector of development. Infected as it is with corruption, Russia cannot become a full member of the European Union. Nevertheless, it’s easy for Europe to see the possible benefits of reconciliation. It makes it possible, within a single framework, to use the industrial strength of Europe to open up Russia’s vast natural resources. By and large, Russia has a gigantic territory and is poorly populated, whereas Europe has been resettled. The general concept of development based on new technology in the decades ahead, creating a united network of highways all the way up to Vladivostok, will allow for more unified job distribution. Many Russian citizens that left the country because they saw no prospects for themselves will be able to return to their homeland. The weight of the European Union will also increase with Russia becoming a part of the European expanse.

Why doesn’t Europe see all of these benefits to itself?

If you have to deal with corrupt authorities, you wind up forced to speak at arm’s length. When Russia makes a clear declaration of a course of reconciliation with Europe, it will be met there by open arms.

By and large, there are two major geopolitical players in the world today – the United States and China. The European Union is too fragmented to resist both the United States and China by itself. But a European Union that included Russia – that’s a powerful player, and it would be counted right alongside the United States and China. As a matter of fact, it would alter the world map dramatically. Such an incredibly powerful political and economic union would bring the world ballast and stability.

Interview conducted by Olga Gulenok. Original version in Russian available on Ej.ru.

Exclusive translation by theotherrussia.org.

Shortages may come about if the Russian neighbor does not stock-up on enough natural gas, Sechin said, warning that Ukrainian gas infrastructure may not be sufficient in any case.

“If this is not done, the tragedy that we lived through in January will develop catastrophically,” Sechin said.  In January, Russia accused Ukraine of stealing gas for domestic use, and cut off gas supplies to the country.  Around 80 percent of Russia’s European-bound gas travels through Ukraine, and the shut-off caused widespread shortages across the continent.

Sechin said the EU and Russia must work together to help Ukraine update its transit network.  Russia had earlier been excluded from a EU-backed deal to develop Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

Sechin added that shortages of oil may ensue if Ukraine goes through with plans to re-work the Odessa-Brody pipeline and reverse its flow, cutting Russia from the pipeline.  The Deputy Prime Minister also criticized the Energy Charter Treaty, which he said failed to help in the winter gas dispute.

Piebalgs, meanwhile, responded to Sechin by asking him not to over-dramatize the situation.

“The Energy Charter treaty will continue to live its life until the countries that established it decide differently,” he said.

—

Political Analyst Stanislav Belkovsky, president of the National Strategy Institute, commented on Sechin’s statements for the Grani.ru online newspaper:

Igor Sechin’s declaration, just like Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s earlier speeches, have most of all an air of hysteria.  Russia’s leaders have been warned for many years that no good would come from their strategy of aggressive incompetence, which they have adhered to in their energy policy.

In January 2009 is was completely clear that another gas war, launched by Russia at the drop of a hat, would lead to a sharp intensification in construction of gas transport routes around Russia.  This is precisely what has happened.  If before January, the EU-Ukraine project was regarded simply though a political angle, then today it is a priority zone for the European Union’s economic interests.  The same can be said about the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline, whose use in direct deliveries has traditionally been considered economically unsound.  At first, the economic reasoning for building the Odessa-Brody pipeline was weak.  From a business point of view, it is noncompetitive as compared with the alternative Russian route, and this is precisely why it has only been used in the reverse (backwards) mode in recent years.

But now, when Europe has become tired of depending on the whim and incompetence of the Kremlin, the Russian Government, and Gazprom, it is plain to see that construction of the Odessa-Brody pipeline has new significance.  And even if the economic feasibility is lacking, the EU will do everything to force it to work in the opposite mode.

The new energy conception, proposed by Moscow as an alternative to the Energy Charter, is consciously weak and purely declaratory.  If anyone in the Russian Government thought that the EU would look at it seriously, then this can again be traced to incompetence.

The many years of childish, I’m not afraid of this word, approaches to the world energy market have undermined Russia’s positions as an energy supplier to Europe, have discredited Gazprom and its leadership, and have discredited the state oil companies.  Emerging out of this simply through emotional pressure on European bureaucrats, including EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, won’t work.  It is clear that Russia must reconsider its strategy of market conduct in the energy sector.  Another question: is there time for this?  Possibly, there isn’t any left.  And it’s completely evident to me, that neither Igor Sechin, nor Vladimir Putin, nor Alexei Miller are capable neither of formulating a new strategy nor lobbying it through.

translation by theotherrussia.org

The summit, which the European Union dubbed the “last and best chance” for the two countries to keep their reputations as reputable gas suppliers, was the last in a series of failed attempts to end a protracted gas dispute. Countries in the EU and Eastern Europe have had gas supplies cut, and consumers and industry have lost power and heat in the dead of winter. The talks marked the highest-level negotiations over the dispute, as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and officials from their two respective national gas companies.

