While the history of corruption in Russia is a long one, what’s begun to change is the status of those speaking out against it. Starting with police officer Aleksei Dymovsky in November 2009, who was promptly fired and discredited by the establishment he tried to criticize, more and more whistleblowers with prominent posts have begun to step into public view.

One such figure, whose story has been lost in the flurry of events since Vladimir Putin announced his presidential run in late September, is Sochi Federal Judge Dmitri Novikov. After attempting to bring several of his colleagues to justice for appropriating public land and selling it back to the government for more than $100 million, Novikov found himself the victim of a system that he already knew was overrun by corrupt officials – but never had to face as a defendant.

As Novikov explained during a press conference last November, he was retroactively stripped of his right to immunity as a judge, “which was absurd,” and held in prison for eight months. He was then freed, all charges against him were dropped, and he was reinstated as a judge – not, however, unscathed.

“I am probably the only judge who went from being a judge to being in jail and then becoming a judge again. And what I saw there and understand – if I, a person with a decent amount of experience and a degree, don’t have the strength to fight this machine, then any of you would simply rather die than have this situation happen to you,” Novikov said.

The judge then described the months of dehumanizing torture he sustained while in jail. Among other measures taken, Novikov was made to strip naked during each interrogation, forced into a concrete box to sit under a stream of ice water for up to two hours, confined to small spaces once the doctors learned that he had claustrophobia, and deprived of air conditioning in 130 F temperatures, to the point that blood began to run from his ears. The torture went on despite the hours of testimony that Novikov voluntarily gave, but which investigators ignored and insisted never happened. “Sometimes the interrogations were held altogether without me,” he said in an interview with Express Gazeta.

Novikov’s account of the torture he endured under politically-motivated charges that were eventually thrown out would be frightening enough on its own. What he had to say about the systemic corruption that that all federal judges participate in to obtain their posts was just icing on the cake.

“The position of a judge in Sochi costs up to half a million dollars,” Novikov explained. “And who has the capacity to sell it? What makes up this sum? This sum is the sum that you give to representatives of the qualification college of judges, which ensures that you get elected; it’s the money that you give to the representatives of the president’s regional plenipotentiary, to federal inspectors, all so that your candidacy is passed by the plenipotentiary. You give a little money to the FSB, you give a little money to the procurator, you even give a little money to the presidential administration.”

He went on to explain how most judges in Sochi abuse their positions to make money off of construction ventures.

“Who in the justice system carries this out?” Novikov asked. “It’s clans. It’s clans where the dad is a judge, the mom is a judge, the son is a judge. Our procurator is another son of an investigator. Not long ago, the president passed an incredible measure to make it so that one family can’t have the mom be a judge, the dad be a lawyer, and the son be an investigator. What began to happen? All the families began to get legal divorces. All of them.”

According to Express Gazeta, numerous television executives have been filming Novikov’s story, questioning his friends and acquaintances in the process. Whether or not they help him escape another eight months of torture following a new set of charges brought against him remains to be seen.

Where the Russian justice system has failed to step up to the plate, the Financial Times has taken up the slack:

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Documents from Mr Kolesnikov, together with a Financial Times investigation, help to lift the veil on the history of Bank Rossiya, whose shareholders include several men with close links to Vladimir Putin, Russia’s supreme leader, including the son of his cousin. Yury Kovalchuk and Niko­lai Shamalov, two of its biggest shareholders, were co-founders with Mr Putin of a lakeside dacha enclave outside St Petersburg.

These men from Russia’s second city are seen by many businessmen and bankers as the core of a new generation of Putin-era oligarchs, combining wealth with links to the country’s top leadership just as their predecessors during the Boris Yeltsin years had done. This is despite Mr Putin’s pledge nearly 12 years ago to eliminate oligarchs as a class.

Now that Mr Putin plans to return as president in elections next March, after four years as prime minister under President Dmitry Medvedev, claims of a new system of crony capitalism are under scrutiny.

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The paper trail Mr Kolesnikov has disclosed to the FT appears to show for the first time how two Bank Rossiya shareholders – Mr Shamalov and Dmitry Gorelov, a former KGB colonel – received via an offshore company funds originally donated for equipment for St Petersburg hospitals, just as they bought their bank stakes.