Medvedev said that it was improper to speak about yielding on the price Ukraine pays for Russian gas, one of the major issues in the dispute. “We cannot talk about some kind of compromises,” he told reporters, “and on the contrary, we need to talk about working in a civilized, measured way, based on those European prices that other countries work with.”

Instead of reproaching each other, the disputing sides should create an “effective mechanism of defense against these situations,” Medvedev said.

The president declined to comment on the theory that the current gas crisis was somehow influenced or protracted by the American presidential administration. “I am not a proponent of conspiracy theories,” he said, “and I won’t speculate now about anyone’s role or influence in [the conflict].”

The crisis in Russian-Ukrainian contractual relations on the delivery and transit of natural gas first started at the end of December 2008. The two sides first failed to agree on a way to resolve Ukrainian debt to Russian gas monopoly Gazprom, and could not reach a compromise on gas and transit prices for 2009. Ukraine paid Russia 1.5 billion dollars for past debts, but did not pay a controversial $614 million in alleged fines. As result, Gazprom cut gas deliveries to Ukraine on January 1st, while continuing shipments through the country.

Russia then accused Ukraine, a major transit route of gas supplies bound for Europe, of siphoning off gas for its own customers. All gas shipments through Ukraine were completely cut on January 7th.

The drop in Russian gas deliveries has led to emergency conditions in a number of European countries. Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Macedonia, the Czech Republic, Austria and Slovakia, which receive all their natural gas from Russia, have had no new shipments, and have eaten through their reserves. Volumes have also dropped significantly for Romania, Hungary, Poland, Germany, France and Italy. Several Eastern European countries have been forced to take emergency measures to conserve gas, shutting factories, closing schools and delivering heating only intermittently to some residential neighborhoods.

Writing for the Grani.ru online newspaper, Nikita Varenov examines Russia’s position in the talks, arguing that Russia may ultimately pay for the consequences of the energy scare.

Frost and War Bosses
Nikita Varenov
Grani.ru
1/7/2009

There is so much politics in the contractual relationships of Russia, Ukraine and the European Union on the issue of [natural] gas deliveries, that the emerging crisis can’t be understood as an argument between two business entities. Nonetheless, its resolution lies precisely there– there are national laws and international agreements, there are signed contracts. And one needs to read them to understand who is formally correct in the current situation. The different sides will do just that during negotiations this Thursday.

But a newly formalized gas transport reality isn’t the only result of the current conflict. The European Union, where factories have stopped working, schools have closed, and the heating supply has been interrupted as result of gas shortages, will not forgive one of the sides, it stands to reason. The likelihood that this will be Russia is fairly great.

The point is that as a consumer, the European Union is indifferent to the underlying reasons for the conflict. The restoration of uninterrupted gas deliveries is important for the EU, especially as a cold winter sets in. Ukraine can likely be charged for dishonest transit, especially if it is proven that gas theft actually took place. But Russia’s fault before the European Union is much greater: a producer and first order supplier cut shipments after failing to settle differences with a intermediary.

One cannot say that Gazprom is completely unprepared for the situation that arose. Reserves have been pumped into underground storage tanks on the territory of Europe. Additional volume is moving by alternate routes – through Belarus and the floor of the Black Sea. But in the end, this does not take the blame off Russia: shipments to ten friendly European countries have stopped completely; [shipments] to the rest have been cut by more than half.

Everything has been done tactically right at Gazprom, but the corporate group in principle lacks a strategy to diversify its distribution channels. A year ago, Russian humorists were already joking about a Ukrainian New Year’s [holiday] with gas-free champagne. But in 2008, nothing was done to ensure that in 2009, Europeans would have gas bubbles in their champagne.

Why it wasn’t done is a separate question. Relations with the Baltic countries have been built on discussing the results of the Second World War for decades. On the Belarussian front, Russia was more concerned in 2008 with twisting Lukashenko’s arms, so that he would finally recognize the independence of two semi-criminal enclaves in the Caucasus. In the last case, a reduced price for gas, by the way, was one of the levers of pressure (and this lever didn’t work largely because of Ukraine’s intractability –Moscow didn’t go for a conflict with two intermediaries at the same time.) In the Caucasus, finally, Russia managed to destabilize the situation to such an extent in the past year, that projects for a direct gas line from Turkmenistan are no longer being discussed (whether they bypassed Russia or not is already unimportant).

Of course, most problems in international relations go outside the realm of Gazprom’s authority as a commercial entity, but the point is that the gas group is not simply a commercial entity in the Russian economy and in Russian foreign policy. Russia (and Gazprom as a de facto government ministry) doesn’t tire of swinging its baton, trying to force its will on its neighbors without considering the costs. The start of Dmitri Medvedev’s presidency has been marked by this path, and it no longer matters how liberal he is on the inside.

The conflict in Georgia raised a boisterous reaction from Europe, but nonetheless had only peripheral meaning for it. Neither the severe Angela Merkel, nor the pragmatic leaders of Eastern Europe, nor the accommodating Nicolas Sarkozy, and especially not the ultra-loyal Silvio Berlusconi, initiated any real steps to pressure Russia then. Partly because of that infamous energy-dependence, however cynical that may sound. Today, when it’ll be the European voters freezing, and not the Georgian ones, their leaders will clearly be firmer.

The energy dependence, of course, won’t go anywhere. For now. And the European Union’s strategy to get rid of this dependence will definitely not go anywhere either. One of the possible steps to take when failures happen in the supply chain is to get rid of the middleman. How could the EU get rid of the Ukraine in its present guise? Accepting it into its group, for instance. Would the Russian authorities have the gall to eternally scare an EU member country with frost?

Not to mention that Russia needs a great deal from Europe. Europe isn’t just a market for Russian gas, but for countless other types of raw commodities and goods. And in many cases, unlike gas, they can be substituted, especially if there were a united political will for it.

Finally, that same gas is only valuable when it is being bought. Side by side with oil it is one of the major sources that replenish the Russian [currency] reserves, whose amount in times of crisis is especially important for the authorities. That being said, the prices for gas, unlike those for oil, don’t bounce by 5 percent a day. Taking into account the losses from January’s forced down time, even an insignificant reduction in the volume of future purchases is capable of reflecting critically on Gazprom’s incomes.

The parties will already start discussing new volumes, conditions and prices tomorrow. The EU has joined in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in a directive capacity. And Russia’s position at these negotiations doesn’t look quite so strong as it seems at first glance.

translation by theotherrussia.org

The Kremlin has reasoned the move, which would put nuclear-capable missiles deep in Central Europe, as a response to an American missile defense system in Eastern Europe.

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier called the step “the wrong signal at the wrong moment.”

Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner for External Relations, also shared her mind. “It’s a surprise to me,” she said, “a not very pleasant one. Deploying missiles in Kaliningrad won’t contribute to improving security in Europe.”

Eastern European leaders were also clear, describing Medvedev’s proposal as “deplorable,” and “blackmailing.”

“Dmitri Medvedev’s statement is no friendly act,” said Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. “What worries us the most is that earlier we heard such rhetoric from generals, and now we hear it from the President when he delivers his keynote speech.”

Bronislaw Komorowski, the Chairman of the Polish Parliament, sounded more severe: “Now that a new administration has come to power in the US,” he said, “such statements only aggravate the situation. They resemble blackmailing, which no one approves of.”

In one week, the first Russia-EU summit since the August war in the Caucasus will take place in Nice, France. Diplomats had hoped to renew interrupted negotiations on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia. Now, “Old Europe’s” nations, who fought hard to prevent sanctions against Russia, are finding it harder to push for normalizing relations with the Kremlin.

Lithuanian president Valdas Adamkus described Medvedev’s words as contradicting themselves. “He speaks about willingness to jointly confront common challenges and moves his missiles to Kaliningrad to neutralize the U.S. AMD system.”

NATO was also preparing a response to the Kremlin’s firm rhetoric. “Medvedev made a serious and aggressive statement,” a high-level official told Kommersant. “Moscow shouldn’t think that it will get away with it. No one has sought large-scale confrontation so far, but we are going to respond to the President’s words. We just need some time to analyze everything,”

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Read Medvedev’s Complete Address (Eng)

“Russia’s invasion,” he writes, “was the direct result of nearly a decade of Western helplessness and delusion.”

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How the West Fueled Putin’s Sense of Impunity
By GARRY KASPAROV
August 15, 2008; Page A13

Russia’s invasion of Georgia reminded me of a conversation I had three years ago in Moscow with a high-ranking European Union official. Russia was much freer then, but President Vladimir Putin’s onslaught against democratic rights was already underway.

“What would it take,” I asked, “for Europe to stop treating Putin like a democrat? If all opposition parties are banned? Or what if they started shooting people in the street?” The official shrugged and replied that even in such cases, there would be little the EU could do. He added: “Staying engaged will always be the best hope for the people of both Europe and Russia.”

The citizens of Georgia would likely disagree. Russia’s invasion was the direct result of nearly a decade of Western helplessness and delusion. Inexperienced and cautious in the international arena at the start of his reign in 2000, Mr. Putin soon learned he could get away with anything without repercussions from the EU or America.