The documents then appear to show that these same funds and offshore companies may have helped finance the first in a string of Bank Rossiya acquisitions of financial assets from Gazprom, the state-controlled gas producer. Some investors allege the deals that followed were quasi-privatisations that helped to drain billions of dollars in value out of a gas group that had come to symbolise Russia’s commodities-fuelled resurgence. Bank Rossiya rejects this as “nonsense”, saying its growth is due to its professional management and successful strategy as a universal bank. The bank’s assets stood at Rbs274bn ($8.9bn) by October 1, up from Rbs6.7bn at the start of 2004 – a compound annual growth rate of more than 60 per cent.

Read the full article at the Financial Times.

On June 22, a small group of protesters stood outside the Moscow mayor’s office holding posters reading “We had a beekeeper for a mayor and now we have a tile layer,” “put a stop to the tile aggression” and “Sobyanin! Enough digging around in the budget money!”

“There are serious grounds to suspect an element of corruption,” said Left Front leader Sergei Udaltsov, present at the protest. “Stones are being laid at a rapid pace, the quality is low, the stones are swelling up, some parts are collapsing.” He called for the work to be temporarily halted until an experiment could be carried out on the tiles.

Police initially tried to detain the protesters, but chose not to in the end.

At the end of this past February, Moscow Vice Mayor Pyotr Biryukov announced plans to tear up 4 million cubic meters of sidewalk pavement and replace it with stone tiles in 2011.

The Russian press explains the mayor’s interest in the project as connected with the fact that his wife, Irina Rubinchik, owns a stone tile business. Whether or not the stones being laid in Moscow were purchased from her company is unclear. But according to Novaya Gazeta, the entire center of Tyumen was laid with stone tiling while Sobyanin was governor of Tyumen Oblast between 2001 and 2005.

While access to the internet itself remains largely unhindered in Russia, many bloggers have come under attack – both online and in person.

In the last two years there have been several cases of technical blocking and numerous cases of content removal. The authorities have also increasingly engaged in harassment of bloggers. At least 25 cases of blogger harassment, including 11 arrests, were registered between January 2009 and May 2010, compared with seven in 2006–08. In addition, dozens of blogs have reportedly been attacked in recent years by a hacker team called the Hell Brigade.

The report did point out areas where access to the internet remains a pressing issue:

The number of internet users jumped from 1.5 million in 1999 to 46.5 million in 2010, and grew by more than 13 million in the last two years, though this still leaves Russia’s penetration rate at 33 percent, lower than the rates in Central European countries. The level of infrastructure differs significantly from place to place, and gaps are evident between urban and rural areas as well as between different types of cities. The worst access conditions can be found in the North Caucasus and the industrial towns of Siberia and the Far East.

Corruption within the federal government also plays a part in what companies control internet access across the country:

Five access providers—Comstar, Vimpelcom, ER-Telecom, AKADO, and the state-owned SvyazInvest—controlled more than 67 percent of the broadband market as of February 2010. Regional branches of SvyazInvest account for 36 percent of subscribers, up from 27.8 percent in 2008. As at the federal level, regional dominance usually depends on political connections and the tacit approval of regional authorities. Although this situation is not the direct result of legal or economic obstacles, it nonetheless reflects an element of corruption that is widespread in the telecommunications sector and other parts of the Russian economy.

Greater concern, however, was focused on blocked online content, particularly opposition-oriented websites.

Although attempts to establish a comprehensive, centralized filtering system have been abandoned, several recent cases of blocking have been reported. In December 2009, a number of ISPs blocked access to the radical Islamist website Kavkaz Center. At almost the same time, the wireless provider Yota blocked several opposition sites. The practice of exerting pressure on service providers and content producers by telephone has become increasingly common. Police and representatives of the prosecutor’s office call the owners and shareholders of websites, and anyone else in a position to remove unwanted material and ensure that the problem does not come up again. Such pressure encourages self-censorship, and most providers do not wait for court orders to remove targeted materials.

…

Content is often removed on the grounds that it violates Russia’s laws against “extremism.” Providers are punished for hosting materials that are proscribed in a list on the website of the Ministry of Justice. The list is updated on a monthly basis and included 748 items as of January 2011. The procedure for identifying extremist materials is nontransparent, leaving ample room for politically motivated content removal. There have been at least three cases of site closures, two of them temporary, on the grounds that the affected sites hosted extremist materials. In February 2010, the major opposition portal Grani.ru was checked for extremism, but the authorities apparently found nothing incriminating.

Among the most disturbing accounts in the report were cases of criminal suits and physical attacks against individual bloggers.

Since January 2009, police and the prosecutor’s office have launched at least 25 criminal cases against bloggers and forum commentators. While some cases were against individuals who posted clearly extremist content, others appear to be more politically motivated. The most severe and widely known sentence was that of Irek Murtazin, a Tatarstan blogger and journalist who received almost two years in prison in November 2009 for defamation.

…

While traditional journalists and activists have faced a series of murders and severe beatings in recent years, physical attacks on Russian bloggers and online activists have so far been comparatively limited. However, one recent event drew significant attention. In November 2010, Oleg Kashin, a reporter for the newspaper Kommersant who was also well known as a blogger, was severely beaten near his home in Moscow. His coverage of protests and political youth movements had prompted vocal responses from pro-Kremlin groups in the past, but it was not known exactly who was responsible for the attack.

Read the report in its entirety by clicking here.

The website cites the newspaper Kommersant, which Ponomarenko spoke to about the sale. The businessman said his holding company had obtained two companies – Lazurnaya Yagoda and Idokopas – that control the incomplete palatial complex.

A source knowledgeable about the deal said it was worth 350 million USD.

Kommersant was unable to reach Shamalov, a personal friend of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the owner Ponomarenko said agreed to sell him the property.

Businessman Sergei Kolesnikov, who first alleged the palace was being built with public money for Putin’s personal use, said the transfer of ownership is only a disguise and the intended purpose of the complex hasn’t changed.

Putin’s press secretary Dmitri Peskov told Kommersant the prime minister had nothing to do with the construction – not while he was president and not in his current position.

“It’s possible that the sellers were influenced by all of this press, I don’t know,” said Ponomarenko. “In general, there’s a rule – buy when there’s a scandal and sell when the news is good.”

For his part, Ponomarenko said he was simply investing money obtained from his $2 billion sale of the Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port last year.

The article did not elaborate on what exactly was meant by the fact that the complex had been sold as a hotel.

Whatever hang-changing the Black Sea palace may go through, strong evidence remains that Putin is somehow involved. Besides the evidence laid out in Kolesnikov’s open letter to President Dmitri Medvedev at the end of last year, documents have emerged showing that Chief Vladimir Kozhin of the Office of Presidential Affairs actually signed the documents authorizing the construction in 2005, when Putin was still president.

The photographs were published by Ruleaks, a group of self-proclaimed “activists from the Pirate Party of Russia and Russian-speaking activists from other Pirate Parties around the world.” The activists organize the translation of classified documents released by Wikileaks into Russian and the publication of those and other materials on the Ruleaks website.

On a page titled “Photographs of ‘Putin’s Palace’ in Praskoveevka on the Black Sea,” several dozen photographs show a gigantic Italian-style villa, complete with colonnades, balconies, and an enclosed park with a fountain. The interior is extravagantly decorated with frescoes, elaborate chandeliers and a wealth of marble and gold trim. The palace appears to be fully furnished and includes a desk bearing the Russian coat of arms; it is identical to the desk in the prime minister’s Novo-Ogaryovo residence.

This is the first time that high-quality photographs of the villa have been published. It was previously visible from satellite imagery and photographs taken from far away, but the building’s high security made it impossible to get up close. The newly-released photographs appear to have been taken by an on-site worker.

Ruleaks underwent a DDoS attack shortly after the photographs went live on January 18, making it temporarily impossible to access the website.

The organization stipulates that it cannot confirm that the residence belongs to Vladimir Putin: “We are not prepared to confirm whose palace this is, we are only publishing photographs of the facility itself.”

The photographs come one month after St. Petersburg businessman Sergei Kolesnikov sent an open letter to Russian President Dmitri Medvedev alleging that a palace “for the personal use of the Prime Minister of Russia” was being built on the Black Sea. “To date this palace costs over $1 billion U.S., mainly through a combination of corruption, bribery and theft.” Kolesnikov goes on to painstakingly detail the corrupt business dealings and theft of state funds that culminated in the creation of this complex. After publishing the letter, Kolesnikov reportedly went abroad and is waiting for the president’s reaction.