Russia reverted to a KGB dictatorship while Mr. Putin was treated as an equal at G-8 summits. Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi and Germany’s Gerhardt Schroeder became Kremlin business partners. Mr. Putin discovered democratic credentials could be bought and sold just like everything else. The final confirmation was the acceptance of Dmitry Medvedev in the G-8, and on the world stage. The leaders of the Free World welcomed Mr. Putin’s puppet, who had been anointed in blatantly faked elections.

On Tuesday, French President Nicolas Sarkozy sprinted to Moscow to broker a ceasefire agreement. He was allowed to go through the motions, perhaps as a reward for his congratulatory phone call to Mr. Putin after our December parliamentary “elections.” But just a few months ago Mr. Sarkozy was in Moscow as a supplicant, lobbying for Renault. How much credibility does he really have in Mr. Putin’s eyes?

In reality, Mr. Sarkozy is attempting to remedy a crisis he helped bring about. Last April, France opposed the American push to fast-track Georgia’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership. This was one of many missed opportunities that collectively built up Mr. Putin’s sense of impunity. In this way the G-7 nations aided and abetted the Kremlin’s ambitions.

Georgia blundered into a trap, although its imprudent aggression in South Ossetia was overshadowed by Mr. Putin’s desire to play the strongman. Russia seized the chance to go on the offensive in Georgian territory while playing the victim/hero. Mr. Putin has long been eager to punish Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili for his lack of respect both for Georgia’s old master Russia, and for Mr. Putin personally. (Popular rumor has it that the Georgian president once mocked his peer as “Lilli-Putin.”)

Although Mr. Saakashvili could hardly be called a model democrat, his embrace of Europe and the West is considered a very bad example by the Kremlin. The administrations of the Georgian breakaway areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are stocked, top to bottom, with bureaucrats from the Russian security services.

Throughout the conflict, the Kremlin-choreographed message in the Russian media has been one of hysteria. The news presents Russia as surrounded by enemies on all sides, near and far, and the military intervention in Georgia as essential to protect the lives and interests of Russians. It is also often spoken of as just the first step, with enclaves in Ukraine next on the menu. Attack dogs like Russian nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky are used to test and whip up public opinion. Kremlin-sponsored ultranationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin went on the radio to say Russian forces “should not stop until they are stopped.” The damage done by such rhetoric is very slow to heal.

The conflict also threatens to poison Russia’s relationship with Europe and America for years to come. Can such a belligerent state be trusted as the guarantor of Europe’s energy supply? Republican presidential candidate John McCain has been derided for his strong stance against Mr. Putin, including a proposal to kick Russia out of the G-8. Will his critics now admit that the man they called an antiquated cold warrior was right all along?

The conventional wisdom of Russia’s “invulnerability” serves as an excuse for inaction. President Bush’s belatedly toughened language is welcome, but actual sanctions must now be considered. The Kremlin’s ruling clique has vital interests — i.e. assets — abroad and those interests are vulnerable.

The blood of those killed in this conflict is on the hands of radical nationalists, thoughtless politicians, opportunistic oligarchs and the leaders of the Free World who value gas and oil more than principles. More lives will be lost unless strong moral lines are drawn to reinforce the shattered lines of the map.

Mr. Kasparov, leader of The Other Russia coalition, is a contributing editor of The Wall Street Journal.

In part, the resolution decries the “disproportionate use of force” and violence used against demonstrators during March 3rd opposition protests known as “Marches of Dissent.” It demands that an investigation be mounted, and that those responsible be brought to justice, calling for the release of those protesters still behind bars. The Parliament also regrets the fact that Russia regards an electoral monitoring mission from the OSCE as interference in Russia’s internal affairs, and deplores the “illegal treatment of opposition candidates” in the election.

At its Strasbourg session, MEPs also called on Dmitri Medvedev, in his new capacity as president of the Russian Federation, to review the treatment of imprisoned public figures, including Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, “whose imprisonment has been assessed by most observers as having been politically motivated.”

The resolution was enacted in consideration of “increased pressure on opposition groups and non-governmental organisations to refrain from any activities directed against the president and the government, preventing the media from reporting on any such activities.”

It also notes that “democracy has been weakened in Russia, in particular by the government control of all major TV stations and most radio stations, the spread of self-censorship among the print media, new restrictions on the right to organise public demonstrations and a worsening climate for non-governmental organisations.”

The European Parliament also calls on Russia to foster the necessary conditions to create a new “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” between EU member states and the Russian Federation, commenting that “that respect for the rule of law, democracy and human rights must be an important part of any future agreement with Russia.” The previous agreement expired in 2007.

Read the complete resolution here.