The newspaper Vedomosti was able to connect with Kolesnikov and verify his claim to the allegations. Judging by the text of his letter, Kolesnikov is the former business partner of two of Putin’s friends, Nikolai Shamalov and Dmitri Gorelov. The newspaper was able to confirm that Shamalov and Gorelov did indeed have a partner named Sergei Kolesnikov. Formally, the palace belongs to Shamalov, but Kolesnikov asserts that it is intended for the prime minister. “If this palace is Shamalov’s, then why is the state spending its own money to build him roads and electrical lines?” Kolesnikov said to Vedomosti.

Putin’s press secretary, Dmitri Peskov, denied that the prime minister had any connection to the Black Sea complex. Shamalov and Gorelov did not respond to inquiries from Vedomosti.

See the full set of photographs on Ruleaks.net.

Click here for the Sergei Kolesnikov’s letter to the Russian president.

As a group of Russian oppositionists continue to sit out jail sentences received in connection with an unsanctioned rally in defense of free assembly, opposition leader Garry Kasparov warns that the state officials involved in such corrupt and unlawful arrests and convictions will, at some point, have to answer for their crimes.

A Criminal Government
Civil servants will answer to the law for their crimes
By Garry Kasparov
January 3, 2011
Kasparov.ru

Nemtsov – 15 days of administrative arrest. Limonov – 15 days. Kosyakin – 10 days. Yashin – 5 days.

On New Year’s Eve, so-called law enforcement representatives committed criminal offenses against these four citizens of Russia, who were publically expressing their deeply negative attitude towards Putin’s regime. The unlawful arrests on the street, the falsification of charges in the police station, the rubber-stamped court decisions – it’s the entire standard arsenal used by the stooges in the police and the courts, who were installed by the Don and his accomplices to keep order in the “zone.” In this most primitive fashion, these punks, who bust their way into the government, settled scores with their political enemies.

Terrible-looking OMON commanders dutifully fulfill the role of the regime’s cur, ordering their subordinates first to beat defenseless people and then to give false testimony in court. Petty hooliganism, obscene expressions, resistance to police officers, violations of public order – for sure, not one opposition event calling for the observance of the constitution could be held without that. The police know very well that they have nothing to worry about – all the “Judge Danilkins” always guarantee a conviction. To that end, any piece of nonsense from men in uniform is accepted as proof, while any evidence from the defense, including photo and video materials, is rejected.

By the way, judging by the police reaction, everything that happened during the unsanctioned march of football fanatics down Leningradka on December 8 was just peachy. That is to say, there were no hooliganistic antics, violations of public order, or, God forbid, obscene expressions. Yes, and the events of December 11 on Manezhnaya, proceeding from the police’s same logic, did not pose a serious threat to law-abiding citizens – as opposed to the opposition’s provocative gatherings on the 31st.

The criminalization of the state apparatus has reached the highest levels of centralization, in which the thieving government distorts the law and strives to hold onto their loot. Only the “loot,” in this case, is the Russian budget and the natural resources of our country.

And one more thing. On his blog, Ilya Yashin colorfully describes how Officer Dima falsified a police report under pressure from his superiors – that is to say, committed a serious act of professional misconduct without a moment’s thought. It’s interesting to ponder whether all of these Officer “Dimas,” Judge “Danilkins,” and Prosecutor “Lakhtins” think that, one wonderful day, the government of tyrants will ever come to an end in Russia, and a normal judicial system will begin to work, so that they will all have to answer to the law for their crimes. Or are they certain that, even if that time comes, nobody will remember them anyway? Like in 1991…

The editor, Hussein Shadiev, was shot in the shoulder while driving between his office at Serdalo newspaper and his home late on Monday.

Local police say they are still searching for the assailants. “We don’t have any details yet, but we can say that, at the moment when Shadiev was traveling in Nazran down one of the city streets in his automobile, he was shot from an unknown weapon. It’s possible that the shooting was done from a pistol with a suppressor, because nobody heard the shot,” a source from Ingush law enforcement told RIA Novosti.

The source added that the bullet had grazed the editor’s shoulder and he had been hospitalized, but that his life was not in any danger.

“Republic President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov knows about the incident, law enforcement agencies are taking all necessary measures to establish the circumstances of the incident and to carry out an investigation,” acting presidential press secretary Bers Yevloyev told Kommersant newspaper. In his words, it was too early to say anything detailed about the attack. “In my recollection this is probably the first case where local journalists have been attacked,” said Yevloyev.

Shadiev’s colleagues say the attack could have been a reaction to an anti-corruption article published in the newspaper. “Yes, we didn’t carry out our own journalistic investigation, we don’t have the strength for that, but we gave publicity to incidents of corruption that were uncovered by law enforcement agencies, and somebody may not have liked that,” said Serdalo editorial deputy Yakub Sultygov.

On Monday night, the victim, Mikhail Vinyukov, explained the situation to a correspondent with the Kasparov.ru news portal. Vinyukov says he was walking to the store around 9 pm that night when an adult man came up and began whacking him with an metal bar for no ostensible reason. Vinyukov initially managed to fight back, but another man with a metal bar then approached him from behind and began hitting him over the head. The rights advocate eventually managed to escape and ran to a hotel and office complex, where an ambulance was called for him.

Vinyukov was admitted to the hospital and diagnosed with “a concussion, a closed head injury, contusions and lacerations of the scalp,” as well as puncture wounds near his shoulder and bruises and lacerations on both legs, according to trauma nurse Mira Kheyshkho. The rights advocate was told he would have to remain hospitalized for an extended period of time.

Additionally, Vinyukov’s mother said that she was called after the attack by an unknown man who asked where her son was.

The activist said he believes that the attack was “organized by a criminal gang” that is working “against those who hinder corruption within government agencies” in the area.

Mikhail Vinyukov is the head of the local Public Service for the Defense of the Rights and Interests of Citizens. About two months ago, he was threatened with murder after releasing an audio recording of a conversation between the city’s resort service and tourism department head, Vladimir Shiroky, and the director of the Lazarevsky Otdykh tourism company, Gavina Panaetova. The recording resulted in Shiroky’s arrest on August 26 for taking bribes from Panaetova.

The recording itself was later posted on the website of well-known whistleblower cop Aleksei Dymovsky. It was recorded by accident when a local resident, sitting in a park near the Lazarevsky Otdykh building, overheard the conversation while making a recording of nature sounds. Dymovsky said the attack on Vinyukov was no doubt “an ordered crime. People don’t just attack people with iron bars. The task was either to kill him or cripple him.”

A host of social activists expressed certainty that the attack on Vinyukov was connected with his efforts to fight corruption, which has risen as a result of preparations for the upcoming 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi.

Valery Suchkov, founder of the Public Assembly of Sochi, said that Vinyukov’s attack was extremely similar to other recent attacks on anti-corruption public figures. “The cases known to the whole public of reprisals against Communist Party Deputy Lyudmila Shestak, Mestnaya newspaper Editor-in-Chief Arkady Landerov, and now the case of human rights advocate Mikhail Vinyukov, speak to the fact that these attacks were ordered,” he said. “Moreover, all the crimes have the same signature. The public must demand that both the perpetrator and the person who ordered the attack be found, and the situation be put under public control.”

In the organization’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, Russia’s transparency rating fell from last year’s 2.2 to 2.1, on a scale of 0.0 (”highly corrupt”) to 10.0 (”very clean”). Additionally, it’s country ranking fell from 146 out of 180 countries to 154 out of 178 countries, landing between Papua New Guinea and Tajikistan.

Within Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Russia was ranked 16 out of 20, with the only countries more corrupt listed as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

The organization estimates that the market for corruption in Russia is worth $300 billion a year.

While authors of the report did not comment on individual countries, they advised overall that “governments need to integrate anti-corruption measures in all spheres, from their responses to the financial crisis and climate change to commitments by the international community to eradicate poverty” in order to combat corruption.

Political commentator Anton Orekh responded to the report by saying that Russia would continue to fall in the ratings “until honest people become the most powerful ones in the country.”

“To say it plainly, take away the bureaucrats’ unlimited authorities, leave them with only the most necessary functions, and you will defeat corruption,” said Orekh. “Because corruption is the way of life for parasites, and our bureaucrats have become precisely parasites.”

The countries ranked in the report as the most transparent were Denmark, New Zealand, and Singapore, while Somalia, Myanmar, and Afghanistan were seen as the most corrupt. The United States came in at 22nd place, and China at 78th.

Transparency International noted that since “corruption – whether frequency or amount – is to a great extent a hidden activity that is difficult to measure,” the level of the perception of corruption in any given country was chosen as a telling alternative. “Over time, perceptions have proved to be a reliable estimate of corruption,” says the organization.